| Front | Back | | --- | --- | | What is the standard philosophical definition of moral responsibility, and what does it typically require? | The status of being worthy of praise or blame for one's actions. It typically requires that the agent acted freely, with knowledge of their actions, and with the capacity to have done otherwise. | | What is Immanuel Kant's view on the relationship between personhood and moral responsibility? | Kant argues that persons are fundamentally rational moral agents. It is our capacity for moral autonomy (giving ourselves moral laws through reason) that separates us from mere things and defines our personhood. | | Identify Kant's three necessary conditions for an agent to be held morally responsible for an action. |

The agent must act freely (without external compulsion).
The agent must have knowledge of what they are doing.
The agent must have the capacity to have done otherwise.

| | How does Aristotle distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions in relation to moral responsibility? |

Voluntary actions: Performed with knowledge and without external compulsion; these deserve praise or blame.
Involuntary actions: Performed in ignorance or under coercion; these deserve pardon or pity.

| | What does Aristotle's example of a sailor throwing cargo overboard during a storm illustrate about moral responsibility? | It illustrates a mixed action. It is voluntary in the specific context (the sailor chose it to survive) but involuntary in the abstract (no one would normally choose it), showing that responsibility can admit of degrees. | | What is Jean-Paul Sartre's view on moral responsibility, and how does he view the appeal to determinism (such as upbringing)? | Sartre argues we are radically free and therefore radically responsible for our actions and character. Appealing to circumstances or upbringing to excuse our choices is dismissed as bad faith. | | What is the problem of marginal cases when moral agency is used as the defining feature of personhood? | If moral agency defines personhood, then beings who lack moral reasoning, such as infants, individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, or those with advanced dementia, would fail to qualify as persons. | | How does Kwasi Wiredu use the Akan philosophical tradition to resolve the problem of marginal cases regarding infants? | Wiredu argues that personhood is not a binary status but a matter of degrees earned through moral development. An infant is not a non-person, but a developing being on the spectrum of personhood. | | Compare the potentiality argument for infant personhood with Peter Singer's utilitarian objection. |

Potentiality argument: Infants are persons because they have the inherent potential to develop moral agency.
Singer's objection: Potential is not actuality; a potential president does not have the rights of an actual president. Singer focuses instead on current sentience.

| | How does the relational view of personhood (associated with Confucius) account for the personhood of infants? | It holds that personhood is not an individual capacity, but a status conferred by relationships of care, recognition, and social roles. Infants are persons because they are embedded in these networks. | | What is the cluster concept of personhood, and how does it explain marginal cases? | It defines personhood by a set of overlapping features (rationality, language, emotions) with no single necessary feature. Marginal cases are hard because they satisfy some features of the cluster but not others. | | Why does hard determinism threaten the traditional concept of moral responsibility? | Hard determinism claims all events and actions are causally determined by prior events. If true, no agent could have done otherwise, which eliminates the freedom required for moral responsibility. | | How do Benjamin Libet's neuroscience experiments challenge the traditional concept of moral responsibility? | Libet showed that brain activity associated with a decision begins hundreds of milliseconds before the subject is consciously aware of choosing, suggesting that conscious free will may be an illusion. | | How do compatibilists (such as David Hume) reconcile determinism with moral responsibility? | They argue that an action is free and responsible as long as the agent acted according to their own desires and values without external coercion, even if those desires were causally determined. | | Explain Harry Frankfurt's distinction between first-order and second-order desires in relation to moral responsibility. |

First-order desire: A desire for a thing, such as wanting to smoke.
Second-order desire: A desire about a desire, such as wanting to not want to smoke.
Responsibility: Exists when an agent acts on desires they reflectively endorse.

| | How does P.F. Strawson ground moral responsibility in his essay Freedom and Resentment? | He grounds it in our reactive attitudes (natural emotional responses like resentment, gratitude, and indignation) that are vital to interpersonal relationships, rather than in metaphysical proofs of free will. | | According to P.F. Strawson, what causes us to shift from a 'reactive attitude' to an 'objective attitude'? | When we learn that an agent was subject to circumstances beyond their control, such as a severe illness or mental incapacity, we stop holding them personally responsible and view them as subject to circumstances. | | How does the legal concept of diminished responsibility align with Kwasi Wiredu's framework of personhood? | Both reject a strict binary and acknowledge that moral agency and responsibility exist on a spectrum rather than being all-or-nothing. | | In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant argues that persons are rational moral agents whose capacity for moral autonomy gives them unique dignity. | In Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant argues that persons are rational moral agents whose capacity for moral autonomy gives them unique dignity. | | Jean-Paul Sartre argues that denying our radical freedom by blaming our circumstances is an act of bad faith, because we always remain free to interpret and respond to those circumstances. | Jean-Paul Sartre argues that denying our radical freedom by blaming our circumstances is an act of bad faith, because we always remain free to interpret and respond to those circumstances. | | While hard determinism claims that causal determination rules out moral responsibility, compatibilism argues that responsibility is preserved if actions align with the agent's internal desires. | While hard determinism claims that causal determination rules out moral responsibility, compatibilism argues that responsibility is preserved if actions align with the agent's internal desires. |

1. Being human6 subtopics

2. Aesthetics3 subtopics

3. Epistemology3 subtopics

4. Ethics3 subtopics

5. Philosophy of religion3 subtopics

6. Philosophy of science3 subtopics

7. Political philosophy3 subtopics

8. Social philosophy3 subtopics

9. HL extension: Philosophy and contemporary issues3 subtopics

10. Prescribed philosophical texts12 subtopics

IB Philosophy 1.4.3 Moral Responsibility Flashcards