| Front | Back | | --- | --- | | What is Descartes' conceivability argument for substance dualism? |

He can clearly and distinctly conceive of his mind existing without his body.
What is clearly and distinctly conceivable is metaphysically possible (guaranteed by a non-deceiving God).
Therefore, mind and body are distinct substances.

| | What is Descartes' indivisibility argument for substance dualism? |

The body (res extensa) is extended and divisible (e.g., losing a limb does not destroy the self).
The mind (res cogitans) is non-extended and indivisible (one cannot have half a thought or half a consciousness).

| | Compare Descartes' concepts of res cogitans and res extensa. |

Res cogitans (mind): Non-extended, indivisible, and conscious.
Res extensa (body/matter): Extended in space, infinitely divisible, and lacks consciousness.

| | What is Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia's interaction objection to substance dualism? |

If mind and body are entirely different substances with no shared properties, they cannot causally interact.
Yet, everyday experience shows clear mind-body causal interaction (e.g., mental decisions causing physical movements).

| | How did Descartes attempt to solve the interaction problem physically, and what is the primary objection to this? |

He proposed the pineal gland as the physical point of interaction in the brain.
Objection: This merely relocates the problem, failing to explain how a non-extended mind interacts with a physical gland.

| | What is Descartes' 'primitive notion' response to Elisabeth, and how does it undermine substance dualism? |

He argued the mind-body union is a primitive notion understood through lived experience rather than intellect.
This undermines dualism by introducing a third irreducible concept, violating his two-substance ontology.

| | Compare how Malebranche and Leibniz resolved the mind-body interaction problem. |

Malebranche (Occasionalism): Mind and body do not interact; God directly causes a physical/mental event to correlate with the other.
Leibniz (Pre-established Harmony): Mind and body run in parallel like two coordinated clocks, pre-synchronized by God.

| | What is Gilbert Ryle's 'category mistake' critique of Cartesian dualism? |

Descartes wrongly treats the mind as a hidden physical-like entity (a 'ghost in the machine').
In reality, 'mind' refers to patterns of behavior and behavioral dispositions, not a separate substance.

| | How does Gilbert Ryle use the Oxford University analogy to critique substance dualism? |

A visitor sees colleges and libraries, then asks 'where is the university?', failing to realize the university is how the parts are organized.
Similarly, dualists treat 'mind' as an extra substance rather than the organization of behavioral patterns.

| | What is the physicalist Identity Theory of mind, and how does it view mental states? |

Mental states are identical to brain states.
For example, the subjective experience of pain is nothing more than a specific pattern of neural firing.

| | How does property dualism differ from Cartesian substance dualism? |

Substance dualism: Mind and body are two entirely different substances.
Property dualism: There is only one physical substance, but it has both physical and non-physical properties (like consciousness).

| | What is David Chalmers' 'hard problem of consciousness'? |

The problem of explaining why physical brain processes (like C-fibres firing) give rise to subjective, felt experiences (qualia).
It asks why there is a 'what it is like' to have experiences instead of mere information processing.

| | What is the epiphenomenalism objection to property dualism? |

If subjective experiences (qualia) are non-physical, they have no causal power over the physical world.
This makes consciousness a causally idle 'extra' bystander that cannot explain physical behavior.

| | How does functionalism define mental states, and how does it avoid substance dualism? |

It defines mental states by their causal roles (what causes them and what they cause) rather than physical makeup.
It avoids dualism because these roles can be realized by physical systems (like brains or computers).

| | How does A.J. Ayer's verification principle critique Cartesian substance dualism? |

Claims about a non-physical substance cannot be empirically tested.
Therefore, the concept of a non-physical mind is cognitively meaningless, dissolving the mind-body problem.

| | Compare the Confucian view of the person with Cartesian substance dualism. |

Cartesianism: Splits the human into a sharp division of physical body and non-physical mind.
Confucianism: Views the person as an integrated whole, where moral growth requires both physical practice and reflection.

| | Philosopher Gilbert Ryle coined the term "ghost in the machine" to critique Cartesian dualism, arguing it commits a category mistake. | Philosopher Gilbert Ryle coined the term "ghost in the machine" to critique Cartesian dualism, arguing it commits a category mistake. | | To argue for property dualism, David Chalmers formulates the hard problem of consciousness, highlighting that subjective experience resists physical reduction. | To argue for property dualism, David Chalmers formulates the hard problem of consciousness, highlighting that subjective experience resists physical reduction. | | In Cartesian metaphysics, the mind is defined as res cogitans (thinking, non-extended substance), while the body is res extensa (extended, divisible substance). | In Cartesian metaphysics, the mind is defined as res cogitans (thinking, non-extended substance), while the body is res extensa (extended, divisible substance). |

IB Philosophy 10.3.5 Mind–body Dualism Flashcards

1. Being human6 subtopics

2. Aesthetics3 subtopics

3. Epistemology3 subtopics

4. Ethics3 subtopics

5. Philosophy of religion3 subtopics

6. Philosophy of science3 subtopics

7. Political philosophy3 subtopics

8. Social philosophy3 subtopics

9. HL extension: Philosophy and contemporary issues3 subtopics

10. Prescribed philosophical texts12 subtopics