Source I

An extract from a memoir, written in 1931, by Ubukata Toshiro, a journalist-novelist, who was a teenager at the start of the Sino-Japanese War.

... Everybody agreed that it would be very difficult to capture Pyongyang, since the city held huge British cannons. However, in August, the Japanese army overpowered Pyongyang with so little effort that it almost was disappointing - and the Japanese people were enraptured. My home town had no telephone system back then. News of victories came to the police before the newspaper received it, thanks to a telegraph line between the post office and police station. All news was put upon the message board in front of the police station, and we children ran to check it several times a day. The excitement of the Japanese people was beyond imagination. After all, C hina was thirty times as big as Japan, and its population was over 200 million, compared t o o u r 30 million. It had such a competent leader in Li Hongzhang ... and this was our first war with a foreign country, a country supported moreover by the British. Everyone - adults, children, the aged, the women - talked about war and nothing else, day and night ... no one ever had been as happy as when we learned of the fall of Pyongyang ...

Source J

A Japanese artist depicts Chinese officials surrendering to naval officers in 1895

Source K

An extract from Japanese government official Hayashi, written in June 1895 following the Triple Intervention.

We must continue to study and make use of Western methods ... If new warships are considered necessary we must, at any cost, build them; if the organisation of our army is inadequate we must start rectifying it from now; if need be, our entire military system must be changed. At present Japan must keep calm and sit tight, so as to lull suspicions nurtured against her; during this time the foundations of her national power must be consolidated; and we must watch and wait for the opportunity in the Orient that will surely come one day. When this day arrives Japan will decide her own fate; and she will be able not only to put into their place the powers who seek to meddle in her affairs; she will even be able, should this be necessary, to meddle in their affairs.

Source L

John Hunter B oyle. Modern Japan: The American Nexus ( 1993 ).

Speaking for many of his countrymen, journalist Tokutomi wrote that the Triple Intervention was to transform him psychologically and dominate the rest of this life . "Say what you will, it had happened because we weren't strong enough. What it came down to was that sincerity and justice didn't amount to a thing if you weren't strong enough." Japan had learned to emulate the West. It had played by the rules. From the standpoint of the victim, they were not particularly fair rules, but they were the established rules of imperialism. Now, in Japan's moment of victory, it found that it was reviled by yellow-peril sloganeering and denied equal membership in the imperialist club. Japanese, even those who had been most enthusiastic about Western models, became convinced, as Marius Jensen writes, that international law and institutional modernization alone would never bring full respect and equality from the West.

Source I

A political cartoon from the early 1930s representing the Japanese perspective on the situation in East Asia.

Source J

An extract from An Outline Plan for the Reorganization of Japan by the radical nationalist thinker Kita Ikki (1923).

The state of Japan, as the leading power of Asia, has a divine responsibility to lead the reconstruction of the Orient. We must break the chains of Western capital and the outdated treaties that stifle the growth of our neighbors. Our expansion into the continent is not an act of aggression, but a revolutionary mission to establish a zone of mutual prosperity where the Yamato race provides the guiding spirit. The current international system, dominated by the selfish interests of the Anglo-American powers, must be replaced by an Asian order that reflects our unique cultural and spiritual values. We have a right to move against the great powers in order to liberate the oppressed peoples of the East.

Source K

Rana Mitter, a historian and professor, in his academic book China's War with Japan, 1937-1945: The Struggle for Survival, page 58 (2013).

The rise of Chinese nationalism under the Kuomintang (KMT) acted as a direct catalyst for Japanese military action. As Chiang Kai-shek's government began to consolidate power and push for the recovery of sovereign rights in Manchuria, the Japanese military leadership perceived a "now or never" moment. The threat was not just military but economic; the KMT's efforts to build competing rail lines and impose tariffs threatened the very foundations of the South Manchuria Railway. In this sense, the expansion was a defensive reaction to a newly assertive China that sought to overturn the established colonial order of the previous century. The Japanese felt their "special position" was under siege from a nationalist movement that would not compromise.

Source L

An extract from a memo by Ishiwara Kanji, a key strategist of the Kwantung Army, regarding the necessity of occupying Manchuria (1931).

A final war between the Eastern and Western civilizations is inevitable. For the Empire to survive this cosmic struggle and emerge victorious, it must secure the vast resources and strategic depth of the continent. Control over Manchuria and Mongolia is not merely a matter of economic gain, but a prerequisite for national survival in a world where total war will define the future. We cannot rely on the false promises of internationalism or the League of Nations. We must create a self-sufficient defense state. The occupation of Manchuria is the essential first step in preparing our nation for the ultimate confrontation with the United States and the preservation of our national essence against foreign materialism.

Source I

Sadao Araki, Japanese Minister of War, speech to the Imperial Diet, February 1934.

Japan's mission in East Asia is clear. We are the stabilising force in a region threatened by communist subversion from the north and Western exploitation from the south. The army is the backbone of the nation. Without a strong military, Japan cannot fulfil its destiny. The politicians talk of economy and diplomacy, but it is the soldier who builds the empire. The resources of Manchuria are essential to Japan's survival as a great power. Without iron, coal and food from the continent, Japan will be strangled by its dependence on hostile foreign markets. The nation must be mobilised, its people united, its youth prepared. Japan's future lies not in the committee rooms of Geneva but on the plains of Asia.

Source J

Western editorial cartoon published in a British newspaper, 1936, showing a Japanese military figure pushing aside a civilian politician in a suit. The military figure holds a scroll reading "National Defence" while the civilian holds a torn document reading "Democracy." In the background, factory smokestacks and warships are visible.

Source K

Yosuke Matsuoka, Japanese Foreign Minister, radio broadcast justifying the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, 27 September 1940.

The Tripartite Pact is not an act of aggression. It is a defensive alliance designed to prevent the spread of the present European conflict to East Asia. Japan, Germany and Italy share a common vision: a new world order in which the nations of each region manage their own affairs free from the interference of outside powers. The Pact is directed against no specific nation. But Japan wishes to make clear that any nation which attempts to obstruct the establishment of the New Order in East Asia or in Europe will find the three signatory powers united in their response. Japan seeks peace, but it will not be denied its rightful place among the great powers of the world.

Source L

Historian S.C.M. Paine, The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949, published 2012.

The militarisation of Japanese foreign policy in the 1930s was not simply a matter of aggressive generals seizing control. It reflected a structural crisis in the Japanese political system: the constitution of 1889 had given the military direct access to the emperor and independence from the cabinet, meaning that the army and navy could effectively veto any policy they opposed. The assassination of Prime Minister Inukai in May 1932 by naval officers ended the era of party government in Japan; thereafter, all prime ministers were either military officers or figures acceptable to the military. The result was a foreign policy driven by institutional militarism rather than by rational strategic calculation, in which each military success (Manchuria, north China, Indochina) created the demand for the next, and in which the army's operational independence made escalation almost impossible to reverse.

Source I

A cartoon by David Low. "Dogs of War". Published in the Evening standard, London, UK. 31 october 1941

Source J

Max Hastings. Retribution: The Battle for Japan 1944-45 (2007).

A Japanese assault on the Soviet Union in 1 941-42, taking the Russians in the rear as they struggled to stem Hitler's invasion, might have yielded important rewards for the Axis. Stalin was terrified of such an eventuality.

The July 1941 oil embargo and asset freeze imposed by the U.S. on Japan - Roosevelt's clumsiest diplomatic action in the months before Pearl Harbor - was partly designed to deter Tokyo from joining Hitler's Operation Barbarossa. Japan's bellicose foreign minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, resigned in the same month because his government rejected his urges to attack ... Japan and Germany were like fascist states ... The common German and Japanese commitment to making war for its own sake provides the best reason for rejecting pleas in mitigation of either nation's conduct. The two Axis partners, however, pursued unrelated ambitions. The only obvious manifestation of shared interest was that Japanese planning was rooted in an assumption of German victory. Like Italy in June 1940, Japan in December 1941 decided that the old colonial powers' difficulties in Europe exposed their remote properties ... Japan sought to seize access to vital oil and raw materials, together with space for mass migration from the home islands.

Source K

Kenneth B. Pyle. The Making of Modern Japan. ( 1996).

The dilemma that Japanese diplomacy had struggled with ever since the Manchurian Incident now became even more difficult, for as the China conflict expanded, the nation was less prepared to deal with the Soviet army on the Manchurian border and the American fleet in the Pacific. A succession of border skirmishes with the Red Army revealed the vulnerability of the Kwantung Army; at the same time the U.S. Navy was now embarked on a resolute program of building additional strength in the Pacific. By the spring of 1940 the Japanese navy General Staff had concluded that America's crash program would result in its gaining naval supremacy in the Pacific by 1942, and that Japan must have access to the oil of the Dutch East Indies in order to cope with American power ... In the autumn of 1940 [Matsuoka] signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, in which the signatories pledged to aid one another if attacked by a power not currently involved in the European war or in the fighting in China. Matsuoka thereby hoped to isolate the United States and dissuade it from conflict with Japan, thus opening the way for Japan to seize the European colonies in Southeast Asia, grasp the resources it needed for self-sufficiency and cut off Chinese supply lines.

Source L

The Japanese Admiral Nagano to the Emperor Hirohito, September 1941

Japan was like a patient suffering from a serious illness ... Should he be left alone without an operation, there was a danger of a gradual decline. An operation, while it might be dangerous, would still offer some hope of saving his life ... the Army General Staff was in favour of putting hope in diplomatic negotiations to the finish, but ... in the case of failure, a decisive operation would have to be performed.

Quoted in Richard Overy. 2009. The Road to War, page 342

Source I

Extract from a statement by Japanese Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe, November 3, 1938, announcing the "New Order in East Asia".

What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will insure the permanent stability of East Asia. In this lie the ultimate purpose of our present military campaign. This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and coordination between Japan, Manchukuo, and China in political, economic, and cultural spheres. Its objective is to secure international justice, to perfect joint defense against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize close economic cohesion throughout East Asia. This is the only way to provide a stable living for the peoples of this region and to contribute to the peace of the entire world. Japan is confident that other Powers will on their part correctly appreciate her aims and policy and will adapt their attitude to the new conditions prevailing in East Asia.

Source J

Extract from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's address to Chinese leaders at Kuling, July 17, 1937, following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.

For the past few years, we have swallowed our pride and endured humiliation in the hope that peace might be maintained. But now, the Lukouchiao [Marco Polo Bridge] Incident has brought us to the final limit of our endurance. We are a weak nation, but we cannot allow our national sovereignty to be trampled upon. If we allow one inch of our territory to be lost, we shall be guilty of an unpardonable sin against our ancestors and our future generations. Peace has reached the stage where it is no longer possible. If we reach the final stage, we must be prepared for every sacrifice. We do not seek war, but once it begins, every person, old or young, north or south, must take up the responsibility of resisting the invader and defending our homeland.

Source K

A contemporary photograph showing Japanese Imperial Army infantry marching through a traditional Paifang gateway during the occupation of a northern Chinese city in late 1937.

Source L

A 1937 political cartoon from an international newspaper. The officer represents Japan, and the map shows North China.