IB Philosophy 9.3.3 Philosophical Methodology Notes

Conceptual Analysis as Philosophical Method

1. Having examined the nature of philosophy in 9.3.1 and its function and meaning in 9.3.2, this article turns to the methods philosophers use to pursue their inquiries. Philosophical methodology asks how philosophy should be done, what tools and procedures yield reliable results, and whether there is a single correct method or a plurality of legitimate approaches.
2. Conceptual analysis has been the main method in English-language philosophy since the early 1900s. The idea is to break a concept into its component parts, propose a precise definition stating exactly what conditions must be met for the concept to apply, then test that definition against real or imagined cases (called counterexamples) that might show the definition is wrong.

1. A classic example is the analysis of knowledge as “justified true belief” (explored in Unit 3).
   1. Edmund Gettier's 1963 counterexamples showed that a person can have justified true belief without knowledge, prompting decades of further analysis. This cycle of definition, counterexample, and revision illustrates the method in action.
2. G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell pioneered analytic philosophy's focus on breaking complex statements into their simplest logical components to reveal what is really being claimed.
   1. Russell's theory of descriptions, for example, showed that sentences like 'The present king of France is bald' have a logical structure that ordinary grammar conceals. The sentence looks like it describes someone, but logically it makes three claims: there is a king of France, there is only one, and he is bald. Philosophy's task, on this view, is to uncover this hidden logical form.

Wittgenstein and the Limits of Analysis

1. The later Wittgenstein challenged the assumptions of conceptual analysis.
   1. In the Philosophical Investigations (1953), he argued that most concepts do not have neat necessary and sufficient conditions. Instead, they show "family resemblances": overlapping similarities with no single feature shared by every instance. If this is right, the whole hunt for precise definitions may be misguided for most philosophical concepts.
2. Wittgenstein's own example is the concept of 'game.' Board games, card games, Olympic sports, a child playing catch, a round of ring-a-ring-o'-roses: is there a single feature they all share?
   1. Some involve competition, but not all.
   2. Some require skill, but not all.
   3. Some are played for fun, but not all.
   4. Instead of a common essence, we find a network of overlapping and criss-crossing similarities, like the resemblances among members of a family. If even a concept as familiar as 'game' resists definition by necessary and sufficient conditions, Wittgenstein suggests, then the assumption that philosophical concepts (knowledge, justice, truth) must have neat definitions may be fundamentally misguided.

Cultural Critiques and Experimental Philosophy

1. Critics argue that conceptual analysis is culturally limited. The intuitions on which it relies may reflect the assumptions of a particular cultural context rather than universal truths.
2. Experimental philosophy (x-phi), a movement that emerged in the early 2000s, uses empirical surveys to test whether philosophical intuitions vary across cultures, raising questions about the reliability of armchair methodology (the traditional practice of doing philosophy entirely through thought, without running any experiments).
   1. A landmark study by Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) presented Gettier-style cases to participants from different cultural backgrounds.
   2. They found that East Asian participants were significantly less likely than Western participants to deny knowledge in classic Gettier scenarios, suggesting that the intuitions analytic philosophy relies on may not be universal but culturally specific (shaped by cultural background rather than shared human common sense). If philosophical conclusions depend on intuitions that vary across populations, then doing philosophy purely in an armchair without testing those intuitions faces a serious problem.
3. Whether conceptual analysis is the "primary" method of philosophy depends on which tradition one considers primary. In analytic philosophy, it clearly dominates.
   1. Continental philosophy, Indian philosophy, Chinese philosophy, and African philosophy all employ methods that cannot be reduced to conceptual analysis, as the following sections explore.
4. Despite Wittgenstein's critique, conceptual analysis remains central to contemporary philosophy. Thought experiments serve as the primary testing ground for philosophical theories: the trolley problem in ethics (Unit 4), the ship of Theseus for identity (Unit 1), and Rawls's veil of ignorance in political philosophy (Unit 7) all employ imaginative scenarios to probe our conceptual commitments.

Critical Evaluation and the Socratic Tradition

1. A second major view holds that the primary purpose of philosophy is not to produce theories but to enable us to evaluate critically our own beliefs and attitudes. This view traces directly to the Socratic tradition and has been influential across many philosophical cultures.