IB Philosophy 1.4.1 Self-consciousness Notes

What Is Self-consciousness?

1. Self-consciousness refers to the ability of a being to reflect on its own existence, thoughts, and experiences. Unlike basic awareness of the external world, self-consciousness involves a distinctly inward-directed awareness that turns the mind upon itself.
2. This concept builds directly on the discussion of consciousness explored in 1.3.1, where we examined what consciousness is and how it relates to the self and the world. Self-consciousness adds a further layer: it is not merely being conscious, but being conscious of being conscious.
3. René Descartes offered one of the most influential accounts of self-consciousness in his famous argument "cogito ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am"). For Descartes, the very act of doubting one's existence confirmed the existence of a thinking subject, making self-consciousness the most certain form of knowledge.
4. Consider a person in a sensory deprivation tank, cut off from all sight, sound, and touch. Even stripped of every sensory input, they cannot doubt that they are thinking.
5. The very act of doubting proves a thinking subject exists, and this is Descartes' cogito: self-consciousness is the one certainty that survives radical doubt.
6. The phenomenological tradition (a philosophical approach that studies the structure of conscious experience from the first-person point of view), particularly the work of Edmund Husserl, distinguishes between pre-reflective self-awareness and reflective self-consciousness.
7. Pre-reflective awareness is the quiet background sense of being present that accompanies all experience, while reflective self-consciousness involves actively turning your attention toward yourself as an object of inquiry.
8. Consider the difference between being absorbed in running (your legs moving, breath steady, attention on the path) and pausing to notice 'I am running.'
   1. The first is pre-reflective awareness: consciousness of the world without consciousness of being conscious.
   2. The second is reflective: turning attention back on the experiencing subject itself.
9. Husserl argues that both modes are genuine forms of self-consciousness, but only the reflective mode makes you consciously think about yourself, treating yourself as the object of your own attention.

Self-consciousness, Degrees, and Scientific Perspectives

1. This distinction matters for personhood because it suggests self-consciousness comes in degrees, a capacity that can be more or less developed.
2. Locke argues that personhood follows self-conscious memory, not bodily continuity. His prince-and-cobbler thought experiment (examined in 1.1.1) demonstrates that if one person's consciousness were transferred to another's body, the person follows the consciousness.
3. What matters for self-consciousness is not what body you inhabit but what experiences you can reflectively claim as your own.
4. The question of whether all humans possess self-consciousness, or whether it admits of degrees, is philosophically contentious. Some thinkers argue that self-consciousness is an all-or-nothing capacity, while others contend that it develops gradually through biological maturation and social interaction.
5. From a neuroscientific perspective, as discussed in 1.3.1, researchers such as Patricia Churchland have investigated the neural basis of self-awareness. Brain imaging studies suggest that specific regions, including the prefrontal cortex, are involved when we think about ourselves, so-called self-referential thought (thoughts that have yourself as their subject). This raises the question of whether self-consciousness is merely a product of brain activity.
6. Buddhist philosophy, explored in 1.2.1, challenges the assumption that self-consciousness reveals a substantial self. The doctrine of anattā (not-self) suggests that what we take to be self-awareness is simply awareness of a constantly changing stream of mental events, with no enduring subject behind them.
7. In meditation practice, a practitioner observes their thoughts, sensations, and emotions arising and passing away. They search for a stable 'self' behind these experiences and find none, only the ever-changing stream itself.
8. This experiential discovery mirrors the philosophical argument: if every component of experience is impermanent, the 'self' is a useful fiction, not a metaphysical reality.
9. The question "Are we self-conscious beings?" therefore opens onto a broader inquiry: does self-consciousness point to something genuinely real about our inner nature, or is it an illusion generated by brain processes? This connects consciousness, identity, and the deep philosophical question of what the self ultimately is.
10. Understanding self-consciousness is essential for the sub-theme of personhood (1.4), because many philosophical traditions treat the capacity for self-reflection as the defining feature that separates persons from non-persons. The next topic, 1.4.2 (Agency), will extend this analysis to ask whether animals or machines could also qualify.