Paper 1 - Conflict and Intervention Questionbank

Source A

Scott Straus, a professor of political science, interviewing a former supporter of Hutu extremists who had also confessed to killing civilians, in the collection of accounts Intimate Enemy. Images and Voices of the Rwandan Genocide (2006).

[President] Habyarimana was the parent of Rwanda. Habyarimana did nothing bad to Tutsis … No person in Rwanda thought “I am Hutu. You are Tutsi.” Habyarimana prevented all that. We intermarried. All that was disturbed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) war … We, the peasants, believed that the person who had killed the president was an enemy … they were Tutsis, so we believed the solution was to kill the Tutsi… We said we were defending ourselves against the enemy… All the things that happened in Rwanda were caused by the war between the RPF and the Rwandan government, and the people who are dead and the things that were destroyed, it was the RPF and the government in place that must answer for that.

Source B Photograph of Rwandan government soldiers atop a tank fleeing with civilians from advancing RPF forces (17 July 1994).

Source C

Linda Melvern, a British journalist, writing in the book Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide (2004).

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) Commander Dallaire met the Rwandan government, hoping to obtain permission to evacuate refugees in Kigali, [but] the government did not seem to be concerned by the horrendous ethnic killing. On 23 April, Dallaire travelled to see the RPF leader Kagame … The RPF was disappointed that the “international community” had not stated its disgust with the violent destruction of the opposition political parties and the total survival of the government and its leaders. Dallaire and Colonel Bagosora [Hutu extremist leader] then met on 28 April … Bagosora told Dallaire that the RPF was intending to conquer the whole country. His side had never refused to share power with the RPF. It was all the fault of the RPF for refusing to negotiate with the government … The swift military success of the RPF in the country created an atmosphere of fear among the [government’s] army … Some officers were planning to massacre all the people in Kigali who were sheltering in hotels and churches, the vast majority of them Tutsi … On 28 April, Oxfam [an international charity] issued a press release stating that the pattern of systematic killing of the Tutsi amounted to genocide … But another story now dominated the headlines: with thousands of people from eastern Rwanda fleeing the RPF advance, this was the fastest exodus [mass movement] of people the world had seen.

Source D

André Guichaoua, a professor of sociology, writing in the academic book From War to Genocide. Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990–1994 (2017).

[Even the] Rwandan government’s … most eager defenders doubted that the war against the RPF could be won … If defeat at the hands of the RPF could not be avoided, none of [the] Tutsi … should be left to profit from their victory … Their primary objective was to exterminate the potential political base for the RPF and its allies … From 12 April onward, government politicians linked their political futures to a conclusion of the war through genocide and the elimination of Tutsi … For its part, the RPF’s repeated refusals to negotiate fell in line with the government’s murderous strategy. When the RPF finally agreed to engage in discussions between 22 April and 14 May 1994, it refused to negotiate with the government’s representative. But there was no longer anything for the two sides to negotiate, the RPF did not want to hear anything more about a ceasefire. This is exactly what Dallaire confirmed in his message to the UN on 24 April, which summarized his conversation with Paul Kagame: “He did not appear interested in a ceasefire. His forces were winning the war and were going to continue fighting as long as they were winning.”

Source A

A speech by Josip Broz Tito made on 29 November 1943 in Belgrade.

We are very well aware that the traitor government is doing all it can to smuggle itself back into Yugoslavia at any cost (and that goes for the king too) before the people utter their decisive word on their future. We know that certain reactionary circles abroad are helping that government. But we also know that the vast majority of progressive democratic elements in the Allied countries sincerely desire our people to decide their future for themselves … We have been slandered from all sides … All the occupiers and traitors … say that our people’s liberation struggle in Yugoslavia is purely a communist affair, involving the bolshevization of a country, an attempt by the communists to seize power, the abolition of private property, the destruction of the church and of religion, the destruction of culture and so on … Very few people believe these lies any longer, and least of all the people of Yugoslavia … The times are past when a handful of reactionaries could ascribe such matters to the communists of Yugoslavia, in order to isolate them from the people. Bearing this in mind … It is essential to take steps to ensure that our peoples obtain a state system based on the brotherhood and equality of rights of all peoples of Yugoslavia and which would guarantee genuine liberty and democracy to all sections of the community. The monarchy has completely discredited itself in the eyes of the people during the last twenty-three years. The evidence for this has been proved hundreds of thousands of times and all our peoples know it. Only a republican form of government can ensure that such disasters never again come upon our people.

Source B

A speech by Josip Broz Tito made on 14 February 1945 in Belgrade.

Our sacrices are terrible. I can safely say that there is no other part of the world which has been devastated on a vaster scale than Yugoslavia. Every tenth Yugoslav has perished in this struggle in which we were forced to wrest armaments from our enemies, to freeze without clothing, and to die without medication. ▲ Josip Tito and General Popovitch, who became foreign minister in Yugoslavia after the war, in 1943 144 2 ATL Thinking and social skills With a partner, share your responses to the questions above. Peer edit each other’s work and suggest how you can each improve your answers. Nevertheless our optimism and faith have proved justied. The greatest gain of this conict between democracy and fascism lies in the fact that it has drawn together everything that was good in humanity. The unity of the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain is the best guarantee to the peoples of the world that Nazi horrors will never again be repeated. In organizing our country on the sacred principles of democracy and of concern for the common man, we Yugoslavs believe that we are making our best contribution to this harmonious community.

Source C

A speech by Josip Broz Tito made on 9 May 1945 in Belgrade.

Peoples of Yugoslavia! Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Moslems! The long-desired day has dawned which you have been waiting for with such yearning. The day of rejoicing has come to us here, too. Finally the greatest fascist power in Europe is vanquished, Germany, which incited so much suffering upon our people and took so many victims. The powers that tried to enslave you have been vanquished. You were offered enticements by the German and Italian fascists in order to lead you to exterminate each other. But your best sons and daughters, inspired with love for their homeland and for you, her peoples, thwarted this diabolical enemy plan. Instead of mutual dissension and hostility, you are today united in a new and happier Yugoslavia. Instead of the old Yugoslavia, rotten with corruption and injustice, today we have the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia of equal peoples. This is the result of the victory of our glorious Yugoslav Army, it is the result of your endurance, your self-sacrifice and faith in your just cause … We must make our brotherhood and unity even stronger, so that never again can any force destroy it.

Source Q

Statement by a Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) commander to the press, 1998

For years we listened to Rugova’s calls for peaceful resistance, and what did it bring us? More repression, more humiliation, and no freedom. Our people were beaten, our homes burned, our schools closed. The world ignored us because we were too quiet. So we took up arms. The KLA was born from desperation, from the belief that only through struggle could we win our rights. We are not terrorists; we are freedom fighters. Every nation has the right to defend itself. The Serbian regime labels us criminals, but it is they who commit crimes daily. We fight because we want to live in dignity, not as second-class citizens. We fight because Serbia understands only the language of force. We will not stop until Kosovo is free.

Source R

Report from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), January 1999

The events in the village of Račak represent a turning point. On 15 January, Serbian security forces launched an operation, claiming to target “terrorists.” When observers entered the village, they found dozens of unarmed civilians, including women and the elderly, shot at close range. Survivors reported that villagers were rounded up and executed. The Serbian authorities insisted the dead were KLA combatants killed in battle, but evidence strongly suggests a massacre. The brutality of Račak shocked the international community, reinforcing the view that Milosevic’s forces were engaged in systematic violations of human rights. For many in Europe and the United States, this atrocity proved that negotiations alone could not stop the violence. Calls for international intervention grew louder. Račak became a symbol of Serbian repression and a catalyst for the escalation of the conflict.

Source S

NATO stumbles over Kosovo, showing how the small region creates big challenges for international powers.

Source T

Testimony of a Kosovar Albanian refugee, interviewed in Macedonia, 1999

They came at night. Serbian soldiers and police. They knocked on doors, shouting for us to leave. My family ran into the street, carrying only what we could. Houses were burning. Neighbours who resisted were shot. We walked for days to reach the border. Along the road, we saw bodies, men separated from women, children crying. At every checkpoint, soldiers demanded money, sometimes taking girls away. By the time we reached Macedonia, we had nothing left. The camps were crowded, but at least we were safe. Still, we wondered: why did it take so long for the world to help us? For years we had asked for protection, but no one came until the killings filled the television screens.

Source Q

Statement by Madeleine Albright, US Ambassador to the UN, April 1994

The United States deeply regrets the tragic loss of life in Rwanda. We are committed to supporting peace and reconciliation, but we must recognise the limits of international engagement. The United Nations has deployed peacekeepers under a mandate to monitor the Arusha Accords. Those forces were never designed for combat operations. Expanding their role requires careful consideration of costs, risks, and the willingness of member states to contribute troops. We are exploring ways to deliver humanitarian assistance and to support negotiations between the parties. However, we cannot and should not impose a solution by force. The responsibility for peace rests ultimately with the Rwandan people themselves. The international community can help, but it cannot substitute for reconciliation within Rwanda. Our priority must be to protect our own citizens, assist refugees, and encourage dialogue. We must not allow the tragedy in Rwanda to derail UN peacekeeping elsewhere or to repeat mistakes made in Somalia.

Source R

Extract from Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story (1999)

The international response to the Rwandan genocide was characterised by hesitation, denial, and abandonment. Even as killings were reported daily, the Security Council voted in mid-April 1994 to reduce UNAMIR from 2,500 troops to 270. The killing of Belgian peacekeepers was used as justification for withdrawal, though the massacres clearly demanded reinforcements. The US and other powers avoided the term “genocide,” aware that acknowledging it would legally oblige them to act. While thousands of Rwandans were slaughtered, foreign nationals were swiftly evacuated. Only in late May did the Council authorise an expanded mission, but by then hundreds of thousands were already dead. France’s Operation Turquoise, launched in June, saved lives in the south-west, but also allowed perpetrators to flee into Zaire. The failure of the international community was not one of ignorance: UN officials, human rights groups, and journalists provided ample evidence. It was a failure of will, as major powers judged Rwanda to be of little strategic value.

Source S

Photograph, Kigali, April 1994

Source T

Testimony of Roméo Dallaire to the Canadian Parliament, 1998

We were not asking for miracles. We knew the situation was deteriorating long before April. I sent cables warning of planned massacres, caches of weapons, and extremist propaganda. My requests for reinforcements and a stronger mandate were denied. When the killings began, I had fewer than 3,000 men, lightly armed, poorly supplied. Within weeks, the Security Council cut us to under 300. We did what we could: we sheltered thousands in safe sites, sometimes with nothing more than a few rifles and our presence. But with even a few thousand well-armed troops, properly supported, I am convinced we could have stopped much of the slaughter. Instead, the great powers dithered. They evacuated their own nationals and left Rwandans to die. France came later, but its intervention was as much about protecting its allies in the old regime as about saving civilians. The world failed Rwanda not because it could not act, but because it chose not to.

Source Q

Report from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), July 1999

By June 1999, over 850,000 Kosovar Albanians had been displaced by Serbian forces. Entire villages were emptied, families forced to march across borders into Macedonia and Albania. Refugee camps became overwhelmed, with shortages of food, shelter, and medicine. Following the entry of NATO and KFOR, the majority of refugees began returning home. Yet what they found was devastation: burned houses, destroyed infrastructure, and continuing insecurity. Many Serb families, in turn, fled Kosovo, fearing reprisals from Albanians. The refugee crisis highlighted the immense human cost of the conflict and the challenges of rebuilding a multi-ethnic society.

Source R

Statement by Ibrahim Rugova, inaugural address as President of Kosovo, 2002

Today, I stand before you as the first democratically elected President of Kosovo. Our journey has been long and painful. We have endured war, displacement, and loss. But we have also demonstrated courage and resilience. The task before us is to build a peaceful, democratic Kosovo, where all citizens, Albanians, Serbs, and others, can live with dignity. We must turn away from the cycle of revenge. Our independence may not yet be fully recognised, but our legitimacy comes from the will of our people and our commitment to democracy. I call upon the international community to continue its support, for our stability will contribute to peace in the Balkans and in Europe as a whole.

Source S

Photograph published in The Guardian, 2001. The image shows Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague courtroom. The courtroom backdrop displays the insignia of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 

Source T

Testimony of a Kosovar Albanian woman, interview with Human Rights Watch, 2000

When I returned to my village after the war, nothing was left. Our house was a pile of ashes. The school was gone, the mosque burned. My husband had disappeared months before, taken by Serbian police, and I still do not know his fate. At first, I felt hope when NATO came, when KFOR patrolled the streets. But soon we saw new violence: Albanians attacking Serbs, taking revenge. Some of my neighbours joined in, but I could not. I had lost too much already. We said we wanted peace, yet hatred remained. Life is still hard, there is little work, and the wounds of war will not heal quickly.

Source Q

Speech by Slobodan Milosevic at Gazimestan, June 1989

Comrades, we stand here on the anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, a reminder of our eternal struggle for freedom and dignity. For centuries, Serbs have defended this land against enemies who sought to destroy us. Today, we face new threats. Certain Albanian extremists demand separation, refusing to recognise the authority of Serbia. They intimidate Serbs, drive them from their homes, and insult our heritage. But let me be clear: Kosovo is the heart of Serbia, and Serbia will never abandon it. Reforms are underway to strengthen our unity, but they are resisted by those who prefer chaos. We have no quarrel with honest Albanians who wish to live in peace, but Serbia cannot and will not tolerate separatism. The enemies of Yugoslavia should understand that any attack on our sovereignty will be met with firmness. We are determined to protect our people and preserve our nation’s integrity.

Source R

Extract from Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (2000)

The conflict in Kosovo was rooted in a collision between rising Albanian nationalism and Serbian fears of disintegration. By the late 1980s, Kosovo Albanians formed over 90% of the population but were politically marginalised. Under Tito’s Yugoslavia, they enjoyed significant autonomy, but Milosevic’s constitutional reforms of 1989 stripped these rights, placing Kosovo under direct Serbian control. For Albanians, this felt like colonisation. Schools and media in the Albanian language were restricted, jobs were lost, and protests were suppressed. In response, Ibrahim Rugova emerged as leader of a movement advocating passive resistance and the creation of parallel institutions: underground schools, clinics, and political organisations. Though Rugova opposed violence, Serbian authorities viewed even peaceful protest as a threat. Thus the stage was set: Serbian nationalism, embodied by Milosevic, clashed with Albanian demands for equality and independence. Kosovo became a crucible where competing visions of sovereignty and identity spiralled toward confrontation.

Source S

Kosovo’s push for independence is portrayed as a spark threatening to ignite Serbia like a powder keg, highlighting the explosive potential for conflict in the Balkans.

Source T

Testimony of a Kosovar Albanian teacher, interviewed in 1993

In 1990, they told us we could no longer teach in Albanian. Our schools were closed, our textbooks banned. I tried to hold lessons in my home, but the police came and said it was illegal. Many of my colleagues lost their jobs because they were Albanian. The government said we were extremists, but we only wanted to keep our language and dignity. We followed Rugova’s call for peaceful resistance, but we lived in fear every day. Some neighbours disappeared after joining protests. The Serbian authorities treated all of us as separatists. Our children grew up in basements, learning in secret. We felt invisible in our own land. I believed then, and still believe now, that they wanted us to give up hope. But we did not.

Source Q

Transcript from Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), 4 April 1994

“Cut down the tall trees! Do not let them escape! The Inyenzi $cockroaches$ are everywhere, plotting with foreigners to destroy our country. They hide in your villages, in your markets, in your churches. Do not trust them, they are snakes in the grass! Take up your machetes and defend Rwanda. Every man who does not rise is a traitor; every woman who hides an Inyenzi is an enemy. The government and our brave soldiers cannot do this alone, we need the people to cleanse Rwanda of this Tutsi plague once and for all. Our forefathers fought for this land, and now it is your duty to protect it. Do not wait! The time is now! We are the majority, they are the minority. Together we will triumph, together we will defend Rwanda’s honour. Remember, the international community does not care about us—they turn their backs. Only you, the people, can save our country. Cut down the tall trees and finish this struggle for good!”

Source R

Human Rights Watch, “Leave None to Tell the Story,” 1999

The genocide in Rwanda was not spontaneous; it was organised and incited. At its heart lay the power of the media. The privately owned Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) became a daily instrument of mobilisation, broadcasting names, addresses, and locations of Tutsi civilians, as well as instructions on where militias should gather. Ordinary Rwandans, many of them poor farmers, were bombarded with a steady stream of dehumanising propaganda that painted the Tutsi minority as “cockroaches” and enemies of the state. The written press, particularly Kangura, reinforced this hatred through articles such as the “Hutu Ten Commandments,” which urged Hutu men to avoid Tutsi women and treat all Tutsi as threats. These messages were not abstract, they were explicit calls for murder. International observers were aware of these broadcasts and publications but failed to act against them. The decision not to jam RTLM’s frequency was justified by some governments as a matter of free speech. The consequence was that hate radio remained on the air, providing encouragement and coordination throughout the slaughter.

Source S

French cartoon published in Le Monde, June 1994, criticizing UN inaction during the Rwandan genocide and the tolerance of RTLM hate radio broadcasts: “It was about time we arrived!

Source T

Testimony of a Rwandan Survivor, Gacaca Court, 2002

I had lived next to my neighbour for twenty years. We shared harvests, celebrated weddings, and mourned the dead together. But in April 1994 everything changed. After listening to the radio, he came to my house with others, carrying machetes. They called us cockroaches. He shouted, “The radio says we must do our duty. If we don’t, they will kill us first.” I could not believe it was him, this man who had once cared for my children. But RTLM gave him courage and gave him orders. They told people where to find us, which roadblocks to avoid, and how to prove loyalty to the Hutu cause. It was not only the killers with guns or uniforms; it was neighbours, teachers, and friends. All said the same thing: the radio told them. I survived by hiding, but my husband and children were killed. The machetes struck because of words. Without the radio, I believe many would never have joined the killings. It poisoned everything.

Source Q

Statement by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, March 1999

After months of failed negotiations and escalating violence in Kosovo, NATO has no choice but to act. Our mission is clear: to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and to protect the innocent. Serbian forces have driven hundreds of thousands from their homes, committing crimes that shock the conscience. Every effort at diplomacy was rejected by Belgrade. We take no pleasure in using force, but inaction would mean complicity. NATO is united: our air campaign will continue until Milosevic withdraws his forces, allows refugees to return, and accepts an international peacekeeping presence. This is not aggression against the Serbian people but a defence of human rights. We cannot and will not stand by while Europe once again witnesses ethnic cleansing.

Source R

Report from Amnesty International, October 1999

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was justified by the urgent need to prevent atrocities. Yet the conduct of the air campaign raises serious concerns. While NATO emphasised precision targeting, many civilians were killed by bombing raids. Strikes on bridges, factories, and television stations blurred the line between military and civilian targets. The destruction of infrastructure deepened the humanitarian crisis, leaving communities without electricity, water, or livelihoods. Moreover, NATO acted without explicit UN Security Council authorisation, setting a troubling precedent for bypassing international law. The bombing may have forced Serbian withdrawal, but it also fuelled resentment, both within Serbia and globally. For many, NATO’s actions highlighted the tension between humanitarian aims and the principles of sovereignty and legality.

Source S

Belgrade under fire during NATO’s 1999 campaign over Kosovo

Source T

Testimony of a KFOR peacekeeper, 2000

When we arrived in Kosovo after the bombing, the destruction was immense. Villages were burned, infrastructure shattered. Our task was overwhelming: protect returning refugees, disarm remaining militias, and prevent revenge attacks. Many Albanians saw us as liberators, but Serb civilians feared us, accusing NATO of bias. In some areas, we struggled to stop reprisal killings and the expulsion of Serbs. It felt like we were always one step behind events. Still, the presence of KFOR stabilised the situation. Refugees returned in large numbers, and basic order slowly returned. But real peace was fragile. Trust between communities was broken, and the scars of violence were everywhere. We were not miracle workers; we could only contain the conflict, not resolve it.