IB Philosophy 10.5.2 Master Morality Vs. Slave Morality Notes

Master Morality and Noble Values

1. The First Essay of On the Genealogy of Morality asks a deceptively simple question: where did the concepts of "good" and "evil" come from? Using the genealogical method introduced in 10.5.1, Nietzsche traces these moral concepts back to two fundamentally different origins, producing two radically different moral systems: master morality and slave morality.
2. Master morality originates with the noble, powerful, and ruling classes of ancient societies. The nobles called themselves and their actions "good" as a spontaneous expression of self-affirmation.
   1. "Good" meant noble, strong, beautiful, healthy, and life-affirming (embracing life's vitality and excellence). The term was not a moral judgment in the modern sense but a declaration of rank and excellence.
3. In master morality, the opposite of "good" is not "evil" but "bad" (schlecht). "Bad" simply means common, low, plebeian, or weak.
   1. It carries no moral condemnation; it is a descriptive term indicating social inferiority. The noble person does not hate or fear the weak; they simply regard them as beneath notice.
4. Nietzsche supports this claim with etymological evidence (evidence from the historical origins of words). He traces the word "good" in multiple languages back to concepts of nobility and social rank. In Greek, "esthlos" (good, noble) relates to aristocratic status.
   1. In Latin, "bonus" derives from an older word meaning warrior. These linguistic origins reveal that moral vocabulary began as vocabulary of social hierarchy.
5. The noble type who creates master morality is characterized by self-reverence, a sense of abundance, and what Nietzsche calls "pathos of distance": the feeling of being fundamentally different from and superior to the common person. This is not petty arrogance but a creative self-assurance that generates values from its own fullness rather than in reaction to others.

The Noble Type and Active Valuation

1. Master morality is active and affirmative. The noble person says "I am good" first, and only then, as an afterthought, notes that others are "bad."
   1. The primary gesture is self-affirmation, not negation of others. This distinction between active and reactive valuation is central to Nietzsche's entire moral psychology.
2. Nietzsche identifies ancient Greek aristocratic culture as a paradigmatic example of master morality. The Homeric heroes (Achilles, Odysseus) valued strength, courage, beauty, and excellence (arete, the Greek word for excellence or virtue in the sense of living up to one's full potential).
   1. They did not measure themselves against a universal moral standard but affirmed their own vital power as the basis of value.
3. The noble person, in Nietzsche's account, has a healthy relationship to enemies. The master type requires worthy opponents; enemies are respected rather than hated.
   1. Nietzsche contrasts this with the slavish attitude toward enemies, which is characterized by deep resentment and the desire for revenge, a point he develops through the concept of ressentiment.
4. For IB Philosophy students, master morality challenges the assumption that morality is essentially about concern for others. In the noble framework, the primary moral relationship is with oneself: being worthy of one's own admiration.
   1. This connects to debates about virtue ethics (4.1.2), where the character of the agent, not the consequences of actions, is morally central.