Source A: Killer Robots: New UN Report Urges Treaty by 2026
The UN secretary-general has called for states to conclude a new international treaty by 2026 to prohibit weapons systems without human control or oversight and that cannot be used in compliance with international humanitarian law. The treaty should regulate all types of autonomous weapons systems. The report reflects 58 submissions from over 73 countries and 33 submissions from the International Committee of the Red Cross and civil society groups. The UN General Assembly is considered a venue for inclusive discussions on autonomous weapons systems, considering international peace and security concerns.
Source B: Operation PEACE STORM: The Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Autonomous Weapons in Libya’s Offensive Strategy
On 27 March 2020, the Prime Minister of Libya, Faiez Serraj, announced the commencement of Operation PEACE STORM, which moved GNA-AF to the offensive along the coastal littoral. The combination of the Gabya-class frigates and Korkut short-range air defence systems provided a capability to place a mobile air defence bubble around GNA-AF ground units, which took Hafter Affiliated Forces (HAF) air assets out of the military equation. Libya classifies HAF as a terrorist rebel organization. The enhanced operational intelligence capability included Turkish-operated signal intelligence and the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance provided by Bayraktar TB-2 and probably TAI Anka S unmanned combat aerial vehicles. This allowed for the development of an asymmetrical war of attrition designed to degrade HAF ground unit capability. The GNA-AF breakout of Tripoli was supported with Firtina T155 155 mm self-propelled guns and T-122 Sakarya multi-launch rocket systems firing extended range precision munitions against the mid-twentieth century main battle tanks and heavy artillery used by HAF.
Logistics convoys and retreating HAF were subsequently hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2 (see annex 30) and other loitering munitions. The lethal autonomous weapons systems were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition: in effect, a true ‘fire, forget and find’ capability. The unmanned combat aerial vehicles and the small drone intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability of HAF were neutralized by electronic jamming from the Koral electronic warfare system.
Source C: The Story of America’s Very first Drone Strike
In the autumn of 2001, however, the United States was unwilling to launch a full-scale land invasion in a region 7000 miles from home. Instead, a plan evolved to send into Afghanistan a small number of CIA agents and Special Forces in support of anti-Taliban militias, with the aid of the US Air Force. That first October night was a powerful display of coordination involving laser- guided munitions dropped from the air and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from the sea. General Tommy Franks, who then led the US Central Command (CENTCOM), the military command overseeing operations in Afghanistan, wrote in his memoir American Soldier that the assault involved in total some 40,000 personnel, 393 aircraft, and 32 ships. But one aircraft did not feature at all in the Air Force’s complex planning: a tiny, CIA-controlled, propeller-driven spy drone, Predator tailfin number 3034 which had crept into Afghanistan some hours earlier. It now hangs suspended in the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C., its place in history assured. Yet its actions that first night of the war – in which numerous agencies in the vast US military-intelligence machine each played sharply contradictory roles – remain steeped in controversy.
(a) With reference to Source A, two different or unexpected impacts of ‘killer robots’.
(b) With reference to Source D, why it may be difficult to reach global agreement on ‘killer robot’ policy.
