The Response of the International Community to the Rwandan Genocide: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
- The international response to the Rwandan genocide was marked by paralysis and failure, with UNAMIR under-resourced and France, Belgium, and the US unwilling to intervene or prevent mass atrocities.
- In this section we will focus on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).
The UNAMIR
- Establishment and Mandate
- UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was established on 5 October 1993 by UN Security Council Resolution 872.
- Its mandate was to assist in implementing the Arusha Accords.
- The mission aimed to support the transitional government, ensure the security of Kigali, oversee the demobilization of forces, and provide humanitarian aid.
- It was a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission, requiring consent from both parties and with limited authority to use force.
- Leadership
- UNAMIR was led by Canadian General Roméo Dallaire as Force Commander.
- Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of Cameroon served as Head of Mission and Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General.
- The force was to comprise 2,548 personnel, including troops, military observers, and support staff.
- Belgian Contingent
- Belgium provided approximately 400 highly trained paratroopers, one of the largest and best-equipped national contingents.
- These troops were considered especially valuable due to Belgium’s historical ties to Rwanda and their French-language capacity, which eased communication.
- Deployment and Daily Presence
- Despite UNAMIR’s shortcomings, Dallaire’s forces were stationed in key locations, including the capital.
- They maintained daily interactions with the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the RPF, political leaders, and local officials.
- Informant Network
- UNAMIR developed a limited but significant network of informants.
- On 10 January 1994, an Interahamwe informant, known as “Jean-Pierre,” told Dallaire that militias were training civilians to kill Tutsis, weapons were being distributed across Kigali, and there was a clear plan to exterminate the Tutsi population.
- The Genocide Fax
- Dallaire immediately recognized the urgency and sent the now-famous “Genocide Fax” to UN HQ in New York.
- He sought permission to raid weapons caches.
- The request was denied due to mandate limitations.
The Genocide Cable/Fax
- Background
- In his memoir, Shake Hands with the Devil (2003), Dallaire explains the Cable event in detail.
- He sent it as Force Commander of UNAMIR, after receiving alarming information from an informant within the Interahamwe militia, known by the pseudonym Jean-Pierre. This individual, allegedly a high-level trainer and insider close to the ruling party (MRND), disclosed that extremist Hutu factions were planning mass extermination of Tutsis.
- Content of the Fax
- He revealed that arms caches were distributed across Kigali, kill lists had been compiled, and militias were being trained to kill up to 1,000 Tutsis in 20 minutes. He also stated that if exposed, he would likely be killed.
- In the fax sent to the UN, Dallaire requested authorization to raid the arms caches and provide protection to the informant. He believed that preemptive action could prevent an impending massacre.
- UN Response
- The response from UN Headquarters, notably Kofi Annan (then head of UN peacekeeping) and his deputy Iqbal Riza, denied the request, citing UNAMIR’s limited Chapter VI mandate and the need to maintain neutrality.
- Dallaire was instructed instead to share the intelligence with Rwandan authorities, some of whom were complicit in the plot.
- Aftermath
- The “Genocide Fax” is now regarded as a critical missed warning. It provided the UN with direct evidence of genocidal planning three months before the genocide began.
- Its dismissal has been widely condemned in post-genocide assessments, including the UN Inquiry on Rwanda (1999), which acknowledged systemic failure. Dallaire later wrote that this inaction “shattered his faith in humanity.”
- Following the genocide, Dallaire suffered from PTSD and depression. He testified before the ICTR and in his memoir condemned the international community’s inaction.
- Today, he is a global advocate for human rights, child soldiers, and genocide prevention. His moral courage and emotional honesty have made him a respected voice in post-genocide reckoning.
The Killing of the Belgian Peacekeepers
- Morning of 7 April 1994
- Just hours after President Juvénal Habyarimana was assassinated (evening of 6 April).
- 10 Belgian peacekeepers from UNAMIR, stationed at Camp Kigali, were ambushed, captured, and brutally murdered by the Rwandan army (FAR).
- Capture and Execution
- Belgians were disarmed under the pretense of protection.
- The Rwandan army separated them from other peacekeepers.
- Taken to Camp Kigali, where they were:
- Tortured and hacked to death with bayonets and machetes.
- Fingernails pulled out and bodies mutilated as intimidation.
- Aftermath
- Belgium withdrew all forces by 19 April 1994.
- This severely weakened UNAMIR and demoralized the mission.
- The withdrawal also pressured other countries to reconsider their presence in Rwanda.
- Overall impact: contributed to the failure of international response.


