IB History Changing Relations with the Ussr/russia Notes

China and the USSR/Russia: Rivalry Gave Way to Strategic Cooperation

1. The PRC and USSR had signed a treaty of alliance in 1950, but disputes over de-Stalinisation and peaceful coexistence widened the Sino-Soviet split after 1956, leading Moscow to withdraw its advisers in 1960 and leaving competing territorial claims along the long shared frontier. Beijing later used rapprochement with Washington to balance against Moscow, and relations remained tense even through limited negotiations in the 1970s.
2. The Sino-Soviet split still shaped relations when Mao died in 1976, with large forces stationed along the shared border. Deng Xiaoping identified three obstacles to normalisation: Soviet forces stationed near China, Soviet support for Vietnam, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. China condemned Vietnam's 1978 invasion of Cambodia precisely because Hanoi was closely aligned with Moscow.

From Confrontation to Normalisation

1. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and reduction of forces in Mongolia removed two of Deng's three objections, and Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Beijing in May 1989 formally normalised relations after three decades of hostility.
2. A 1991 border agreement settled much of the eastern frontier shortly before the Soviet Union dissolved. China recognised the Russian Federation as the Soviet Union's successor and retained diplomatic continuity after December 1991, and further agreements in 1994 and 2004 settled most of the remaining border disputes. Normalisation reduced the risk of a two-front strategic threat and let China focus its resources on economic development.

Security Cooperation and Regional Organisations

1. Russia became a major supplier of advanced aircraft, submarines and air-defence systems to China during the 1990s, and Chinese purchases helped sustain Russian defence industries after the economic collapse that followed the Soviet breakup.
2. China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan formed the Shanghai Five in 1996 to reduce forces and build trust along former Soviet borders. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation replaced the Shanghai Five in 2001 and added Uzbekistan, addressing separatism, extremism and terrorism while limiting direct Western influence in Central Asia. China and Russia also signed the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001.
3. Joint military exercises from 2005 demonstrated growing operational cooperation without creating a formal alliance. Both governments defended the principle of state sovereignty and opposed Western-led intervention in domestic political crises, and Russia and China often coordinated positions in the UN Security Council on issues such as Syria, sanctions and regime change.

Energy, Asymmetry and the Limits of Partnership

1. Russian oil and gas offered China an alternative to energy supplies transported through vulnerable sea lanes. The Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline began supplying China through a branch completed in 2010, and the Power of Siberia gas pipeline opened in 2019 after a 2014 supply agreement.
2. China's larger economy changed the balance of the relationship and made Russia increasingly dependent on Chinese markets and finance. China also expanded investment and trade in Central Asia, an area Russia had long treated as its privileged sphere of influence, showing that cooperation coexisted with quiet competition.
3. Beijing avoided formally recognising Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, showing that cooperation did not remove conflicting interests, and Russia remained cautious about transferring its most advanced military technology because Chinese production could create future competition. The two states shared opposition to United States dominance but differed in economic power, regional priorities and long-term strategic aims.

1. By 2020, the relationship was a close strategic partnership based on overlapping interests rather than an alliance with automatic defence commitments: relations had moved from the 1950 alliance through ideological rupture and armed confrontation to a pragmatic, asymmetric, interest-based partnership.