IB History Italian Expansion: Abyssinia Notes

Mussolini's Aims and the Italian Empire

1. Mussolini wanted to create an empire to make Italy a Great Power like Britain and France. "There were economic reasons why empire was needed as well, but Mussolini did not emphasize these in his public statements." Empire-building was central to fascist ideology and the Roman revival narrative.
2. Italy's existing colonial empire (Libya, Eritrea, and Somalia) "were not particularly important and were somewhat of an embarrassment because of their poverty." Italy had seized Libya from the Ottoman Empire before WWI, but "this territory had few people and few resources, and oil had yet to be discovered."
3. "The creation of an Italian Empire was not Mussolini's idea; it had been Italian policy for decades." Italy had long sought to expand in Africa but lacked the resources. "When reviewing the world map for suitable territory to conquer in nearby Africa, there remained only Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and Liberia."
4. Abyssinia was "conveniently located beside the Italian colonies of Somaliland and Eritrea, and its borders were loosely defined." Mussolini was "completely uninterested in its economic potential" and "also disregarded the state of the Italian economy, which was totally unprepared to finance a war for any purpose."

The Wal-Wal Incident and the Road to Invasion

1. In December 1934, a clash occurred between Italian and Abyssinian troops at the small oasis of Wal-Wal, "80 km (50 miles) on the Abyssinian side of the border with Italian Somaliland, leaving at least two Italian soldiers and over 100 Abyssinian troops dead."
2. Italy demanded $100,000 and an official apology. Abyssinia appealed to the League of Nations. An arbitration committee announced in September 1935 that the incident "was minor and that neither country was at fault."
3. "Mussolini, however, had already directed the Italian army in December 1934 to prepare for the invasion. Armies also prepared to invade from neighbouring Italian colonies." The Wal-Wal Incident was a pretext, not a cause. Mussolini had decided on war regardless of the arbitration outcome.
4. "Britain and France were very aware of Italy's plans, but were unwilling to jeopardize their relationship with Italy." A British Foreign Office memo by Sir Robert Vansittart stated bluntly: "Italy will have to be bought off... or Abyssinia will eventually perish."
5. In January 1935, French FM Pierre Laval met Mussolini and "verbally promised Mussolini that France would not interfere with Italy's actions in Abyssinia; France's main concern was Germany." The Stresa Front (April 1935) focused only on European issues, and Mussolini interpreted the silence on Africa as consent.

The Invasion and Its Brutality

1. "October 1935 saw the long-expected invasion of Abyssinia." Italian forces attacked from both Eritrea in the north and Somalia in the south. "The relatively modern Italian forces annihilated the Abyssinian armies sent against them that used a variety of antique weapons."
2. "Aerial bombing by the Italians and the liberal use of poison gas over large areas led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of men, women, children and livestock, poisoning water and destroying crops." Italy's use of mustard gas violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol which Italy had signed.
3. Over 750,000 Abyssinians were killed during the war and occupation. "Inhabitants and livestock of whole villages were completely destroyed. Suffering in Abyssinia continued after the war officially was declared over."
4. MacGregor Knox's research uncovered Mussolini's personal telegrams ordering war crimes: "To finish off rebels, as in case at Ancober, use gas" (June 1936); "I repeat my authorization to initiate and systematically conduct policy of terror and extermination against rebels and populations in complicity with them" (July 1936).
5. In February 1937, Mussolini agreed that the "male population of Goggetti over 18 years of age is to be shot and village destroyed." Guerrilla attacks on Italian forces "were relatively minor, but continued throughout Italy's occupation of Abyssinia" - probably due to "the lack of weapons and organization, but also because of the sheer violence of the Italian military's response."
6. Emperor Haile Selassie "escaped to Britain while practically all organized opposition to the Italian occupation collapsed." Italian Somaliland, Eritrea, and Abyssinia were merged into Italian East Africa with its capital at Addis Ababa. The King of Italy was retitled Emperor of Ethiopia. Mussolini proclaimed "the foundation of a new Roman Empire."

International Responses to the Invasion

The League of Nations

1. "In October 1935, the League, led by Britain and France, condemned the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, voting for a gradually escalating programme of economic sanctions." However, "the League placed no embargo on oil exports to Italy, which would have brought the Italian economy to a halt, and quickly."
2. F.S. Northedge confirmed: "The British and French Governments never had any intention of using force against Italy to stop its advance in Abyssinia, or even of closing the Suez Canal, which would have locked Italian forces in East Africa in a trap." Laval even "regarded an oil embargo as a form of military sanction" and opposed it.
3. The Peace Ballot (June 1935) had shown 10 million out of 11 million British votes backed economic sanctions over military intervention. The British public wanted the League to act, but not through war. The November 1935 election pressured the government to appear supportive of the League.
4. The Hoare-Laval Pact (December 1935) proposed giving Italy two-thirds of Abyssinia. "There was a strong possibility that the Hoare-Laval Plan would have been acceptable to Mussolini, but it was leaked to the French press" causing an "explosion of rage" that forced Hoare's resignation. "No one bothered to ask Abyssinia's government for its opinion."

Responses of Other Powers

1. The USA "worked diplomatically to encourage Mussolini not to invade." US Neutrality Acts blocked arms sales to both sides, but "this only affected Abyssinia as Italy produced much of its own war materiel." Once Abyssinia was absorbed, the USA "refused to recognize this annexation, in line with the Stimson Doctrine invoked against Japan."
2. The Soviet Union was "in no condition to exercise an aggressive foreign policy" due to mass industrialisation. However, the Soviets issued declarations that Abyssinia's independence "must be guaranteed," imposed a full trade embargo on Italy, and "the Soviet representative harangued Italian representatives, condemning their statements regarding Abyssinia in the strongest of terms."
3. France believed it needed Italy to help guarantee its allies "in the Little Entente against Germany." French opinion was divided: "socialists supporting the League and conservatives supporting Italy." Many conservatives believed Mussolini, as an anti-communist, "should be given free rein in Ethiopia" so that "a united front could face a potentially aggressive Soviet Union."
4. "Britain and France, in addition to all the other pressures, did not want to militarily threaten Italy as this could lead to a war which they could not afford to fight. Again, in the midst of the Great Depression, no country wanted to have to rearm, much less rearm to defend a land far from home."

Consequences of the Abyssinian Crisis

1. "The Abyssinian Crisis revealed the League of Nations to be simply an extension of the foreign ministries of Britain and France." Collective security "failed in an effort by the governments of Britain and France to keep Italy as an ally against Germany while satisfying the demands of its citizens."
2. A.J.P. Taylor wrote: "This was the deathblow to the League as well as to Abyssinia. Fifty-two nations had combined to resist aggression; all they accomplished was that Haile Selassie lost all his country instead of only half."
3. "Italy was actually driven closer to Germany by League actions." Sanctions were lifted in July 1936. Italy signed the Rome-Berlin Axis (October 1936) and withdrew from the League (December 1937). The very outcome collective security was designed to prevent had occurred.
4. Haile Selassie addressed the League Assembly in June 1936: "It is us today. It will be you tomorrow." His prophecy proved accurate. Hitler, emboldened by the League's failure, remilitarised the Rhineland (March 1936) just months after sanctions failed.
5. "Economically, Italy was affected by the Abyssinian Crisis in many ways." Italy "was further isolated from the markets and relative wealth of Western Europe." This "encouraged Italy to continue expanding its economic ties with central and southeastern Europe, giving it more independence in its foreign policy" and pushing it toward the Axis.
6. The crisis demonstrated that the great powers "would not oppose each other's dealings with smaller states." Smaller nations concluded that the League existed only in theory. F.S. Northedge argued that collective security was "dealt a blow from which it never fully recovered."

Historiography, Source Analysis, and Exam Preparation

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