NATO bombing campaign Notes

The NATO Bombing Campaign: Operation Allied Force

1. Duration and controversy
   1. The NATO air campaign, Operation Allied Force, lasted 78 days, ending on 10 June 1999.
   2. It marked a controversial use of military force by NATO, which traditionally focused on defending against external threats rather than intervening in a sovereign state’s internal conflict.
2. Bypassing the UN Security Council
   1. NATO acted without UN approval due to anticipated Russian and Chinese opposition.
   2. This raised questions about the legality and legitimacy of the intervention.
   3. Before the bombing, the conflict in Kosovo had resulted in fewer than 2,000 deaths and displaced fewer than 250,000 people. These numbers are far smaller than genocides elsewhere.

1. Scale of operations
   1. Fourteen NATO countries contributed aircraft, with the United States providing over 700 planes.
   2. The campaign involved around 38,000 sorties, one-third being strike missions targeting over 1,000 sites including military, police, and infrastructure facilities.
   3. NATO lost only two aircraft and suffered no combat fatalities, highlighting a highly precise and technologically advanced operation.
2. Resistance from Serbia
   1. Initial expectations of a swift campaign proved mistaken as Milosevic and Serbian forces resisted despite heavy bombardment.
   2. President Clinton publicly ruled out a ground invasion, a decision later seen by some military officials as a strategic error that emboldened Serbian resistance.
3. Political constraints
   1. NATO’s campaign was prolonged partly due to political considerations.
   2. General Michael C. Short criticized how national parliaments vetoed specific targets, hindering operations and extending the campaign.
   3. NATO sought to balance overwhelming air power with minimizing civilian casualties and avoiding direct ground conflict with Yugoslav forces.
4. Kofi Annan’s position
   1. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan supported the intervention in principle but criticized NATO’s unilateral action without Security Council authorization.
   2. He emphasized the Security Council’s primary role in maintaining international peace.
   3. Annan argued that regional organizations like NATO should operate under UN mandates whenever possible (Annan, 1999).

1. Civilian casualties
   1. During the Kosovo air campaign, NATO sometimes caused unintended civilian casualties, referred to as collateral damage.
   2. This term describes harm to civilians or non-military structures during military operations.
2. Bjakovica incident (April 14, 1999)
   1. NATO mistakenly bombed a convoy of Kosovar Albanian refugees near Bjakovica.
   2. The attack killed 82 civilians and injured 50.
3. The incident
   1. On 7 May 1999, NATO aircraft mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three journalists.
   2. The attack involved five bombs, intended for a nearby Yugoslav supply facility 400 meters away.
   3. The CIA’s reliance on outdated maps was cited as the cause of the targeting error.
4. China’s reaction
   1. China accused NATO of deliberately targeting the embassy, while the U.S. insisted it was unintentional.
   2. Investigations by The Observer and Politiken alleged the embassy had been used for Yugoslav military communications, though this was never officially confirmed.
5. International fallout
   1. China condemned the bombing as a “gross violation of sovereignty.”
   2. Massive protests erupted across Chinese cities, targeting U.S. embassies and businesses.
   3. The incident severely strained Sino-Western relations during the conflict.
6. U.S. response
   1. President Clinton publicly apologized in a broadcast, aired by Chinese state media.
   2. U.S. investigations confirmed the bombing was accidental.
   3. Later in 1999, the U.S. agreed to pay $28 million in compensation for damages to the embassy.

Ethnic Cleansing and “Operation Horseshoe”

1. Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign
   1. Targeted Kosovar Albanians and strongly influenced Western public support for NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign.
   2. NATO sought to force Slobodan Milošević to end the atrocities and withdraw from Kosovo.
2. Massive refugee exodus
   1. By the fourth day of NATO bombing, large-scale expulsions began.
   2. Serbian government reportedly used NATO attacks as cover to accelerate expulsions.
   3. Around 850,000 ethnic Albanians (over 80% of Kosovo’s population) fled to neighboring states.
3. Systematic and planned expulsions
   1. Human Rights Watch and UN reports described the campaign as organized and deliberate.
   2. Villages were surrounded, civilians forced to flee, and young Albanian men detained or executed on suspicion of KLA involvement.
4. Identity cleansing
   1. Refugees were stripped of belongings and identification.
   2. This aimed to prevent their return and erase their presence from Kosovo.
   3. Reflected deliberate Serbian state policy.
5. Demographic and political aims
   1. Expulsions sought to alter Kosovo’s demographic balance, enforce ethnic separation, and weaken both Kosovar Albanians and NATO’s resolve.
   2. However, international sympathy and global outcry ultimately strengthened opposition to Serbia.
6. Alleged Serbian plan
   1. Serbian government was accused of designing Operation Horseshoe (Potkova) to ethnically cleanse Kosovo.
   2. The strategy reportedly aimed to defeat the KLA, then forcibly expel Albanians by encircling the province and pushing them into Albania and Macedonia.
   3. German officials claimed to have early intelligence on the plan, but its existence has never been conclusively verified.
7. Serbian denial
   1. Serbia denied the existence of any formal ethnic cleansing plan.
   2. Claimed population movements were for civilian safety and blamed NATO bombings for triggering the refugee crisis.
   3. Amnesty International and ICTY investigations confirmed systematic expulsions, war crimes, rape, and forced displacement, but no conclusive proof of Operation Horseshoe as a formal strategy.
8. Controversy and propaganda claims
   1. Critics accused NATO and Western media of using Operation Horseshoe as propaganda to justify the air strikes.
   2. During Milošević’s trial at The Hague, related documents were withdrawn due to lack of verification.
   3. Some German documentaries questioned whether the operation ever existed, while Serbian authorities continue to deny it, with archives still closed.

The End of Operation Allied Force

1. Western pressure for ground forces
   1. By April 1999, Western allies, especially Britain’s Tony Blair, pushed for the deployment of ground forces in Kosovo.
   2. Although President Clinton had initially ruled out U.S. ground troops, political pressures and the effectiveness of air strikes increased the likelihood of intervention on the ground.
2. Russian opposition and diplomacy
   1. Russia opposed NATO’s air campaign and vetoed UN Security Council military action, viewing it as a breach of sovereignty.
   2. To avoid escalation, Boris Yeltsin sent envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin to Belgrade for negotiations with Milošević.
   3. Russia emphasized the need for a negotiated peace while protecting its position as a key diplomatic actor.
3. Ceasefire and UN resolution
   1. With mediation by Russian diplomacy and EU envoy Martti Ahtisaari, Milošević agreed to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo.
   2. The deal was formalized in UN Resolution 1244 on 10 June 1999, officially ending NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign.
   3. Despite the military defeat, Milošević presented the outcome domestically as a way to preserve political power.