German and Italian Expansion (1933-1940) - Causes of expansion Questionbank

Source A

La domenica del Corriere, weekend supplement of the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, depicting Italian Blackshirts in action against Abyssinian forces, January 1936.

Source B

Memorandum from Marshal Badoglio, Chief of General Staff to Mussolini, December 1934.

The problem of Italian-Abyssinian relations has very recently shifted from a diplomatic plane to one which can be solved by force alone ... The obj ect ... is nothing more or less then the complete destruction of the Abyssinian army and the total conquest of Abyssinia. In no other way can we build the Empire ... The speedier our action the less likely will be the danger of diplomatic complications. In the Japanese fashion there will be no need whatsoever officially for a declaration of war and in any case we must always emphasise the purely defensive character of operations. No one in Europe would raise any difficulties provided the prosecution of operations resulted rapidly in an accomplished fact. It would suffice to declare to England and France that their interests would be recognised.

Source C

Ruth Henig. The Origins of the Second World War 1933-41 ( 1985).

Since his ascension to power in 1 922, the Fascist leader had made no secret of his ambition to raise Italy's status as a European power by increasing its influence around the Mediterranean and by expanding its empire. Unlike Japan, however, Mussolini lacked a strong economic base and well-equipped, effective military forces, and the onset of the Depression made it even harder for him to secure them. Thus he aimed in the short term to seek glorious expansion on the cheap, possibly in Africa at the expense of Abyssinia, but for that he needed the agreement, or at least tacit consent, of Britain and France ... Mussolini was inclined more and more towards the prospect of a glorious, short, triumphant war of conquest.

Source D

Martin Blinkhorn. Mussolini and Fascist Italy, (1984).

The conquest of Ethiopia represented Mussolini's accomplishment of what had been an Italian nationalist dream for half a century. Neither the problems of the depression nor the African interests of certain industrial pressure groups were sufficient to dictate it. Existing colonies were failing to attract the millions of potential emigrants beloved of fascist propaganda, and were proving unrewarding to the few thousand who actually settled there; moreover, their administration, policing and economic infrastructures constituted a considerable drain on the Italian treasury. The explanation for the attack on Ethiopia thus lies in fascism and its Duce. The fascist need for excitement, conflict and dramatic success was perfectly personified in Mussolini himself and sanctified by the puerile machismo of the Duce cult. Other dictators such as Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal constructed personal cults on the appeal of stability and lack of excitement. Neither Mussolini's personality nor the psychology of fascism rendered such a thing conceivable.

Source I

Extract from Adolf Hitler’s speech at the Nuremberg Rally, 12 September 1938.

“We demand justice for the three and a half million Germans in Czechoslovakia who suffer under oppression and indignity. These Germans are denied the right of self-determination, a right which all peoples deserve. We cannot and will not abandon them to a foreign government that mistreats them because of their nationality. The Sudeten Germans must be free to live as part of the great German Reich, with the same dignity and pride as their brothers in Austria. Our desire is peace, but peace cannot exist so long as our people are persecuted. It is the duty of the Reich to protect its citizens wherever they may be.”

Source J

Extract from a speech by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to the House of Commons, 5 October 1938, following the Munich Agreement.

“I believe we have secured peace for our time. The Munich settlement is not a triumph of force but of reason, ensuring that the legitimate grievances of the Sudeten Germans have been addressed without plunging Europe into war. By engaging in negotiation rather than confrontation, we have prevented catastrophe. The alternative was certain conflict on a scale greater than the world has yet seen. The government has acted in the true spirit of democracy, protecting the interests of the British people and upholding peace in Europe. While some may criticise this agreement, I am convinced that history will judge it as a statesmanlike act of courage and foresight.”

Source K

Extract from historian Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, Nemesis (2000).

“The Munich Agreement represented both the peak of Hitler’s successes and the nadir of British and French foreign policy. While Chamberlain genuinely believed he had secured peace, in reality the Western democracies had conceded to blackmail. Hitler himself was astonished at the ease with which Britain and France surrendered Czechoslovakia’s defences without a fight. The policy of appeasement was based on the illusion that Hitler’s ambitions were limited and negotiable. In truth, Munich confirmed Hitler’s contempt for the West and encouraged further aggression. Within six months, Czechoslovakia was dismantled, and Europe was on the brink of war. The Munich settlement was not peace but a prelude to destruction.”

Source L

David Low cartoon, published in the Evening Standard, 4 October 1938. The cartoon shows a collapsing wall labelled “OUR NEW DEFENCE” with figures stumbling as it falls apart. Above the debris, the caption reads “I will be good—”.

Source I

Extract from Benito Mussolini’s proclamation to the Italian people, 7 April 1939, announcing the invasion of Albania.

“Italy’s destiny lies across the Adriatic. For centuries, Albania has been tied to our nation by history, culture, and geography. Today, Italy fulfils its mission by securing Albania’s future as part of a new order in Europe. The Albanian state has been weak and unstable, unable to ensure prosperity for its people or security for its borders. Our intervention brings stability, order, and the benefits of modern civilisation. This action is not conquest but liberation, guaranteeing Albania’s rightful place alongside Italy in the march of progress. Italy’s sacrifice and strength will ensure that Albania no longer remains a pawn of foreign powers but becomes a partner in building a stronger Mediterranean.”

Source J

Extract from a statement by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons, 13 April 1939.

“The Italian occupation of Albania is a clear act of aggression, carried out without justification and in violation of the independence of a sovereign state. The government of His Majesty regards this development with the utmost seriousness, for it demonstrates once again the disregard shown by certain powers for international law. Britain cannot stand by while smaller nations are absorbed by force. It is for this reason that the government has given assurances of support to Greece and Romania, recognising that Italy’s actions threaten the peace of the Balkans and the wider security of Europe. Yet Britain must also consider carefully the balance between deterrence and the preservation of peace, for the world is once again on the edge of calamity.”

Source K

Extract from historian Denis Mack Smith, Modern Italy: A Political History (1997).

“The Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939 was less about strategic necessity than about Mussolini’s pride and rivalry with Hitler. Determined not to be overshadowed by Germany’s dramatic expansion into Austria and Czechoslovakia, Mussolini sought a quick victory to prove Italy’s power. Albania, militarily weak and politically divided, was an easy target. International reaction was critical but limited: Britain and France issued formal protests and extended guarantees to Greece and Romania, but they were unwilling to confront Italy militarily. For Mussolini, Albania was intended as a show of strength, but in reality, it deepened Italy’s dependence on Germany, as the Western democracies drew further away and the Rome–Berlin Axis tightened. The episode demonstrated once again that the dictators could act with relative impunity, as Europe drifted ever closer to war.”

Source L

Public domain cartoon, c. April 1939.

Source A

A British report by the heads of the three armed services on their ability to fight a war against Germany in 1936.

We would at once emphasise ... that any question of war with Germany while we were as at present heavily committed to the possibility of hostilities in the Mediterranean would be thoroughly dangerous. As regards naval operation against Germany, our minimum requirements could only be carried out by weakening naval forces in the Mediterranean to an extent which would jeopardise our position there vis-avis Italy ... As regards the Army and the Air Force, the purely defensive provisions already made in the Mediterranean have drawn upon the resources of these two S ervices to such an extent that until those reinforcements have returned to this country we should be quite incapable of dispatching a Field Force or providing any proper defence in the air. To bring home the se forces with their equipment ... would take in the case of the army two months ... and even longer in the case of the Air Force . At the moment our coast defence artillery requires modernisation to a large extent, we have no anti-submarine defences for a number of our most important ports, and the number of our anti-aircraft guns and searchlights is quite inadequate to deal with the air threat from Germany.

Source B

A cartoon published in Punch Magazine on 18 March 1936

Source C

Ruth Henig, a British academic historian, in an academic book, The Origins of the Second World War ( 1985 ).

On 7 March 1936, token German forces marched into the Rhineland and Hitler announced that the German government was remilitarizing it because of the threat to Germany posed by the Franco-Russian alliance which had just been ratified by the French Senate ... The remilitarization was a further challenge to the Versailles settlement and to the British government's wish to secure peaceful and orderly revision. For the British government had already gone out of its way to indicate to Hitler that ministers were willing to agree to German remilitarization of the Rhineland as part of a more general package of measures which might include an air-pact, German return to the League of Nations, some peaceful revision of Germany's eastern frontiers and the return of former German colonies. Now Hitler had shown once again, in his rearmament policies that he preferred to achieve his objectives by unilateral military action rather than by participating in multilateral diplomatic discussions . ... In retrospect, many politicians and commentators claimed that this was the point at which Hitler should have been challenged, and that after March 1936 he could not be stopped from plunging Europe into war.

Source D

A speech by Hitler to the Reichstag following the remilitarization of the Rhineland, Saturday 7 March 1936.

The German government has continuously emphasised during the negotiations of the last years its readiness to observe and fulfil all the obligations arising from the Rhine Pact so long as the other contracting parties were ready on their side to maintain the pact. This obvious and essential condition can no longer be regarded as being fulfilled by France . France has replied to Germany's repeated friendly offers and assurances of peace by infringing the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the Soviet Union directed exclusively against Germany. In this manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased to exist ... In order, however, to avoid any misinterpretation of its intentions and to establish beyond doubt the purely defensive character of these measures, as well as to express its unalterable longing for a real pacification of Europe between states in equal rights and equally respected, the German government declares itself ready to conclude new agreements for the creation of a system of peaceful security for Europe ... After three years, I believe that today the struggle for German equality of rights can be deemed concluded ... We have no territorial claims to make in Europe. Above all, we are aware that all the tensions resulting either from erroneous territorial provisions or from the disproportion between the size of its population and Lebensraum can never be solved by wars.

Source I

An extract from Adolf Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag, 7 March 1936, announcing the reoccupation of the Rhineland.

“Germany has no aggressive intentions. Our actions today are simply the re-establishment of our sovereignty in our own territory. No people of honour can be expected to accept a situation in which their land is permanently occupied and restricted by foreign powers. The German government has made proposals for peace, and we remain willing to negotiate guarantees with our neighbours. However, Germany cannot allow herself to be treated as a second-class nation. The return of German troops to the Rhineland is not a threat, but a step towards true equality and the restoration of national dignity. We call upon the world to see this act not as aggression, but as a gesture of peace.”

Source J

An extract from a speech by French Foreign Minister Pierre Flandin to the French Chamber of Deputies, 9 March 1936.

“The government of France views with the utmost seriousness the German military entry into the Rhineland. This action is a direct violation of both the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact, agreements solemnly signed and guaranteed by the international community. France cannot ignore this breach of international law. However, the government must also recognise the limits of our strength in the absence of support from our allies. Britain’s position has been cautious, unwilling to risk war over the Rhineland. Without a united front, France cannot undertake military action alone. It is with deep regret that I acknowledge this constraint, for the consequences of inaction may prove grave for European security.”

Source K

An extract from historian Richard Overy, The Dictators: Hitler’s Germany, Stalin’s Russia (2004).

“The reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 was perhaps the greatest gamble of Hitler’s career. At the time, the German army was ill-prepared for a confrontation with France; withdrawal would have been inevitable had the French acted with force. Instead, the lack of opposition transformed a risky venture into a triumph. Britain regarded Hitler’s move as the Germans marching into their ‘own backyard,’ and saw no reason to intervene. France, divided politically and cautious militarily, failed to act without British support. The episode demonstrated not only the weakness of collective security but also the collapse of deterrence. For Hitler, the Rhineland gamble convinced him that the democracies lacked the will to resist, a lesson that emboldened his later expansion into Austria and Czechoslovakia.”

Source L

A cartoon by David Low, published in the Evening Standard (London), March 1936.

Source I

An extract from a speech by Benito Mussolini to the Italian Chamber of Deputies, 30 March 1936, after Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia.

“The destiny of the Italian people is expansion. The world has no place for the weak, and our victory in Africa proves that Italy is a nation to be respected. Abyssinia, backward and uncivilised, has been brought under the authority of Rome. This conquest gives us space for our growing population and restores the glory of our Empire. The League of Nations, dominated by hypocritical powers, has sought to hinder our progress, yet it is Italy who has shown courage and discipline. The sanctions imposed on us are unjust, ineffective, and will not break the spirit of the Italian people. Our actions will be judged not by idle words in Geneva but by history, which rewards the strong.”

Source J

An extract from the British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden’s speech in the House of Commons, 18 June 1936.

“The government regards with deep concern the course of events in Abyssinia. We joined the League of Nations on the understanding that collective security would be upheld against aggression, wherever it occurred. It was for that reason that Britain supported sanctions against Italy. Yet it is clear that sanctions, limited as they have been, have not achieved the desired effect. The League has failed to prevent aggression, and the Italian conquest of Abyssinia stands as a dangerous precedent. Nevertheless, I must stress that Britain will not act alone. Without wider international support, military measures are impossible. The tragedy of Abyssinia lies not only in the suffering of its people, but in the blow dealt to the principle of collective security.”

Source K

An extract from historian Zara Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark: European International History 1933–1939 (2011).

“The Abyssinian crisis of 1935–1936 marked a turning point in the history of the League of Nations. Italy’s invasion was a direct challenge to the system of collective security. Although the League condemned the aggression and imposed sanctions, these measures were half-hearted and riddled with exceptions. Britain and France, fearful of alienating Mussolini at a time when Hitler’s power was growing in Germany, deliberately avoided oil sanctions or closing the Suez Canal. Their priority was the preservation of their own strategic interests, not the defense of Abyssinia. The crisis exposed the hollowness of collective security and encouraged further aggression. For Mussolini, victory confirmed Italy’s imperial ambitions; for Hitler, it demonstrated that the major powers would tolerate defiance of international law.”

Source L

A cartoon by David Low, published in the Evening Standard (London), October 1935, during the Abyssinian crisis.