IB Philosophy 3.2.3 Theories of Justification Key Definitions

Coherentism is a theory of epistemic justification holding that a belief is justified not by resting on a foundation but by cohering with the wider system of beliefs one already holds, so that mutual support among beliefs replaces the need for self-evident starting points. Critics object that a perfectly coherent set of beliefs could still be entirely divorced from reality, since coherence alone cannot guarantee truth.

Epistemic justification is the property of a belief that makes it reasonable or rationally held. Within the justified true belief framework, justification distinguishes knowledge from lucky guesses by providing the reasons, evidence, or reliable processes that support a belief's claim to truth.

Foundationalism is a theory of epistemic justification that addresses the regress problem by positing that some beliefs are self-evident or incorrigible, requiring no further justification, and that all other justified beliefs ultimately rest on this secure foundation. The view, associated with Descartes and classical empiricists, faces the challenge of identifying which beliefs genuinely qualify as foundational and whether they can bear the weight placed on them.

In the philosophy of the Indian thinker Bhartrhari, pratibha refers to a form of direct, intuitive understanding or flash of insight that grasps meaning holistically, prior to and distinct from propositional analysis. It challenges Western epistemology's focus on propositional knowledge ('knowing that').

Reliabilism is an externalist theory of justification holding that a belief is justified if it is produced by a cognitive process that reliably generates true beliefs. The believer need not be aware of the process's reliability for the belief to count as justified.