IB History Creation of UN Peacekeeping Forces Notes

Canada and the Invention of UN Peacekeeping

From Observation to Peacekeeping

1. The UN Charter did not name peacekeeping: The practice developed because collective security was often blocked by Cold War rivalry.
2. Early missions were small observer groups: Unarmed personnel monitored ceasefires and reported violations.
3. UNTSO began in 1948: Military observers supervised truces in the Middle East after the first Arab-Israeli war.
4. UNMOGIP followed in 1949: Observers monitored the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in Kashmir.
5. These missions established useful habits: International personnel could reduce uncertainty and provide neutral reporting.
6. Observation had strict limits: Observers could record breaches but could not separate armies or compel compliance.
7. The next innovation was armed interposition: A lightly armed force could stand between belligerents with their consent.

The Suez Crisis of 1956

1. 26 July 1956: Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company.
2. Britain and France feared lost influence: They also opposed Nasser's Arab nationalism and control of the canal.
3. Israel attacked Egypt on 29 October: Britain and France then intervened under a secret plan negotiated at Sèvres.
4. The invasion divided the Western alliance: The United States opposed military action by its NATO partners.
5. The Soviet Union threatened intervention: The crisis risked drawing superpowers into a wider confrontation.
6. The Security Council was blocked: British and French vetoes prevented decisive action there.
7. The General Assembly became central: Emergency sessions demanded a ceasefire and created a route toward a UN force.

Pearson and the Creation of UNEF

1. Lester Pearson proposed an international force: Canada's external affairs minister sought to separate the combatants and enable withdrawal.
2. The proposal was developed with Dag Hammarskjöld: The UN secretary-general translated the political idea into operational principles.
3. 4 November 1956: The General Assembly approved the first United Nations Emergency Force.
4. UNEF was not an invading army: It entered Egyptian territory only after Egypt consented.
5. Troops came from neutral or non-belligerent states: Canada contributed logistics, communications, and personnel.
6. A Canadian combat contingent was initially rejected: Its British-style uniforms risked appearing connected to the invading forces.
7. Pearson received the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize: The award reinforced Canada's reputation for practical multilateral diplomacy.

Core Peacekeeping Principles

1. Consent was essential: A force normally deployed only when the host state and principal parties agreed.
2. Impartiality guided operations: Peacekeepers were expected to implement a mandate rather than support one side.
3. Force was tightly restricted: Weapons were generally used only in self-defence and defence of the mandate.
4. A ceasefire had to exist: Traditional peacekeeping preserved political space but did not create peace from active war.
5. The mandate defined authority: Ambiguous instructions could leave commanders unable to respond to changing threats.
6. Troop-contributing states retained influence: National governments decided what forces, equipment, and risks they would accept.
7. These principles created legitimacy and weakness: They encouraged cooperation but depended on continued political consent.

Canada's Peacekeeping Role

1. Canada offered specialized capabilities: Signals, transport, engineering, medical support, and staff officers were recurring contributions.
2. Participation supported middle-power strategy: UN missions allowed Canada to influence crises without matching superpower military strength.
3. Peacekeeping complemented alliances: Canada remained committed to NATO and NORAD while presenting itself as an honest broker.
4. The Cyprus mission began in 1964: Canadian troops helped contain violence between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.
5. Service was sustained: Canada maintained a major presence in Cyprus for nearly three decades.
6. Public identity grew around the blue helmet: Peacekeeping became associated with moderation, compromise, and international responsibility.
7. The image simplified reality: Canadian personnel faced danger, coercive choices, and mandates shaped by major-power interests.

The Congo and Expanding Mandates

1. Congo became independent in 1960: The new state entered crisis as the army mutinied and Katanga attempted secession.
2. ONUC deployed at large scale: The UN sent troops and civilian personnel to prevent international escalation.
3. Canada supplied signals units: Communications expertise was vital across a vast and fragmented theatre.
4. Consent became unstable: Competing Congolese authorities disagreed over what the UN should do.
5. The mandate expanded: UN forces eventually used significant force against Katangan secession.
6. The mission exposed Cold War pressures: The Soviet Union, United States, Belgium, and African states pursued conflicting goals.
7. Congo challenged the traditional model: Peacekeeping moved toward state-building and enforcement without a settled peace.

Achievements, Limits, and the Peacekeeping Myth

1. UNEF helped end the immediate Suez fighting: It supervised withdrawal and reduced direct confrontation for more than a decade.
2. Peacekeepers lowered accidental escalation: Neutral patrols and communication channels made local incidents easier to contain.
3. They could not settle political disputes: The Arab-Israeli conflict continued because its underlying claims remained unresolved.
4. Consent could be withdrawn: Egypt demanded UNEF's departure in May 1967, shortly before the Six-Day War.
5. Resources were uneven: Missions often lacked transport, intelligence, equipment, or clear political backing.
6. Canadian memory became selective: The national story emphasized Pearson and service while downplaying coercion and failure.
7. Peacekeeping was a tool, not a solution: Its success depended on diplomacy, realistic mandates, and cooperation by the parties.

Rwanda and the Crisis of Traditional Peacekeeping

1. Canada commanded the UN mission in Rwanda. Major-General Romeo Dallaire led UNAMIR, deployed in 1993 to oversee a peace agreement between the Rwandan government and Tutsi rebels.
2. Dallaire warned of impending genocide in January 1994. His cable to UN headquarters, describing arms caches and mass-killing plans, became known as the "genocide fax," but the Security Council did not authorize a stronger response.
3. The killing of Belgian peacekeepers triggered withdrawal. After ten Belgian soldiers were murdered in April 1994, Belgium withdrew its contingent and the Security Council cut UNAMIR's strength by 90 percent.
4. Roughly 800,000 people were killed in about 100 days. The genocide proceeded largely unimpeded while the shrunken UN force lacked the mandate and troops to intervene.
5. Dallaire's limited force could not act under existing rules. Peacekeeping's traditional principles of consent and minimum force proved unworkable once local authorities were themselves the perpetrators.
6. The failure reshaped Canadian and UN peacekeeping doctrine. It contributed to the later "responsibility to protect" principle, developed partly by a Canadian-led international commission in 2001, which argued that sovereignty does not shield states from outside intervention against mass atrocities.
7. Dallaire became a prominent critic of international inaction. His account, published as Shake Hands with the Devil, argued that indifference among major powers, not doctrine alone, explained the failure to prevent genocide.
8. The Canadian government later championed the Responsibility to Protect at the UN. Ottawa funded the ICISS report and pushed for its adoption, linking the Rwanda failure directly to Canadian foreign policy.
9. Rwanda became a standard case study in later peacekeeping reform. UN review panels cited it, alongside Srebrenica in Bosnia, when recommending more robust rules of engagement and clearer mandates for future missions.

Historiography and Overall Judgment

1. John English emphasizes Pearson's diplomacy: Canadian influence came from coalition-building and workable institutional proposals.
2. J L Granatstein challenges national mythology: He argues that peacekeeping should not obscure Canada's combat alliances and strategic interests.
3. Sean Maloney stresses military reality: Peacekeeping required trained forces and could involve serious risk rather than passive neutrality.
4. Michael Carroll highlights Suez innovation: UNEF established operational principles that shaped later missions.
5. A liberal internationalist view stresses achievement: Canada helped create a mechanism that reduced Cold War escalation.
6. A critical view stresses constraint: Peacekeeping frequently managed conflicts without resolving colonial or political causes.
7. Overall judgment: Canada made an important contribution to UN peacekeeping, but national influence depended on allies, consent, and credible military capacity.