IB History Vietnam War Notes

The Domino Theory and the Cold War (1950s–1970s)

Background and Origins

• The Domino Theory emerged during the early Cold War as a key idea behind U.S. foreign policy.
• It was first articulated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1954, after the communist victory in Vietnam’s anti-French war.
• The theory suggested that if one country in a region fell to communism, neighboring nations would soon follow, like a row of falling dominos.
• It reflected the growing U.S. fear of Soviet expansion in Asia, Latin America, and beyond.

Application During the Cold War

• The theory guided U.S. involvement in Korea (1950–1953) and later in Vietnam (1955–1975), where American leaders feared a communist takeover would spread across Southeast Asia.
• In Latin America, the Domino Theory justified U.S. intervention in Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1961) to prevent Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere.
• The U.S. supported anti-communist governments and military dictatorships, seeing them as necessary to stop “the first domino” from falling.
• It also led to massive military spending and long-term commitments that shaped the Cold War balance of power.

Impact and Legacy

• The Domino Theory led the U.S. into costly and unpopular wars, particularly in Vietnam, where the fear of communism outweighed local realities.
• In Southeast Asia, some countries (like Laos and Cambodia) did experience communist movements, partly confirming the theory, but others, like Thailand and Malaysia, did not fall.
• In Latin America, the theory justified decades of U.S. intervention and support for repressive regimes, fueling anti-American sentiment.
• By the 1970s, critics argued that the theory oversimplified complex regional issues, turning political struggles into global ideological battles.