IB History Italian Expansion: Albania Notes

The Invasion of Albania (April 1939)

1. Between 1936 and 1939, Italy was deeply involved in the Spanish Civil War, sending approximately 75,000 troops plus weapons and naval support to Franco's Nationalists. "Money, troops and supplies that Italy could not afford were wasted" on an intervention that brought no territorial gains.
2. When Germany annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia (March 1939) without consulting Italy, Mussolini felt humiliated and wanted to demonstrate that Italy could also act decisively. Albania, already an Italian client state economically dependent on Italy, was the easiest target.
3. Italy invaded Albania on 7 April 1939. Italian forces landed at several Albanian ports including Durres, Vlore, Saranda, and Shengjin. Resistance was minimal as Albania's small army was no match for the Italian military. King Zog fled to Greece.
4. Albania was formally annexed to Italy. The Italian King Victor Emmanuel III was declared King of Albania. The invasion gave Italy a strategic base in the Balkans and control of the Albanian coastline opposite southern Italy across the Adriatic Sea.
5. The invasion was Mussolini's third military campaign in four years (after Abyssinia and Spain). Each had drained Italy's limited resources further. Despite expanding territory, Italy's military remained fundamentally unprepared for a major war: only 10 of 73 divisions were combat-ready, equipment was outdated, and ammunition reserves would last only weeks.

International Response to the Albanian Invasion

1. Britain and France condemned the invasion but took no direct action. By April 1939, appeasement was collapsing (Germany had just occupied Czechoslovakia in March), but the democracies were still unwilling to confront Italy militarily.
2. In response to the Albanian invasion, Britain and France issued guarantees to Greece and Romania (in addition to their existing guarantee to Poland from March 1939). These guarantees pledged to defend the independence of these states if attacked, but their enforceability without Soviet cooperation remained questionable.
3. The Soviet Union "led world criticism of Italy in the Abyssinian Crisis and later during Italy's invasion of Albania." The Soviets continued to oppose Italian expansion but remained focused on their own industrialisation and rearmament.
4. The League of Nations was effectively irrelevant by April 1939. Italy had already withdrawn from the League in December 1937, and the organisation had proven incapable of stopping aggression after the Manchurian and Abyssinian crises. No sanctions were even discussed.
5. The Albanian invasion further confirmed the pattern established since the Rhineland: aggression went unpunished. Each act of expansion by Italy and Germany was met with protests but no effective counter-action, emboldening both dictators to push further.

The Pact of Steel (May 1939)

1. Just weeks after the Albanian invasion, Italy signed the Pact of Steel (22 May 1939) with Germany. This transformed the Rome-Berlin Axis from a diplomatic understanding into a full military alliance. If either country went to war, the other was obligated to join.
2. Mussolini had warned Hitler that Italy would not be ready for war until 1943. Hitler had promised there would be no war before then. Italian Foreign Minister Ciano recorded deep scepticism in his diary, noting that Germany treated Italy as a "junior partner."
3. "Germany's economy was far greater than that of Italy, and with Germany's economic and military expansion in the late 1930s, Italy was soon reduced to a junior partner in their relationship. This meant that Germany, not Italy, determined the course of their mutual foreign policies and that in time, Italy's opinions were of little importance to Hitler."
4. The Nazi-Soviet Pact (23 August 1939) shocked Mussolini, who was informed only two days before signing. Hitler made this major decision without consulting his ally, further exposing the unequal nature of the Axis.

Italy's Entry into the Second World War

1. When Germany invaded Poland (1 September 1939), Italy declared "non-belligerency" rather than joining. Mussolini chose this term rather than "neutral" to preserve the appearance of an active choice. He sent Hitler a deliberately impossible list of 17 million tonnes of supplies needed to enter.
2. The Fall of France (May-June 1940) transformed Mussolini's calculations. Germany's stunning Blitzkrieg victory in six weeks convinced him the war would be short and Italy must join before it ended. He feared a neutral Italy would become "another Switzerland" in a German-dominated Europe.
3. Italy declared war on Britain and France on 10 June 1940, just days before France's surrender. Mussolini told his Chief of Staff: "I need only a few thousand dead to sit at the peace conference as a belligerent." He envisioned a "parallel war" where Italy would pursue its own objectives independently.
4. Italy's territorial ambitions included Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, and Djibouti from France, and Egypt and Sudan from Britain. Mussolini wanted to transform the Mediterranean into an Italian lake (Mare Nostrum).

Italy's Military Failures

1. Italy's initial engagement was minor skirmishes against France before the armistice (25 June 1940). Despite facing a collapsing French army, Italian forces gained minimal territory.
2. In September 1940, 236,000 Italian troops invaded Egypt from Libya but were routed by a much smaller British force of 36,000. By February 1941, Britain had captured 130,000 Italian prisoners and advanced 800 km into Libya. Germany had to send Rommel's Afrika Korps to prevent total collapse.
3. In October 1940, Mussolini invaded Greece from Albania without informing Hitler, partly to prove Italy could match German military successes. The Greek army pushed the Italians back into Albania, humiliating Mussolini and forcing Germany to intervene in the Balkans in April 1941.
4. Both failures exposed Italy's fundamental military weaknesses and destroyed the "parallel war" concept. Italy became completely dependent on Germany. The Balkan campaign potentially delayed Operation Barbarossa by approximately five weeks, contributing to Germany's failure to capture Moscow before winter 1941.
5. Fascist ideology's emphasis on military glory far exceeded Italy's actual capability. Years of military spending had produced quantity but not quality. The gap between rhetoric and reality proved catastrophic, ultimately leading to Italy's defeat and Mussolini's overthrow in July 1943.

Historiography, Source Analysis, and Exam Preparation

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