IB Philosophy 4.2.2 Foundations for Moral Judgements Notes

The Question of Moral Foundations

1. Topic 4.2.1 examined the origins and nature of moral values, asking where they come from and whether they are more than preferences. This topic narrows the focus to a more specific question: what foundations can be offered for moral judgements? When someone claims that an action is right or wrong, what grounds that claim, and can such claims be justified?

1. The answer depends on what kind of foundation we think moral judgements rest upon: reason, emotion, natural law, or the social and physical environment in which moral agents find themselves.
2. The four foundations identified by the syllabus, rationality, emotion, natural law, and environment, represent the major historical answers to this question.
   1. Each proposes a different source of moral authority: rationalists ground morality in reason, sentimentalists in feeling, natural law theorists in the structure of the cosmos, and environmentalists in the material conditions of human life.
3. Alongside these four foundations, the syllabus asks students to understand two key meta-ethical distinctions: cognitivism versus non-cognitivism, and naturalism versus non-naturalism.
   1. These distinctions are about what kind of thing a moral claim is: can it be true or false (cognitivism), or does it express something other than a belief, like a feeling or a command (non-cognitivism)?
   2. And if moral claims can be true or false, are moral properties the same thing as natural properties like pain or pleasure (naturalism), or are they a completely different category of fact that cannot be reduced to anything in the physical world (non-naturalism)?
4. Two specific theories, intuitionism and emotivism, are also required. Intuitionism holds that moral facts are real and grasped through a direct moral perception; emotivism holds that moral statements express feelings rather than facts.
5. Each will be examined in detail in the sections that follow.
6. The relationship between this topic and 4.2.1 should be clear: 4.2.1 asked where moral values come from (their origins), while this topic asks what justifies moral judgements (their foundations).
   1. A moral value may originate in cultural conditioning, but the question remains whether it can be rationally justified once we reflect on it. Origins and foundations are distinct philosophical questions.
7. This topic connects directly to the overarching Unit 4 question: "Are there fundamental moral principles that apply in all situations?"
   1. If moral judgements have rational or natural law foundations, then universal moral principles may exist.
   2. If they are grounded in emotion or environment, their scope may be limited to particular cultures or individuals.
   3. The foundations we accept determine the scope of moral authority.
8. The discussion here also prepares the ground for 4.2.3 (Ethical Language), which will examine the meaning of moral statements in greater detail.

Four Foundations: Rationality, Emotion, Natural Law, and Environment

1. Rationality as a foundation for moral judgements has its strongest advocate in Immanuel Kant (discussed in 4.1.1 and 4.1.3), who argued that moral principles are derivable from pure practical reason alone, independent of desire, culture, or empirical circumstances.
2. The categorical imperative is a test of rational consistency: a maxim is moral if and only if it can be universalized without contradiction, making the rational structure of the maxim itself the ground of its moral authority.
3. The rationalist position supports moral universalism: if moral principles are grounded in reason, and reason is the same for all rational beings, then moral truths are universal and necessary.
   1. This is the strongest possible foundation for moral judgements, but it faces the objection (raised by Hume in 4.2.1) that reason alone cannot motivate action.