IB Philosophy 2.3.2 Aesthetic Judgement Notes

What Is Aesthetic Judgement?

1. Topic 2.3.1 examined the nature of aesthetic experience, the various modes in which we respond to art and nature (pleasure, disgust, the sublime, provocation). This topic asks the next question: when we move from experiencing art to evaluating it, what are we doing?
2. Is the judgement “this is a great painting” a statement of personal preference, a cultural convention, or a claim about objective quality?
3. Aesthetic judgement involves the interplay of three elements identified by the IB syllabus: the senses, the emotions, and values. When we judge a piece of music as beautiful, we respond to its sensory qualities (melody, harmony, rhythm), experience emotional responses (joy, melancholy, exhilaration), and apply evaluative standards (complexity, originality, emotional depth) that reflect our cultural training.
4. Immanuel Kant, whose concept of disinterested pleasure was introduced in 2.3.1, argued that aesthetic judgement occupies a unique philosophical position. It is subjective (rooted in the individual's feeling of pleasure) yet claims universal validity: when I say “this sunset is beautiful,” I do not merely report my personal reaction; I expect others to agree.
5. Kant called this the “antinomy of taste.”
6. Kant’s solution was to argue that aesthetic judgement involves something he called the free play of imagination and understanding: the mind at its most alert and open, discovering harmony without following a rule. Because all human beings share the same mental faculties, this kind of response has a genuine claim to universal assent, even though it is not based on concepts or rules.
7. Aesthetic relativists argue, against Kant, that judgements of beauty are entirely culturally conditioned.
8. What counts as beautiful music in the Western classical tradition (tonal harmony, symphonic structure) differs radically from what is valued in Indian raga (melodic improvisation over a drone) or West African drumming (polyrhythmic complexity); if aesthetic standards vary across cultures, aesthetic judgement cannot be universal.
9. The IB syllabus asks: “To what extent are aesthetic judgements culturally conditioned?” This question does not demand a binary answer; it invites exploration of how culture shapes aesthetic responses without necessarily determining them entirely. The challenge is to find a middle ground between universalism (Kant) and radical relativism.

Aesthetic Judgement as Social Practice

1. The IB syllabus also requires examination of how people use, enjoy and criticize art. In everyday life, aesthetic judgement is not a purely philosophical exercise; it is embedded in practices of art criticism, museum curation, arts education, social media discussion, and personal taste.
2. Social dimensions of aesthetic judgement.
3. Pierre Bourdieu (discussed in 2.1.3) showed that aesthetic preferences are systematically correlated with social class. In Distinction, Bourdieu demonstrated that the ability to make “refined” aesthetic judgements (preferring abstract art over kitsch, avant-garde music over pop) functions as a marker of cultural capital that reinforces class hierarchies.
4. Bourdieu’s analysis suggests that what we call “good taste” is not a neutral perception of objective quality but a social practice shaped by education, upbringing, and class position.
5. This does not mean that all aesthetic judgements are merely arbitrary. It means that the conditions under which we make them are never culturally neutral.
6. For IB students, the question of cultural conditioning provides a framework for critical analysis of aesthetic claims. When a critic declares a work “great,” students should ask: great by whose standards?
7. According to which tradition? And what social interests does this judgement serve?

Gombrich and the Beholder’s Share