Role of France, Belgium and the US Notes

The Role of France, Belgium, and the United States in the Rwandan Genocide

France

1. Support for the Hutu-led Government (1990–1993)
   1. From 1990 to late 1993, France openly backed Rwanda’s Hutu-led government against the Tutsi-dominated RPF rebels.
   2. While encouraging peace talks like the Arusha Accords, France simultaneously trained the Rwandan army and Interahamwe militia.
   3. In October 1990, France sent 600 elite troops to protect Kigali during the initial RPF invasion. French operatives remained even after official troop withdrawals.
2. Military Cooperation and Alliance
   1. In 1975 and again in the late 1980s, France signed military cooperation agreements with Rwanda, training and arming the Rwandan army (FAR) and sending military advisors.
   2. When the RPF invaded in 1990, France saw it as a threat to its ally and external aggression, stepping in to help.
   3. France maintained a long-standing alliance with President Juvénal Habyarimana, whose government was dominated by the Hutu elite.
   4. France continued to see Habyarimana as the legitimate head of state despite growing evidence of ethnic violence.
   5. The RPF, composed mainly of Tutsi exiles from Uganda, was framed as foreign-backed rebels. This framing justified continued French military and political support.
   6. France labeled the RPF as “Khmer Noir,” linking them to Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge, which France had ironically supported decades earlier.
3. Operation Amaryllis (April 1994)
   1. Days after Habyarimana’s assassination, France launched Operation Amaryllis, sending 500 soldiers to evacuate mainly Western foreigners.
   2. The operation’s primary objective was to evacuate French citizens (including diplomats, aid workers, missionaries, and families).
   3. France also evacuated other European and Western nationals (Belgian, American, other non-African expatriates, UN personnel, NGO staff, businesspeople).
   4. In selective cases, France evacuated Rwandan nationals, particularly those connected to the Hutu-led government (relatives of elites, military members, ruling party MRND).
   5. Ordinary Rwandan civilians, including Tutsis and moderate Hutus, were excluded. Many Rwandan staff for embassies or NGOs were left behind despite pleas for protection.
   6. This highlighted what France could have done early to prevent violence but chose not to.
4. Support for the Interim Hutu Government
   1. France maintained close relations with the interim Hutu government in April–May 1994, providing political support.
   2. Reports suggest continued arms shipments despite UN embargoes.
   3. French personnel, possibly mercenaries, were seen around Kigali. Authorities denied knowledge but were criticized for supporting genocidal leaders.
5. Operation Turquoise (June 1994)
   1. France led a UN-backed intervention, Operation Turquoise, officially aimed at protecting civilians.
   2. About 2,500 French troops were deployed.
   3. A “safe zone” was created along the Rwanda–Zaire border.
   4. While many Tutsi lives were saved, numerous Hutu perpetrators used the safe zone to flee into Zaire.
   5. The RPF condemned the operation as protecting the failing Hutu regime and criticized coordination problems between UNAMIR and French troops.
6. Aftermath and Controversy
   1. Evidence implicating France in enabling genocide through support and negligence has long been debated.
   2. French government inquiries exonerated France.
   3. France was the only country to recognize the genocidal interim government and granted asylum to some fugitives.
   4. Public debates and trials began decades later, continuing to strain Rwanda–France relations.

Belgium

1. Colonial Legacy
   1. Belgium was Rwanda’s former colonial power.
   2. It had deep-rooted connections and a strong understanding of the region.
   3. Colonial policies institutionalized ethnic divisions by favouring the Tutsi minority over the Hutu majority.
   4. This laid the foundations for long-term ethnic tensions.
2. Contribution to UNAMIR
   1. In 1993, Belgium provided the largest Western troop contingent to UNAMIR.
   2. Belgium presented itself as an expert on African affairs.
   3. This position collapsed after ten Belgian peacekeepers were tortured and killed in April 1994, during the early hours of the genocide.
3. Impact of Withdrawal
   1. Belgium’s swift withdrawal created a major psychological and operational blow to the mission.
   2. General Dallaire and UN officials described it as devastating.
   3. The withdrawal signalled to génocidaires that Western nations would not risk lives for African civilians.
4. Influence on International Policy
   1. Belgium’s exit influenced France and the US to adopt a policy of non-intervention.
   2. Although Belgium and France had the military capacity to protect civilians, both prioritized domestic political concerns.
   3. Many Belgian soldiers reportedly wanted to remain in Rwanda.
5. Historical Judgment
   1. The 1999 Carlsson Report condemned Belgium’s withdrawal as morally negligent and humiliating.
   2. Former officers like Colonel Luc Marchal stated the withdrawal sentenced thousands of Tutsi to death.

United States

1. Non-Intervention Policy
   1. Despite early and clear evidence of genocide, the U.S. chose not to take a leading role in stopping the massacres.
   2. Influenced by the loss of 18 U.S. soldiers in Somalia (1993), the government prioritized avoiding casualties and political risk, adopting a policy of non-intervention.
2. Deliberate Caution
   1. This stance was deliberate, reflecting lack of political will rather than ignorance or oversight.
   2. U.S. officials engaged in what Samantha Power calls a “two-month dance to avoid the g-word,” refusing to officially label the mass killings as genocide until June 1994.
3. Legal and Political Concerns
   1. Recognizing genocide would have obligated action under the Genocide Convention.
   2. The U.S. also pressured the UN Security Council to avoid the term, weakening international response efforts.
   3. Instead of supporting intervention, the U.S. discouraged deploying additional troops or resources.
4. Impact on the UN
   1. U.S. obstructionism crippled the UN’s capacity to respond, worsening the scale of the genocide.
   2. U.S. diplomatic actions reflected broader strategic disinterest in Rwanda, seen as “small, poor, remote, and irrelevant.”
5. Focus on Other Crises
   1. The Clinton administration prioritized crises in Haiti and Bosnia, with Rwanda considered a “sideshow.”
   2. Domestic political concerns, including elections, overshadowed humanitarian considerations.
6. Clinton’s Apology
   1. In 1998, President Bill Clinton apologized in Kigali, acknowledging U.S. failure to act.
   2. Scholars and officials have since criticized U.S. policy as morally dishonorable, highlighting how the genocide unfolded due to conscious decisions in Washington.