IB Philosophy 10.6.4 the Self and Vulnerability Notes

Rethinking the Self: From Autonomy to Vulnerability

1. Martha Nussbaum's Creating Capabilities challenges a deeply rooted assumption in Western philosophy: that the self is fundamentally an autonomous, independent rational agent (a free, self-sufficient individual whose thinking and choices are entirely their own). The capabilities approach, as outlined in 10.6.1 through 10.6.3, rests on a different picture of the self, one that takes vulnerability and dependency as central features of the human condition.
2. The tradition in modern philosophy, running from Descartes (10.3) through Kant to contemporary social contract theory, treats the self as rational subject capable of independent thought and action. Nussbaum argues that this picture is dangerously incomplete because it ignores the degree to which every human being depends on others throughout life.
3. Vulnerability is not a deficiency or an accident; it is a constitutive feature of human existence. Every person passes through periods of infancy, illness, and old age in which they cannot function without the care of others.
   1. Others live with permanent disabilities that require ongoing support. A just society must be built around this reality, not around a fiction of self-sufficiency.
4. This connects directly to the Core Theme of Being Human (Unit 1). The question "what does it mean to be human?" receives a distinctive answer from Nussbaum: to be human is to be a needy, embodied, social creature whose flourishing depends on material conditions, relationships, and institutional support.
5. Nussbaum draws on Aristotle's insight that human beings are political animals (zoon politikon): creatures who can only achieve their full potential within a community. Unlike Hobbes, who views the social contract as an escape from a dangerous state of nature, Nussbaum sees sociality as intrinsic to what we are.

Affiliation and Relational Freedom

1. The concept of affiliation (one of the ten central capabilities listed in 10.6.2) is central here. Affiliation includes both the capacity to live with and toward others and the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation.
   1. Without affiliation, other capabilities lose much of their value, revealing how deeply interdependent the capabilities are with one another.
2. This resonates with the IB theme of relations to others (1.2.3) and the self and the Other (1.2). Nussbaum rejects the solipsistic picture of the self (critiqued in 1.2.2) and instead presents a relational self: a self that is constituted in part by its connections with others.
3. Dependency is not the opposite of agency; it is a condition within which agency is exercised. A child depends on caregivers, but within that relationship the child develops the capacities for practical reason and emotional attachment that will define their adult life.
   1. Nussbaum insists that acknowledging dependency does not diminish human dignity; it enriches our understanding of it.
4. For IB students, this reframing of the self has significant implications for debates about freedom and determinism (1.6.1). If the self is fundamentally vulnerable and interdependent, then freedom cannot mean complete independence from others.
   1. Instead, freedom means having the capabilities to function well within a network of social relationships.

The Challenge to Social Contract Theory

1. Nussbaum argues in Frontiers of Justice (2006) that the social contract tradition systematically excludes the most vulnerable members of society. Classical contract theorists assume that parties to the contract are roughly equal in power and rationality, which means that those who do not meet this standard are left outside the scope of justice.
2. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all model the social contract as an agreement among competent adults who can negotiate and enforce terms. People with severe cognitive disabilities, who may not be able to participate in such negotiations, are implicitly excluded from the original position.
3. John Rawls's Theory of Justice (1971) represents the most sophisticated contract theory. However, even Rawls assumes that parties behind the veil of ignorance are "fully cooperating members of society over a complete life." This excludes those whose disabilities prevent them from meeting the threshold of "full cooperation."
4. Nussbaum identifies three groups systematically excluded by contract theories: people with disabilities, non-human animals, and citizens of less powerful nations who lack bargaining power in international relations. The capabilities approach addresses all three by grounding justice in dignity rather than in the capacity to negotiate.
5. The inclusion of disability is philosophically significant. Nussbaum argues that cognitive disability does not diminish a person's inherent dignity or their entitlement to capabilities.
   1. A person with severe intellectual disability still possesses the capability of affiliation, play, and bodily integrity, even if these capabilities are exercised differently than in typical cases.
6. This argument draws on the work of Eva Feder Kittay, whose Love's Labor (1999) argues that dependency relationships (especially caregiving, the work of looking after others) are at the heart of human social life and deserve recognition in theories of justice. Kittay criticises Rawls for treating dependency as a marginal case rather than a universal human experience.