Reasons for Inaction
UNAMIR’s Shortcomings
- Under-Resourced Mission
- UNAMIR was severely under-resourced from the start. Authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 872 in October 1993, it initially had only about 2,548 troops (far fewer than the planned 8,000).
- Many were lightly armed and not equipped for active combat. These shortcomings worsened after Belgian troops withdrew.
- Minimal Budget and Limited Mandate
- The mission’s budget was minimal, restricting capacity.
- Its mandate focused on monitoring the ceasefire and assisting with implementing the Arusha Accords, but it lacked the mandate and resources for robust peace enforcement or civilian protection.
- Contributing countries provided troops with inconsistent levels of training and equipment, leading to uneven capability across the mission.
- Logistical and Technical Constraints
- UNAMIR faced severe logistical and technical problems.
- The mission lacked sufficient communication equipment, vehicles, and supplies, which limited mobility and coordination.
- Troops lacked adequate armored vehicles and heavy weapons, leaving them vulnerable in hostile environments.
- Restrictive Rules of Engagement
- UNAMIR’s rules of engagement prevented proactive intervention.
- Despite repeated requests for reinforcements, the UN Security Council hesitated to increase support.
- This under-resourcing critically impaired UNAMIR’s ability to respond to escalating violence during the 1994 genocide, when thousands of civilians needed protection.
- Drastic Troop Reductions
- Despite Dallaire’s warnings, the UN reduced UNAMIR to just 270 personnel on 21 April.
- The remaining peacekeepers were instructed to seek a ceasefire, not to stop the genocide.
- Nonetheless, Dallaire and those who stayed continued to save lives where they could.
- Impact of Somalia Syndrome
- The shortcomings of UNAMIR must also be seen in the context of the 1993 US and UN failure in Somalia (the “Black Hawk Down” incident).
- This caused the US and international community to be reluctant to intervene militarily in Rwanda.
- The “Somalia syndrome” contributed to a weak UN mandate and limited international engagement during the buildup to genocide.
Case study
The Black Hawk Down Incident and the “Somalia Syndrome”
- Background
- In the early 1990s, Somalia was engulfed in civil war and famine after the collapse of Siad Barre’s regime in 1991.
- Warlords, particularly Mohamed Farrah Aidid, controlled territories, fueling instability and humanitarian crises.
- The UN launched UNOSOM, a peacekeeping and humanitarian mission, while the U.S. led UNITAF in 1992 to secure key areas and deliver aid.
- Tensions escalated between U.S. forces and Aidid’s militia, culminating in targeted raids against Aidid’s lieutenants.
- The Battle of Mogadishu (October 3–4, 1993)
- U.S. forces, including Army Rangers and Delta Force, launched a raid to capture two of Aidid’s top lieutenants.
- Using helicopters for insertion, they faced heavy resistance when Somali militias shot down two Black Hawk helicopters.
- What began as a quick raid turned into a 15-hour urban battle as U.S. troops fought to secure crash sites and rescue survivors.
- Result: 18 U.S. soldiers killed and more than 70 wounded.
- Operational and Tactical Challenges
- Mogadishu’s narrow streets, hostile civilians, and organized militias equipped with RPGs and small arms made combat difficult.
- Technical vehicles and intense fire hindered U.S. mobility and coordination.
- Recovery efforts for the Black Hawks required close-quarter combat and exposed the limits of conventional tactics in urban guerrilla warfare.
- Consequences
- The heavy U.S. casualties and graphic media coverage shifted U.S. and international opinion.
- By March 1994, U.S. troops withdrew from Somalia.
- The incident shaped U.S. military doctrine, emphasizing urban combat training, rapid evacuation, and coordination between special operations and conventional forces.
- The “Somalia Syndrome”
- Refers to the reluctance to intervene militarily after traumatic losses.
- Inspired by the U.S. failure in Somalia, it discouraged future interventions in failed states without clear political solutions.
- This reluctance directly influenced international hesitation during the Rwandan genocide.
Rwanda and the UN Security Council
- Rwanda’s Position on the Security Council
- Rwanda held a rotating seat on the UN Security Council during the genocide.
- After the interim government took power, its representatives had insider access to all UN deliberations.
- This allowed them to monitor and anticipate international inaction, including Belgium’s withdrawal and the reluctance of the US, UK, and France to intervene.
- Role of Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh
- Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, the UN Head of Mission, minimized the scale of the killings in his reports to the Security Council, often contradicting Dallaire’s urgent accounts.
- Meanwhile, the genocidal regime’s representative remained in the Security Council chamber without censure.
Note
Command Structure of UNAMIR
- Head of Mission
- Civilian appointed by the UN Secretary-General.
- Represents the UN politically in the host country.
- Responsible for overall leadership of the mission.
- Focus on political, diplomatic, and administrative dimensions.
- Booh-Booh held this role and was formally above Dallaire.
- Force Commander
- Responsible for military operations and peacekeeping troops on the ground.
- Dallaire held this role.
- Reported to Booh-Booh as his direct superior.
Downplaying and Avoiding the Term "Genocide"
- Framing the Violence
- Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh repeatedly described the events in Rwanda as a civil war, not genocide.
- Despite urgent warnings from UNAMIR commander Roméo Dallaire, Booh-Booh maintained a politically cautious stance, emphasizing neutrality and avoiding confrontation with the Rwandan government.
- His reports downplayed the killings, calling them inter-ethnic conflict or a resumed war between the FAR and the RPF.
- Undermining Recognition of Genocide
- Booh-Booh’s reluctance to use the term genocide weakened efforts to secure reinforcements and a stronger mandate for intervention.
- This mischaracterization influenced the UN Security Council’s decision on 21 April 1994 to reduce UNAMIR’s troops during the genocide.
- Dallaire later criticized him for willful blindness and failure to act decisively.
- International Reluctance
- By late April 1994, humanitarian groups like Oxfam publicly referred to the killings as genocide.
- However, many governments, including the US and France, avoided the term, despite clear evidence of systematic extermination.
- Legal and Political Concerns
- Labeling the violence genocide would have triggered obligations under the 1948 Genocide Convention to intervene.
- Governments instead used vague terms like civil war or ethnic violence, allowing them to justify limited responses and avoid direct military involvement.
Historiography
Why Didn’t the International Community Intervene?
- Lack of Political Will and Geopolitical Importance
- Many scholars argue that the international community simply did not care enough to intervene in Rwanda.
- The genocide was seen as occurring in a small, remote African country with limited geopolitical importance.
- Samantha Power (2001) in A Problem from Hell emphasizes the moral failure and apathy of powerful nations, who prioritized national interests over humanitarian responsibility.
- The United States, France, and others showed little urgency, partly because of racial biases and the perception that African lives were less valuable (Des Forges, 1999, Leave None to Tell the Story).
- Somalia Syndrome
- Another explanation focuses on the “Somalia syndrome.”
- The traumatic failure of the U.S. and UN in Somalia (1993) made Western governments extremely wary of intervening in African conflicts.
- This caution, coupled with unclear strategic interests and Rwanda’s internal complexities, led to paralysis and reluctance to commit troops.
- This perspective stresses fear of another military failure over outright disregard.
- Underestimation of Atrocities
- Some scholars contend the UN genuinely underestimated the scale and nature of the atrocities.
- Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh downplayed the severity, labeling it a civil war rather than genocide.
- The Security Council’s delayed and limited response reflects both bureaucratic inertia and fragmented intelligence.
- Samantha Power (2001) also notes that while evidence was available, it was often ignored or dismissed by key officials, leading to catastrophic inaction.
