Paper 1 - The Move to Global War Questionbank

Source A

An extract from a memoir, written in 1931, by Ubukata Toshiro, a journalist-novelist, who was a teenager at the start of the Sino-Japanese War.

... Everybody agreed that it would be very difficult to capture Pyongyang, since the city held huge British cannons. However, in August, the Japanese army overpowered Pyongyang with so little effort that it almost was disappointing - and the Japanese people were enraptured. My home town had no telephone system back then. News of victories came to the police before the newspaper received it, thanks to a telegraph line between the post office and police station. All news was put upon the message board in front of the police station, and we children ran to check it several times a day. The excitement of the Japanese people was beyond imagination. After all, C hina was thirty times as big as Japan, and its population was over 200 million, compared t o o u r 30 million. It had such a competent leader in Li Hongzhang ... and this was our first war with a foreign country, a country supported moreover by the British. Everyone - adults, children, the aged, the women - talked about war and nothing else, day and night ... no one ever had been as happy as when we learned of the fall of Pyongyang ...

Source B

A Japanese artist depicts Chinese officials surrendering to naval officers in 1895

Source C

An extract from Japanese government official Hayashi, written in June 1895 following the Triple Intervention.

We must continue to study and make use of Western methods ... If new warships are considered necessary we must, at any cost, build them; if the organisation of our army is inadequate we must start rectifying it from now; if need be, our entire military system must be changed. At present Japan must keep calm and sit tight, so as to lull suspicions nurtured against her; during this time the foundations of her national power must be consolidated; and we must watch and wait for the opportunity in the Orient that will surely come one day. When this day arrives Japan will decide her own fate; and she will be able not only to put into their place the powers who seek to meddle in her affairs; she will even be able, should this be necessary, to meddle in their affairs.

Source D

John Hunter B oyle. Modern Japan: The American Nexus ( 1993 ).

Speaking for many of his countrymen, journalist Tokutomi wrote that the Triple Intervention was to transform him psychologically and dominate the rest of this life . "Say what you will, it had happened because we weren't strong enough. What it came down to was that sincerity and justice didn't amount to a thing if you weren't strong enough." Japan had learned to emulate the West. It had played by the rules. From the standpoint of the victim, they were not particularly fair rules, but they were the established rules of imperialism. Now, in Japan's moment of victory, it found that it was reviled by yellow-peril sloganeering and denied equal membership in the imperialist club. Japanese, even those who had been most enthusiastic about Western models, became convinced, as Marius Jensen writes, that international law and institutional modernization alone would never bring full respect and equality from the West.

Source A

A graph showing Japanese exports 1926-38

Source B

Prime Minister Wakatsuki's appeal to the secretary of the respected Prince Saionji

Kinmochi in 1931. I am not being kept informed by either the Foreign Ministry or the Army Ministry ... I have just warned them through Chief of Cabinet Secretary Kawasaki ... The Chinese forces in Manchuria and Mongolia number more than two hundred thousand [sic] while We have only ten thousand. I asked the army minister, "What are you going to do if, by chance, your challenge causes something you haven't anticipated - something that given you are so outnumbered you can't stop?" The army minister told me, "We'll send in troops from Korea ... indeed, they may have already gone in." I rebuked him: "How can you allow dispatch of soldiers from Korea without Government authorization? " He said, "Well, the fact is that during the Tanaka cabinet (1927-29) troops were dispatched without imperial sanction." I gathered he had not foreseen any problem at all ... under these circumstances I am quite powerless to restrain the military. How can his majesty's military act without his sanction? What can I do? Maybe I should not be talking to you like this, but can you do anything? ... I am in serious trouble .

Cited in Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, page 236, by Herbert P.Bix

Source C

Saburo Ienaga, a Japanese historian, in an academic book The Pacific War (Taiheiyo Senso) 1 931-45, page 129 ( 1968).

The Imperial Army's march into Manchuria was presented as an act of self-defence to guard "Japan's lifeline", which had been acquired at great cost in blood and treasure in the Sino -Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. Next, North China and Inner Mongolia had to be controlled to guard Manchuria. Protecting These areas required further advances into the heartland of China. This pattern of over-expanding military operations confirmed a truism about international conflict: once a war escalates uncontrollably in the quest for elusive victory.

How could China be brought to its knees? That was an intractable problem.

Source D

An extract from Kenneth B. Pyle, The Making of Modern Japan, page 189 ( 1996).

The weakness of the government, the diffuseness of decision-making power, the general confusion and uncertainty attending both the domestic and foreign turmoil - all created an opportunity for resolute action by the Kwantung Army. It pushed ahead to conquer all of Manchuria and establish a Japanese puppet state, Manchukuo. Wakatsuki resigned and was replaced by a Seiyukai cabinet headed by Inukai Tsuyoshi. It was the last party government in pre -war Japan.

Source I

Extract from Adolf Hitler’s speech at the Nuremberg Rally, 12 September 1938.

“We demand justice for the three and a half million Germans in Czechoslovakia who suffer under oppression and indignity. These Germans are denied the right of self-determination, a right which all peoples deserve. We cannot and will not abandon them to a foreign government that mistreats them because of their nationality. The Sudeten Germans must be free to live as part of the great German Reich, with the same dignity and pride as their brothers in Austria. Our desire is peace, but peace cannot exist so long as our people are persecuted. It is the duty of the Reich to protect its citizens wherever they may be.”

Source J

Extract from a speech by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to the House of Commons, 5 October 1938, following the Munich Agreement.

“I believe we have secured peace for our time. The Munich settlement is not a triumph of force but of reason, ensuring that the legitimate grievances of the Sudeten Germans have been addressed without plunging Europe into war. By engaging in negotiation rather than confrontation, we have prevented catastrophe. The alternative was certain conflict on a scale greater than the world has yet seen. The government has acted in the true spirit of democracy, protecting the interests of the British people and upholding peace in Europe. While some may criticise this agreement, I am convinced that history will judge it as a statesmanlike act of courage and foresight.”

Source K

Extract from historian Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, Nemesis (2000).

“The Munich Agreement represented both the peak of Hitler’s successes and the nadir of British and French foreign policy. While Chamberlain genuinely believed he had secured peace, in reality the Western democracies had conceded to blackmail. Hitler himself was astonished at the ease with which Britain and France surrendered Czechoslovakia’s defences without a fight. The policy of appeasement was based on the illusion that Hitler’s ambitions were limited and negotiable. In truth, Munich confirmed Hitler’s contempt for the West and encouraged further aggression. Within six months, Czechoslovakia was dismantled, and Europe was on the brink of war. The Munich settlement was not peace but a prelude to destruction.”

Source L

David Low cartoon, published in the Evening Standard, 4 October 1938. The cartoon shows a collapsing wall labelled “OUR NEW DEFENCE” with figures stumbling as it falls apart. Above the debris, the caption reads “I will be good—”.

Source I

Extract from Benito Mussolini’s proclamation to the Italian people, 7 April 1939, announcing the invasion of Albania.

“Italy’s destiny lies across the Adriatic. For centuries, Albania has been tied to our nation by history, culture, and geography. Today, Italy fulfils its mission by securing Albania’s future as part of a new order in Europe. The Albanian state has been weak and unstable, unable to ensure prosperity for its people or security for its borders. Our intervention brings stability, order, and the benefits of modern civilisation. This action is not conquest but liberation, guaranteeing Albania’s rightful place alongside Italy in the march of progress. Italy’s sacrifice and strength will ensure that Albania no longer remains a pawn of foreign powers but becomes a partner in building a stronger Mediterranean.”

Source J

Extract from a statement by British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the House of Commons, 13 April 1939.

“The Italian occupation of Albania is a clear act of aggression, carried out without justification and in violation of the independence of a sovereign state. The government of His Majesty regards this development with the utmost seriousness, for it demonstrates once again the disregard shown by certain powers for international law. Britain cannot stand by while smaller nations are absorbed by force. It is for this reason that the government has given assurances of support to Greece and Romania, recognising that Italy’s actions threaten the peace of the Balkans and the wider security of Europe. Yet Britain must also consider carefully the balance between deterrence and the preservation of peace, for the world is once again on the edge of calamity.”

Source K

Extract from historian Denis Mack Smith, Modern Italy: A Political History (1997).

“The Italian invasion of Albania in April 1939 was less about strategic necessity than about Mussolini’s pride and rivalry with Hitler. Determined not to be overshadowed by Germany’s dramatic expansion into Austria and Czechoslovakia, Mussolini sought a quick victory to prove Italy’s power. Albania, militarily weak and politically divided, was an easy target. International reaction was critical but limited: Britain and France issued formal protests and extended guarantees to Greece and Romania, but they were unwilling to confront Italy militarily. For Mussolini, Albania was intended as a show of strength, but in reality, it deepened Italy’s dependence on Germany, as the Western democracies drew further away and the Rome–Berlin Axis tightened. The episode demonstrated once again that the dictators could act with relative impunity, as Europe drifted ever closer to war.”

Source L

Public domain cartoon, c. April 1939.

Source I

Statement from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, September 1940, announcing the signing of the Tripartite Pact.

The Tripartite Pact is an agreement among three great powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan, to cooperate in establishing a new order that guarantees peace and justice. Japan, faced with encirclement and economic pressure, has taken this step to secure its rightful place in the world. The pact is not aimed at any nation which desires peace but only at those who would threaten the stability of East Asia or Europe. It affirms Japan’s leadership in establishing a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This alliance strengthens our defensive position and ensures that no hostile power can dominate Asia or Europe. Japan remains committed to peaceful development, but the world must know that aggression against us will be met with unified resistance.

Source J

Extract from U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s press statement, September 1940.

The agreement signed in Berlin among Germany, Italy, and Japan is clearly a threat to international peace. It demonstrates Japan’s increasing subservience to militarism and aggression. The so-called “new order” in East Asia is nothing more than domination through force and intimidation. The United States cannot accept the legitimacy of a pact whose very purpose is to divide the world into spheres of influence controlled by authoritarian powers. The people of Asia and Europe desire freedom, not subjugation. The United States will continue to oppose attempts to undermine the principle of self-determination. This pact confirms that Japan has abandoned any pretence of peaceful coexistence, instead aligning itself with forces bent on conquest.

Source K

Historian Akira Iriye, writing in The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (1987).

The Tripartite Pact was a diplomatic manoeuvre intended more as a deterrent than as a declaration of war. For Japan, the alliance promised recognition of its dominance in East Asia and access to resources, while for Germany and Italy it extended the threat to the United States. However, the pact was as much symbolic as practical, it did not create effective military coordination. Instead, it deepened U.S. suspicion of Japan and contributed to the escalation of economic sanctions. By aligning openly with Germany and Italy, Japan closed the door to compromise with Washington. While the pact was presented domestically as a triumph of diplomacy, in reality it was a gamble that further isolated Japan and brought it closer to conflict with the United States.

Source L

Political cartoon, 1940, international satirical publication. The cartoon depicts Hitler, Mussolini, and a Japanese figure as three monkeys enacting the proverb “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.” They sit on a pedestal labelled “Totalitarian Axis.”

Source I

Statement by Japanese Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, December 8, 1941, to the Japanese Diet (parliament).

The Empire of Japan has acted in self-defence and out of necessity. For months we sought peaceful settlement with the United States, but our just demands for an end to economic strangulation were ignored. America’s unjust embargo on oil and essential materials threatens the very survival of our nation. We could not stand idle while our people faced ruin. Our actions yesterday were not of aggression, but of preservation. Japan’s aim is to establish a new order of peace and stability in East Asia, ensuring prosperity for all nations of the region. By striking decisively, we have removed the menace that sought to undermine our rightful role in Asia. We call upon our citizens to unite in spirit and sacrifice, confident that our cause is just and that ultimate victory will secure Japan’s destiny.

Source J

Statement by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress, December 8, 1941 (“Day of Infamy” speech).

Yesterday, December 7, 1941, a date which will live in infamy, the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. The attack caused severe damage to American naval and military forces at Pearl Harbor, with many American lives lost. It is obvious that the attack was deliberately planned many days or even weeks ago. During that time, the Japanese government deliberately sought to deceive the United States by false statements of continued peace. The attack demonstrates the duplicity of Japan’s foreign policy. Japan has, therefore, launched an unprovoked and dastardly attack upon our nation. I ask Congress to declare that since the attack, a state of war has existed between the United States and the Empire of Japan.

Source K

Historian Ian Buruma, writing in The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (1994).

Pearl Harbor was not merely a military strike; it was a gamble born out of desperation. Japan’s leaders believed that crippling the U.S. Pacific Fleet would force America to negotiate a settlement favorable to Japanese dominance in Asia. Yet this miscalculation underestimated both American industrial strength and public resolve. Rather than dividing the United States, the attack unified the nation and gave Roosevelt the political mandate to enter the war fully. Pearl Harbor therefore marked not just the escalation of the Pacific conflict but the transformation of World War II into a truly global war. It symbolized the final collapse of Japan’s diplomacy, where force replaced negotiation and short-term military success led to long-term strategic disaster.

Source L

Propaganda cartoon, 1942 (artist unknown; published in U.S. wartime media).