IB History Good Neighbor Policy and Inter-american Diplomatic Agreements Notes

Origins of the Good Neighbor Approach

1. Franklin D. Roosevelt entered office in 1933. The Great Depression, rising global tension, and regional distrust encouraged a change in method.
2. Military occupations had created resentment. Interventions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Cuba, and elsewhere damaged American legitimacy.
3. The policy promised nonintervention. Roosevelt declared that the United States would respect the rights and sovereignty of neighbouring states.
4. Economic pressure also favoured cooperation. Washington needed trade and political stability without the cost of repeated occupation.
5. The approach built on earlier change. Herbert Hoover had already withdrawn some forces and used diplomatic language of regional partnership.
6. Good Neighbor policy did not end US power. It replaced routine military coercion with consultation, trade, cultural diplomacy, and political influence.
7. The central question was credibility. Latin American governments judged the policy through withdrawals, treaties, and responses to national reform.

Montevideo and the Principle of Nonintervention

1. The Seventh Pan American Conference met in Montevideo in 1933. Secretary of State Cordell Hull represented the United States.
2. The convention affirmed state equality. Signatories declared that no state had the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.
3. Washington accepted the principle. This marked a significant retreat from the Roosevelt Corollary's claimed policing role.
4. Latin American diplomacy shaped the outcome. Regional governments had long defended nonintervention through the Drago and Calvo traditions.
5. Legal commitments strengthened political trust. The United States publicly accepted rules it had previously resisted.
6. Implementation remained the true test. Formal equality did not remove economic imbalance or covert political pressure.
7. Montevideo supplied the policy's legal foundation. Later inter American agreements built on consultation and collective decision making.

Ending Occupations and Revising Treaties

1. US Marines left Nicaragua in 1933. The withdrawal ended a long occupation but left a National Guard trained and structured by American authorities.
2. Haiti regained formal control in 1934. Marines departed while financial supervision continued for several years.
3. The Platt Amendment was abrogated in 1934. A new treaty ended the formal right of intervention in Cuba.
4. Guantanamo Bay remained under American control. The revised relationship therefore preserved an important strategic exception.
5. The Clark Memorandum rejected the corollary's logic. It argued that the Monroe Doctrine did not itself justify intervention in Latin America.
6. Withdrawal altered the visible form of power. Local governments gained greater formal sovereignty even where institutions reflected earlier occupations.
7. The change improved regional diplomacy. It reduced a major symbol of American imperial control.

Mexico and Oil Nationalization

1. President Lázaro Cárdenas nationalized foreign oil companies in 1938. The decision affected major American and British interests.
2. Earlier administrations might have threatened intervention. Roosevelt instead pursued negotiation and compensation.
3. American companies demanded stronger action. The administration balanced corporate claims against wider regional strategy.
4. Mexico defended constitutional sovereignty. Article 27 supported national ownership of subsoil resources.
5. A settlement developed gradually. Wartime cooperation and negotiated compensation eased the dispute.
6. The response strengthened Good Neighbor credibility. Washington accepted a major nationalist economic policy without sending troops.
7. Strategic circumstances mattered. Growing threats from Germany, Italy, and Japan increased the value of hemispheric unity.

Cuba and Political Pragmatism

1. The United States reduced formal control over Cuba. Abrogation of the Platt Amendment symbolized respect for sovereignty.
2. Economic influence remained substantial. Sugar trade, investment, and the naval base continued to connect Cuban policy to the United States.
3. Washington accepted Fulgencio Batista's rise. Stability and cooperation often mattered more than democratic reform.
4. Good Neighbor policy tolerated authoritarian governments. Nonintervention could mean avoiding criticism of domestic repression.
5. Cultural diplomacy improved public presentation. Radio, film, tourism, music, and educational exchange promoted ideas of hemispheric partnership.
6. Cuban nationalism remained strong. Formal treaty revision did not erase memories of occupation and intervention.
7. The case revealed selective principles. Sovereignty received greater respect while strategic and economic interests continued.

Trade and Reciprocal Agreements

1. Cordell Hull promoted reciprocal trade. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 allowed negotiated tariff reductions.
2. Trade policy aimed to revive economies. Lower barriers could expand exports during the depression and reduce protectionist conflict.
3. Bilateral agreements increased economic links. Several Latin American states negotiated new arrangements with the United States.
4. Economic cooperation supported political goals. Interdependence was expected to strengthen hemispheric solidarity.
5. Unequal structures remained. Many Latin American economies depended on exporting primary products and importing manufactured goods.
6. The United States retained greater bargaining power. Market size, finance, and industrial capacity shaped the terms of exchange.
7. Good Neighbor economics mixed reform with continuity. Tariff cooperation replaced some coercion without removing dependency.

Hemispheric Security and Wartime Cooperation

1. European and Asian threats transformed regional diplomacy. Fascism, war, and possible Axis influence made collective security urgent.
2. The Buenos Aires Conference met in 1936. American republics agreed to consult during threats to peace.
3. The Lima Conference of 1938 reaffirmed solidarity. Governments emphasized continental defence while preserving formal sovereignty.
4. Panama hosted a major meeting in 1939. The Declaration of Panama created a maritime security zone around much of the hemisphere.
5. The Havana Conference met in 1940. It addressed European colonies in the Americas and agreed on collective trusteeship if control changed.
6. Most American states supported the Allied cause. They shared intelligence, resources, bases, and diplomatic cooperation after 1941.
7. Wartime solidarity strengthened US leadership. Consultation made that leadership more acceptable than unilateral policing.

Somoza, Sandino, and the National Guard in Nicaragua

1. The withdrawal of Marines in 1933 left behind a new institution. The US-trained National Guard became the country's dominant armed force.
2. Augusto César Sandino had led resistance to the occupation since the late 1920s. He agreed to a peace settlement once the Marines withdrew, laying down arms in 1933.
3. Anastasio Somoza García commanded the National Guard. He viewed Sandino's continued influence and armed followers as a threat to his own power.
4. Somoza's forces assassinated Sandino in 1934. National Guard officers killed him after a dinner with President Juan Bautista Sacasa, without presidential authorization.
5. Somoza used the Guard to seize the presidency in 1936. He established a family dictatorship that lasted, through his sons, into the late 1970s.
6. The episode showed a cost of nonintervention. Ending direct occupation could leave local strongmen, often armed and trained by the United States, in control rather than democratic government.

Nelson Rockefeller and Wartime Cultural Diplomacy

1. Roosevelt created the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in 1940. Nelson Rockefeller led the agency, which coordinated economic and cultural outreach across the hemisphere.
2. The office funded radio programming, film, and press material. Its goal was to build goodwill and counter Axis propaganda circulating in Latin America.
3. Walt Disney Studios produced goodwill films for the effort. Following a 1941 tour of Latin America, Disney released 'Saludos Amigos' and later 'The Three Caballeros'.
4. Lend-Lease extended material cooperation to the region. Latin American governments received equipment and training in exchange for access to bases and raw materials.
5. Brazil became the most significant wartime partner. It allowed US air bases and sent its own expeditionary force to fight in Italy, the only Latin American ground troops in the European theatre.
6. Cultural diplomacy reinforced but did not replace strategic interest. Goodwill campaigns worked alongside base agreements, resource access, and political pressure against pro-Axis sympathies.

Assessment and Historical Debate

1. The policy changed methods substantially. Occupations ended, treaties were revised, and nonintervention became an accepted diplomatic norm.
2. It did not produce complete equality. Economic dominance, strategic pressure, and support for friendly authoritarian rulers continued.
3. Mexico provided the strongest test. Roosevelt's negotiated response to oil nationalization contrasted with earlier military coercion.
4. Wartime needs reinforced cooperation. The threat of Axis influence encouraged both respect and strategic calculation.
5. Bryce Wood emphasizes diplomatic transformation. His work presents the policy as a meaningful departure from interventionism.
6. Lars Schoultz stresses deeper continuity. Unequal assumptions and strategic dominance survived beneath friendlier language.
7. Good Neighbor policy was both change and adaptation. It improved legitimacy and regional cooperation while preserving American leadership.

1. Historians reach different conclusions about how much this record of change actually amounted to.