IB Philosophy 1.2.3 Relations to Others Notes

From Knowing Others, to Relating to Them

1. The previous two topics in 1.2 asked whether the self exists (1.2.1) and whether the self or the other can be known (1.2.2). Section 1.2.3 takes the next step: granted that others exist and can be known, what is the nature of our relations to them, and how do those relations constitute who we are?
2. The central question of this topic is: Is how we define 'the other' part of how we define 'the self'? If the self is partly constituted through its relations, as Jonardon Ganeri argued in 1.2.1 and Simone de Beauvoir argued in 1.2.2, then examining the types of relation we stand in to others is examining the very structure of selfhood.
3. Philosophers across traditions have identified multiple dimensions of self-other relations: biological (kinship, family), social (civic life, professional roles, institutions), psychological (friendship, love, care), and spiritual (religious community, shared transcendent meaning). Each dimension shapes selfhood in a different way.
4. Confucius’ (551-479 BCE) philosophy provides the most systematic account of how the self is constituted through its relations to others.
5. For Confucius, there is no self apart from one's relational roles: the person is fundamentally a node in a network of relationships.
6. This topic connects backward to cultural identity (1.1.3): culture is the medium through which relations to others are structured. The particular forms that biological, social, psychological, and spiritual relations take are always culturally shaped, varying across traditions and historical periods.
7. It also builds on de Beauvoir’s analysis in 1.2.2, where she showed that how we define the Other carries ethical and political weight. This topic asks the next question: what do good, genuine relationships with others actually look like?
8. The topic points forward to social structures (8.1.1), which will examine how formal institutional arrangements shape and sometimes constrain the relational dimensions of selfhood. The relations explored here are the building blocks out of which social structures are formed.
9. A key philosophical tension runs through this topic: do our relationships with others simply happen to us from the outside, or do those relationships actually make us who we are from the very start?
10. Western individualism typically assumes the former, while Confucian and many non-Western traditions assume the latter.

Confucius and the Relational Self

1. Confucius (Kong Qiu, 551-479 BCE) is the founder of Confucianism, one of the most influential philosophical traditions in East Asian history. His teachings are collected in the Analects (Lunyu), assembled by his disciples after his death.
2. At the centre of Confucian philosophy is the concept of ren (benevolence or humaneness). The Analects contain over one hundred references to ren, consistently characterising it as the highest human virtue and as something that can only be realised through loving and caring relations with others.
3. For Confucius, the self is fundamentally relational: persons are defined not by isolated properties (such as Descartes' idea that the self is a thinking substance, a mind that exists independently of everything around it) but by the roles they occupy within a structured network of relationships: to be a person is to be a son, a friend, a citizen, a mentor, or a minister.
4. Confucian philosophy identifies five cardinal relationships (wu lun): ruler and minister, parent and child, husband and wife, elder and younger sibling, and friend and friend. Each relationship is governed by specific virtues and obligations, and together they constitute the social fabric within which the self is formed.
5. When an elderly father falls ill, the obligation of filial piety (xiao) is not something his son works out from scratch by consulting general rules: it is part of what it means to be a son.
6. To neglect his father would not merely be a bad act but a failure of selfhood itself: the relational role is part of who you are, not just a constraint on a self that exists independently.
7. The concept of li (ritual propriety) is equally important: it refers to the ceremonial forms, social norms, and proper conduct that structure relations. Li is not mere etiquette but the grammar of human social life, the system of practices through which persons coordinate, recognise, and fulfil their relational roles.
8. The junzi (exemplary person or gentleman) is the Confucian ideal of a person who fully embodies the virtues appropriate to each of their relationships. The junzi is not a self-made individual but a person who has perfected their relational roles, becoming a worthy son, a loyal minister, a true friend.
9. Confucius's account of the relational self directly answers the topic's core question: yes, defining the other is part of defining the self. To define someone as a parent is simultaneously to define oneself as a child, with all the obligations, dispositions, and forms of care that entails.
10. This contrasts sharply with Western individualist traditions, which typically picture the self as fully formed before it enters any relationships, then choosing to join communities or make friends from a position of independence. For Confucius, such a fully formed pre-social self is a philosophical fiction: the social relations come first.