Cognitivism holds that moral statements express beliefs or propositions that can be true or false. Non-cognitivism holds that moral statements primarily express attitudes, emotions, or prescriptions, so they are not literally truth-apt.
The Central Difference
Consider the moral statement, “Stealing is wrong.” A cognitivist interprets this as making a claim about morality. A non-cognitivist interprets it as performing another function, such as condemning stealing or directing people not to steal.
| Issue | Cognitivism | Non-cognitivism |
|---|---|---|
| What moral statements express | Beliefs or propositions | Attitudes, emotions, commitments, or prescriptions |
| Truth value | Truth-apt: capable of being true or false | Not literally true or false |
| “Stealing is wrong” means | Stealing has the property of wrongness, or satisfies some condition for being wrong | “Boo to stealing!” or “Do not steal!” |
| Example theories | Moral realism, ethical subjectivism, error theory | Emotivism, prescriptivism |
| Moral disagreement | Usually a disagreement in belief | Often a conflict of attitudes or prescriptions |
Under emotivism, associated with A. J. Ayer, moral language expresses approval or disapproval. “Generosity is good” functions approximately like “Hooray for generosity!” Under prescriptivism, associated with R. M. Hare, it functions more like a universal command: “Be generous.”
A common misconception is that all cognitivists believe objective moral facts exist. This is false. Error theory is cognitivist because moral statements attempt to describe moral facts and are therefore truth-apt, but it argues that all positive moral claims are false because no such moral properties exist. Similarly, ethical subjectivism can be cognitivist if moral statements have truth conditions based on a person’s attitudes.
Exam Technique
In an IB Philosophy response, define both positions through the concepts of meaning and truth-aptness, then apply them to the same moral statement. For evaluation, consider whether non-cognitivism adequately explains moral reasoning and genuine disagreement, and whether cognitivism can justify the moral facts or truth conditions it claims moral statements represent.
