The NATO Bombing Campaign: Operation Allied Force

- Duration and controversy
- The NATO air campaign, Operation Allied Force, lasted 78 days, ending on 10 June 1999.
- It marked a controversial use of military force by NATO, which traditionally focused on defending against external threats rather than intervening in a sovereign state’s internal conflict.
- Bypassing the UN Security Council
- NATO acted without UN approval due to anticipated Russian and Chinese opposition.
- This raised questions about the legality and legitimacy of the intervention.
- Before the bombing, the conflict in Kosovo had resulted in fewer than 2,000 deaths and displaced fewer than 250,000 people. These numbers are far smaller than genocides elsewhere.
How could NATO act without the approval of the Security Council?
- UN Security Council authority
- Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, only the UN Security Council (UNSC) has the legal power to authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.
- States are supposed to refrain from using force except in two situations: self-defense or Security Council authorization.
- NATO’s decision in Kosovo
- In Kosovo, NATO launched airstrikes without UNSC approval.
- NATO argued that diplomatic options had failed and that military action was necessary to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe, namely the mass expulsion and killing of Kosovar Albanians.
- "Legitimate but not legal"
- NATO described the operation as legitimate but not legal, acknowledging the lack of formal UN authorization.
- It argued instead that the moral imperative justified the action.
- International legal precedent
- Consulting the Security Council is not just custom; it is an international legal norm.
- NATO did consult the Security Council but acted without approval after Russian and Chinese vetoes made authorization impossible.
- This was an exceptional move, not standard practice, and it remains a legally grey and politically charged precedent in international relations.
Link to Global Politics
- This case can be connected to discussions about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.
- Formally adopted in 2005, R2P sought to codify criteria for humanitarian interventions.
- Crucially, it allowed such interventions only with UNSC approval.
- Scale of operations
- Fourteen NATO countries contributed aircraft, with the United States providing over 700 planes.
- The campaign involved around 38,000 sorties, one-third being strike missions targeting over 1,000 sites including military, police, and infrastructure facilities.
- NATO lost only two aircraft and suffered no combat fatalities, highlighting a highly precise and technologically advanced operation.
- Resistance from Serbia
- Initial expectations of a swift campaign proved mistaken as Milosevic and Serbian forces resisted despite heavy bombardment.
- President Clinton publicly ruled out a ground invasion, a decision later seen by some military officials as a strategic error that emboldened Serbian resistance.
- Political constraints
- NATO’s campaign was prolonged partly due to political considerations.
- General Michael C. Short criticized how national parliaments vetoed specific targets, hindering operations and extending the campaign.
- NATO sought to balance overwhelming air power with minimizing civilian casualties and avoiding direct ground conflict with Yugoslav forces.
- Kofi Annan’s position
- UN Secretary General Kofi Annan supported the intervention in principle but criticized NATO’s unilateral action without Security Council authorization.
- He emphasized the Security Council’s primary role in maintaining international peace.
- Annan argued that regional organizations like NATO should operate under UN mandates whenever possible (Annan, 1999).
Military Strategy and Technology
- The campaign’s initial phase saw a massive, technologically advanced strike on hundreds of targets within three days, involving 1,000 aircraft and approximately 450 Tomahawk cruise missiles.
- These missiles, launched mainly from sea platforms, had a 90% success rate and cost about $1 million each. Early attacks neutralized Serbia’s air defences and key military infrastructure.
- Operation Allied Force demonstrated the effectiveness of precision-guided munitions, GPS technology, and stealth bombers like the B-2, enabling long-range, low-casualty strikes.
The Kosovar Albanian Refugee Convoy near Bjakovica
- On April 14, 1999, a NATO aircraft struck a convoy of Kosovar Albanian refugees near the town of Bjakovica (also known as Peja) in western Kosovo.
- The convoy was fleeing the conflict zone to reach safety across the border.
- The attack killed approximately 82 civilians and injured around 50 more.
- Victims included women, children, and elderly people who were unarmed and posed no military threat.
- NATO initially denied responsibility but later acknowledged the bombing as a “tragic error.”
- The convoy was mistakenly identified as a military target, believed to be carrying armed KLA fighters or military supplies.
- The confusion arose from intelligence and reconnaissance failures under difficult targeting conditions in a fast-moving conflict.
- This incident severely damaged NATO’s credibility and highlighted the challenges of precision bombing in asymmetric warfare.
- The Bjakovica bombing drew widespread international condemnation and intensified criticism from human rights organizations.
- Critics argued that NATO’s bombing campaign disproportionately endangered civilians.
- It underscored the tragic costs of the conflict for Kosovars caught between Serbian forces and NATO intervention.
- UN and ICTY investigations later concluded that civilians were not deliberately targeted.
- Investigators highlighted the difficulty pilots faced in distinguishing civilians from military targets at high speeds and altitudes.
- Bombing ceased once the civilian presence was realized.
- Civilian casualties
- During the Kosovo air campaign, NATO sometimes caused unintended civilian casualties, referred to as collateral damage.
- This term describes harm to civilians or non-military structures during military operations.
- Bjakovica incident (April 14, 1999)
- NATO mistakenly bombed a convoy of Kosovar Albanian refugees near Bjakovica.
- The attack killed 82 civilians and injured 50.
- The incident
- On 7 May 1999, NATO aircraft mistakenly bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, killing three journalists.
- The attack involved five bombs, intended for a nearby Yugoslav supply facility 400 meters away.
- The CIA’s reliance on outdated maps was cited as the cause of the targeting error.
- China’s reaction
- China accused NATO of deliberately targeting the embassy, while the U.S. insisted it was unintentional.
- Investigations by The Observer and Politiken alleged the embassy had been used for Yugoslav military communications, though this was never officially confirmed.
- International fallout
- China condemned the bombing as a “gross violation of sovereignty.”
- Massive protests erupted across Chinese cities, targeting U.S. embassies and businesses.
- The incident severely strained Sino-Western relations during the conflict.
- U.S. response


