IB Philosophy 6. Philosophy of Science Key Definitions

the libertarian view of self-originating causal power, holding that rational agents can initiate causal chains not fully determined by prior events or laws of nature. Unlike mere event causation, where one event mechanically produces another, agent causation holds that persons are genuine originating causes of their actions.

a model of scientific research characterised by large-scale funding, institutional collaboration, and international coordination, exemplified by projects such as the Manhattan Project and the Human Genome Project. Big science raises philosophical questions about resource allocation, paradigm entrenchment, and the distribution of scientific benefits across societies.

Biochemical reductionism holds that all biological phenomena, including consciousness, emotion, and selfhood, can be fully explained as chemical interactions between molecules. On this account, the self is nothing more than the product of neurotransmitter activity, hormonal regulation, and genetic expression.

Biosemiotics is an interdisciplinary framework proposing that the defining feature of life is sign activity, the capacity of organisms to interpret, produce, and respond to signs in their environment. On this view, the self is a semiotic process of ongoing meaning-making rather than a substance or a bundle of biochemical reactions.

Causal determinism is the thesis that the state of the universe at any given moment, together with the laws of nature, uniquely determines every subsequent state. In its Laplacean form, if a hypothetical intelligence knew every particle's position and momentum, it could predict the entire future of the universe, including every human decision.

Causality is the relation between events in which one event (the cause) brings about or necessitates another (the effect), a concept fundamental to scientific explanation, moral responsibility, and everyday reasoning.

Compatibilism is the philosophical position that determinism and free will are compatible. Free will, on this view, requires not the ability to have done otherwise in a strict causal sense, but the ability to act in accordance with one's own reasons and rational deliberation, unimpeded by external constraint.

Consciousness: the state of subjective awareness in which an individual experiences thoughts, sensations, and perceptions with a first-person, qualitative character: the 'what it is like' quality of mental life.

In Hume's philosophy, constant conjunction refers to the regular succession of two types of events where one is always followed by the other. In his regularity theory, this repeated pattern of observed co-occurrence is all that causation amounts to, with no deeper necessary connection between cause and effect.

Constitutive values are values internal to scientific practice that define what counts as good science, including empirical accuracy, consistency, and explanatory scope. These values guide theory choice and methodology and are widely accepted as essential to scientific inquiry.

Contextual values are values external to science that originate in the broader social, moral, or political environment in which research is conducted. The value-free ideal demands these be excluded from scientific reasoning, though Helen Longino argues they inevitably shape the background assumptions scientists bring to their work.

The deductive-nomological model, developed by Carl Hempel, explains an event by showing that it follows logically from general laws and specific initial conditions. If the laws and conditions are true, the event to be explained must occur as a deductive consequence.

The demarcation problem is the philosophical question of what criteria distinguish genuine scientific theories from pseudo-scientific claims, non-scientific beliefs, and other forms of inquiry.

one of Robert Merton's four norms of science, holding that scientists should pursue knowledge without personal gain or self-interest as a motive. Critics argue that disinterestedness is insufficient as a moral standard, since a scientist may act without personal bias yet still bear moral culpability for failing to consider the harmful applications of their findings.

the view, associated with Patricia Churchland, that folk-psychological concepts such as belief, desire, and the self are radically false and will ultimately be replaced by more precise neuroscientific vocabulary, much as the concept of phlogiston was eliminated by modern chemistry. If eliminative materialism is correct, the hard problem of consciousness may dissolve rather than be solved.

Emergence is the position that higher-level properties such as consciousness and selfhood arise from the complex organisation of simpler parts but cannot be predicted or explained solely from knowledge of those parts. Emergentists accept a physical basis for the self while denying that it reduces to lower-level chemistry.

Falsificationism is the view, developed by Karl Popper, that a theory is scientific if and only if it makes predictions that could, in principle, be shown to be false through observation or experiment.

Functionalism is a theory of mind holding that mental states are defined by their causal roles rather than by the physical substrate that realises them. According to this theory, what makes something a mental state is the functional role it performs in mediating inputs, outputs, and other mental states, not whether it occurs in neurons or silicon.

The hard problem of consciousness is David Chalmers' term for the question of why physical brain processes give rise to subjective experience at all, as distinct from the easier problems of explaining how the brain processes information and controls behaviour.

Induction is the method of reasoning that moves from particular observations to general conclusions, as when repeated instances of a phenomenon lead us to formulate a universal law. Hume famously argued that induction cannot be rationally justified without circularity, since any defence of induction presupposes the very uniformity of nature it seeks to establish, a problem that remains central to the philosophy of science.

Informed consent is a foundational principle of research ethics requiring that participants voluntarily agree to take part in a study after receiving clear information about its nature, risks, and purpose. Established by the Nuremberg Code (1947), it affirms that the autonomy and dignity of research subjects must be respected regardless of the potential benefits.

the pre-reflective, immediate sense of being a subject of experience, including the sense of ownership (this body is mine) and sense of agency (I am acting). Identified by Shaun Gallagher, the minimal self is present before any conscious self-reflection and is more basic than the narrative self.

Moral responsibility is the status of being worthy of praise or blame for one's actions, typically requiring that the agent acted freely, with knowledge of what they were doing, and with the capacity to have done otherwise.

the richer, autobiographical layer of personal identity formed by weaving memories, intentions, and social roles into a coherent life story. Daniel Dennett describes it as a "centre of narrative gravity": not a real entity inside the brain but an abstract point around which our self-stories converge, raising the question of whether the narrative self is a genuine feature of reality or a useful fiction.