IB Philosophy 10.12.5 Moral Autonomy and Responsibility Notes

Self-Regarding and Other-Regarding Actions

Foundations of Moral Autonomy

1. John Stuart Mill argues in On Liberty that genuine moral character requires moral autonomy (the ability to make ethical choices based on your own reasoning, not just rules imposed from outside). This links his defence of individual freedom to a broader theory of moral responsibility.
   1. A person who acts rightly only because they fear punishment or social disapproval has not achieved moral autonomy.
2. Mill's distinction between self-regarding actions (choices that mainly affect only you) and other-regarding actions (choices that affect others) is the foundation of his account of moral responsibility.
   1. Other-regarding actions affect the interests of others and may therefore be subject to moral evaluation and, in serious cases, legal regulation. This distinction determines the scope and limits of moral accountability.
3. In the domain of self-regarding conduct, Mill argues the individual has full authority over their own choices. Society may advise or urge a different course, but it may not compel.
   1. Even when an individual's choices are unwise or self-destructive, the moral cost of overriding them outweighs any benefit. Interfering treats the person as a child rather than a rational moral agent (someone capable of reasoning and deciding for themselves).
4. For other-regarding actions, Mill recognises a fuller range of moral and legal accountability. When a person's conduct causes definite harm to the interests of others, society is justified in holding them responsible through moral censure, legal penalty, or both.
   1. Mill's harm principle (10.12.1) sets the test: only conduct that damages identifiable interests of specific people justifies holding someone externally accountable.
5. Mill's account of moral autonomy draws on the Kantian tradition (the view that morality is grounded in rational duty) while transforming it. Like Immanuel Kant, Mill holds that genuine morality requires acting from your own rational convictions, not from external compulsion.

Graduated Responsibility and Positive Obligations

1. However, Mill rejects Kant's categorical imperative (the rule that you should act only on principles you could universalise) in favour of a utilitarian standard: the autonomous moral agent decides what is right by considering the consequences of their actions for human happiness.

1. Mill argues that moral responsibility is proportional to the degree of voluntary choice involved. A person who harms others through negligence bears less responsibility than one who acts deliberately, and a person whose harmful conduct results from circumstances beyond their control may bear little responsibility at all.
   1. This graduated account (the idea that blame scales up or down with how freely you chose) connects to broader philosophical debates about free will and determinism (1.6.1).
2. Moral competence (the set of mental capacities needed to make genuine moral choices) is central to Mill's framework. He argues that moral autonomy presupposes three things: the ability to reason about consequences, to weigh competing interests, and to act on your own judgement.
   1. Individuals who lack these capacities, including children and those with severe cognitive impairments, are not fully autonomous agents and may legitimately be subject to paternalistic protection (intervention for their own good, rather than as punishment).
3. Mill's account implies that moral education should aim at developing autonomous judgement rather than imposing fixed rules. The morally educated person understands why certain actions are right or wrong, not merely that they are prescribed or forbidden.
   1. This connects to his defence of individuality (10.12.2): moral development, like intellectual development, requires active engagement rather than passive conformity.
4. Mill recognises duties of positive obligation (duties to actively help others, not just refrain from harming them) alongside the negative duty not to harm. He argues that individuals can be required to give evidence in court, contribute to the common defence, and rescue people in danger when this can be done without undue risk.
   1. Failing to fulfil these positive duties is a form of harm through omission (causing harm by doing nothing, rather than by acting), for which the individual is morally and potentially legally responsible.