Reasons for Inaction
UNAMIR’s Shortcomings
- Under-Resourced Mission
- UNAMIR was severely under-resourced from the start. Authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 872 in October 1993, it initially had only about 2,548 troops (far fewer than the planned 8,000).
- Many were lightly armed and not equipped for active combat. These shortcomings worsened after Belgian troops withdrew.
- Minimal Budget and Limited Mandate
- The mission’s budget was minimal, restricting capacity.
- Its mandate focused on monitoring the ceasefire and assisting with implementing the Arusha Accords, but it lacked the mandate and resources for robust peace enforcement or civilian protection.
- Contributing countries provided troops with inconsistent levels of training and equipment, leading to uneven capability across the mission.
- Logistical and Technical Constraints
- UNAMIR faced severe logistical and technical problems.
- The mission lacked sufficient communication equipment, vehicles, and supplies, which limited mobility and coordination.
- Troops lacked adequate armored vehicles and heavy weapons, leaving them vulnerable in hostile environments.
- Restrictive Rules of Engagement
- UNAMIR’s rules of engagement prevented proactive intervention.
- Despite repeated requests for reinforcements, the UN Security Council hesitated to increase support.
- This under-resourcing critically impaired UNAMIR’s ability to respond to escalating violence during the 1994 genocide, when thousands of civilians needed protection.
- Drastic Troop Reductions
- Despite Dallaire’s warnings, the UN reduced UNAMIR to just 270 personnel on 21 April.
- The remaining peacekeepers were instructed to seek a ceasefire, not to stop the genocide.
- Nonetheless, Dallaire and those who stayed continued to save lives where they could.
- Impact of Somalia Syndrome
- The shortcomings of UNAMIR must also be seen in the context of the 1993 US and UN failure in Somalia (the “Black Hawk Down” incident).
- This caused the US and international community to be reluctant to intervene militarily in Rwanda.
- The “Somalia syndrome” contributed to a weak UN mandate and limited international engagement during the buildup to genocide.
The Black Hawk Down Incident and the “Somalia Syndrome”
- Background
- In the early 1990s, Somalia was engulfed in civil war and famine after the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991.
- Warlords, particularly Mohamed Farrah Aidid, controlled territories, fueling instability and humanitarian crises.
- The UN launched UNOSOM, a peacekeeping and humanitarian mission, while the U.S. led UNITAF in 1992 to secure key areas and deliver aid.
- Tensions escalated between U.S. forces and Aidid’s militia, culminating in targeted raids against Aidid’s lieutenants.
- The Battle of Mogadishu (October 3–4, 1993)
- U.S. forces, including Army Rangers and Delta Force, launched a raid to capture two of Aidid’s top lieutenants.
- Using helicopters for insertion, they faced heavy resistance when Somali militias shot down two Black Hawk helicopters.
- What began as a quick raid turned into a 15-hour urban battle as U.S. troops fought to secure crash sites and rescue survivors.
- Result: 18 U.S. soldiers killed and more than 70 wounded.
- Operational and Tactical Challenges
- Mogadishu’s narrow streets, hostile civilians, and organized militias equipped with RPGs and small arms made combat difficult.
- Technical vehicles and intense fire hindered U.S. mobility and coordination.
- Recovery efforts for the Black Hawks required close-quarter combat and exposed the limits of conventional tactics in urban guerrilla warfare.
- Consequences
- The heavy U.S. casualties and graphic media coverage shifted U.S. and international opinion.
- By March 1994, U.S. troops withdrew from Somalia.
- The incident shaped U.S. military doctrine, emphasizing urban combat training, rapid evacuation, and coordination between special operations and conventional forces.
- The “Somalia Syndrome”
- Refers to the reluctance to intervene militarily after traumatic losses.
- Inspired by the U.S. failure in Somalia, it discouraged future interventions in failed states without clear political solutions.
- This reluctance directly influenced international hesitation during the Rwandan genocide.
