The Role of the Media in the Rwandan Genocide

1. The power of media
   1. The Rwandan genocide exposed the deadly influence of media.
   2. Radio in particular was weaponized to incite hatred, coordinate killings, and turn words into tools of mass violence.
2. Media as an instrument of genocide
   1. Kangura magazine and Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) were central propaganda outlets.
   2. They spread anti-Tutsi hatred long before and during the genocide.
   3. These outlets fueled extremist ideology, normalized violence, and mobilized perpetrators.

RTLM and the Rwandan Genocide

1. Initial RPF Attack (April 1994)
   1. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) shelled the RTLM radio station in Kigali during the first week of the genocide.
   2. They targeted it because RTLM was central in spreading propaganda and inciting mass killings.
   3. Despite the attack, RTLM resumed almost immediately using mobile transmitters on vehicles, which kept propaganda running throughout the 100 days of genocide.
2. Relocation After Kigali Falls (July 4, 1994)
   1. When the RPF captured Kigali, RTLM operations shifted to Gisenyi (near the Zaire border) and later into Zaire itself.
   2. Exiled members of the interim Hutu government continued broadcasts, spreading hate speech, mobilizing militias, and issuing threats against returning refugees and the RPF.
   3. These broadcasts prolonged regional instability and obstructed post-genocide reconciliation efforts.

Why didn’t the international community intervene the pro genocide media?

1. UN and US Failure to Jam RTLM
   1. Despite knowing RTLM’s central role, the UN and US failed to jam the station.
   2. Reasons included the high cost ($8,500 per hour), legal concerns about free speech, and political hesitation, particularly after Somalia.
2. US Department of Defense Assessment (May 1994)
   1. The Pentagon assessed that jamming RTLM would cost around $8,500 per hour, calling it “ineffective and expensive.”
   2. US officials argued that jamming RTLM, even though it was inciting genocide, could still conflict with international principles of freedom of expression.
   3. Although technically feasible through aircraft or satellite disruption, no action was taken.
   4. These justifications masked a deeper reluctance to act decisively, as officials prioritized procedure over the urgent humanitarian crisis.
3. Impact of Black Hawk Down (1993)
   1. The US, still reeling from the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia, was highly cautious about any military involvement in African conflicts.
   2. This trauma contributed to political hesitation and a lack of will to intervene in Rwanda, even through non-combat measures like radio jamming.
   3. The Clinton administration feared domestic backlash and chose inaction, despite knowing RTLM was inciting genocide.
4. UN Limitations (UNAMIR)
   1. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) recognized RTLM’s dangerous role before and during the genocide.
   2. General Roméo Dallaire repeatedly warned UN headquarters that the station was inciting mass murder and effectively coordinating killings.
   3. Despite these warnings, the UN lacked both the political authority and the technical capacity to jam broadcasts.
   4. UNAMIR had no mandate to conduct offensive operations or electronic warfare.
   5. Dallaire requested permission to disable RTLM by military means such as jamming the signal or destroying its infrastructure. The UN Security Council refused, citing legal and logistical concerns.
   6. Dallaire later described this refusal as a key failure that allowed the genocide to continue unchecked.
5. Earlier Warnings Ignored (1990s)
   1. As early as 1990, the UN and international NGOs were aware of extremist propaganda in Kangura, a Hutu magazine founded by Hassan Ngeze.
   2. Kangura published the notorious “Ten Hutu Commandments”, which promoted ethnic purity and dehumanized Tutsis.
   3. No concrete action was taken by the UN to suppress or counter this propaganda.
   4. While the magazine circulated freely throughout the early 1990s, the UN did not publicly denounce it or pressure the Habyarimana regime to shut it down.
   5. After the genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) convicted Ngeze for using Kangura to incite genocide.
   6. This demonstrated that inaction on hate media had deadly consequences.