**Indicative content (responses may include but are not limited to):** - The question requires candidates to **judge relative importance** and **sustain a comparative argument**: they should assess whether ideology outweighed security and economic motives in shaping German foreign policy from 1933 to 1939, and show how these motives interacted over time. - Candidates may argue that ideology was fundamental because it provided the long term objectives: racial empire, expansion for living space, destruction of Bolshevism, and a reordering of Europe under German dominance, shaping the direction and ultimate endpoints of policy. - Candidates may support this with evidence from Nazi worldview, rearmament as preparation for expansion, and expansionist actions culminating in the destruction of Czechoslovakia and the decision for war in 1939. - Candidates may argue that security and revisionist goals were at least as important, especially in the early years, because policy aimed to overturn Versailles, rebuild military strength, and exploit diplomatic opportunities while avoiding premature confrontation. - Candidates may support this with evidence such as withdrawal from international constraints, remilitarisation policies, alliance and pact making, and the calculated use of risk and diplomacy to secure strategic advantages. - Candidates may argue that economic motives shaped policy through rearmament demands, autarkic planning, and the search for resources and markets, influencing the timing and targets of expansion (for example Austria and Czechoslovakia). - Credit answers that integrate perspectives or interpretations, such as intentionalist versus structuralist debates, or arguments about ideological primacy versus pragmatic opportunism. - Responses should reach a clear, substantiated judgement consistent with “to what extent”, showing how far ideology dominated, where security or economic motives were decisive, and whether the balance shifted across 1933 to 1939. **Marks awarded** - Establishes ideological aims and links them to concrete foreign policy choices between 1933 and 1939, using accurate supporting examples 3 marks - Explains security and revisionist objectives, including dismantling Versailles constraints and building strategic advantage, and connects these to policy sequencing 3 marks - Analyses economic motives, including rearmament pressures and resource considerations, and shows how these could shape target selection or timing 3 marks - Demonstrates interaction among motives through at least two well chosen episodes, showing where pragmatism moderated ideology or where ideology pushed beyond security logic 2 marks - Integrates at least one perspective or interpretation on Nazi foreign policy motives and uses it to refine the judgement 2 marks - Reaches a balanced, clearly argued conclusion on the extent of ideological primacy over security and economic motives across the period 2 marks High level responses will avoid treating motives as mutually exclusive and will instead show sequencing and interaction. Candidates can be credited for different emphases if supported by evidence, for example portraying ideology as the ultimate destination but security and economics as the practical route. Reward answers that consider the 1939 decision making, including the role of diplomacy with the Soviet Union, as a test of ideological rigidity versus pragmatic calculation. **Sample answer** German foreign policy from 1933 to 1939 was shaped by a blend of ideological aims, security driven revisionism, and economic pressures, and the weight of each varied across the period. Ideology gave the Nazi regime its overarching vision of a racially ordered empire and a Europe dominated by Germany, but the practical sequencing of policy often reflected security calculations and the constraints of rearmament and resources. The best judgement is that ideological aims were more important in setting long term direction, while security and economic motives were decisive in shaping timing and method, at least until the final escalation of 1938 and 1939. Ideological aims mattered because the Nazi worldview framed international relations as a struggle among races and systems in which compromise was temporary. The regime’s goals included overturning the Versailles order not simply to restore equality, but to enable expansion and dominance. Concepts such as living space in the east and the destruction of Bolshevism implied eventual conflict with the Soviet Union and a remaking of eastern Europe. This helps explain why rearmament was pursued with urgency and why the regime placed such emphasis on opportunities for territorial expansion. It also helps explain why the destruction of Czechoslovakia as an independent state in 1939 was not treated as a regrettable excess but as a step towards a reordered Europe. Yet security and revisionist motives were powerful and often shaped early policy. From 1933, Germany sought to escape international constraints, leaving the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations to regain freedom of action. Rearmament, the restoration of conscription in 1935, and the building of an air force served ideological ambitions but also met security objectives by restoring deterrence and giving Germany leverage. The remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936 can be interpreted as a security move to remove a vulnerable frontier and to prevent France from using the demilitarised zone as a pressure point. It also represented a calculated gamble based on the belief that Britain and France would not fight. That calculation shows that security logic and assessment of enemy will mattered for policy choices. Economic motives further complicated the balance. Rearmament placed intense demands on foreign exchange and raw materials, and the leadership feared vulnerability to blockade or resource shortage in any future war. Autarkic planning sought to reduce dependence on imports. The Four Year Plan of 1936 aimed to accelerate economic preparation for conflict and reflected the belief that political goals required economic mobilisation. Expansion could therefore appear economically attractive as a way to acquire resources and strengthen the war economy. The absorption of Austria brought financial assets and strategic depth, while the later seizure of Czech industrial capacity offered military and economic advantages. Even if ideology provided an ultimate goal, economic realities helped direct attention towards regions that could support a sustained confrontation. The interaction of motives is most visible in the pattern of escalation and diplomacy. The Anschluss aligned with ideological claims about national community, but it also improved Germany’s strategic position in central Europe. The Munich crisis later in 1938, leading to the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, can be presented as security driven, removing a potential enemy and weakening French strategic reach. However, the subsequent occupation of the Czech lands in 1939 went beyond a narrow security rationale tied to self determination. It indicated a willingness to transform Europe through coercion and domination, closer to ideological ambition. It also helped confirm to Britain and France that earlier concessions had not satisfied limited aims, which increased the risk of war. German diplomacy in 1939 provides a crucial test of primacy. The Nazi Soviet Pact temporarily set aside intense ideological hostility to Bolshevism in order to avoid a two front war and to isolate Poland. This indicates that security calculation could override ideological consistency in the short term. At the same time, the pact can be read as tactical, designed to create conditions for expansion rather than to establish a durable partnership. The decision to attack Poland in 1939 combined ideological contempt for the post 1919 eastern settlement with strategic beliefs about Britain and France, and also with economic concerns about resources and security of supply in wartime. The policy cannot be reduced to a single motive, but ideology provided the context that made a drastic solution acceptable. Interpretations of Nazi foreign policy often divide between those emphasising ideological programme and those stressing structural constraints and opportunism. An intentionalist reading argues that ideology was the coherent core, with policy steps forming a calculated path towards war and conquest. Structuralist and more contingent accounts emphasise economic pressures, regime dynamics, and the exploitation of international weakness. The evidence supports a blended account. Ideology provided consistent ambitions and legitimised extreme measures, but the regime repeatedly adjusted tactics to the diplomatic environment, suggesting that security assessments and opportunity shaped how ideology was implemented. In conclusion, ideological aims were more important than security and economic motives in shaping German foreign policy from 1933 to 1939 in the sense that they set the ultimate objectives of expansion and domination and increasingly pushed policy beyond limited revisionism. However, security driven calculations and economic pressures were decisive in shaping the route taken, the timing of risk, and even temporary diplomatic compromises such as the pact with the Soviet Union. Ideology was the destination, but security and economics often determined the path, especially until the turning point of 1938 and 1939.