IB History Key Policies Notes

The Brezhnev Doctrine and the Prague Spring (1968)

1. Brezhnev became Soviet leader in 1964 after Khrushchev's removal by the Politburo.
2. Alexander Dubcek introduced reforms in Czechoslovakia in 1968 - known as the Prague Spring.
3. Reforms included freedom of the press, relaxation of censorship, and moves toward "socialism with a human face."
4. On 20-21 August 1968, 500,000 Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia to crush the reforms.
5. The Brezhnev Doctrine declared the USSR's right to intervene in any socialist state where communism was threatened.
6. It was published in Pravda in November 1968 and asserted that socialist sovereignty was limited by the collective interests of the bloc.
7. The doctrine served as a warning to Romania, Yugoslavia, and other states considering independent paths.
8. The West condemned the invasion but took no military action - confirming Cold War spheres of influence.
9. China strongly criticised the invasion, deepening the Sino-Soviet split.

Detente with the United States

1. Detente refers to the period of relaxed tensions between the superpowers from the late 1960s to 1979.
2. Brezhnev pursued detente partly because the arms race was economically unsustainable for the USSR.
3. The Nixon-Brezhnev summit of May 1972 in Moscow produced SALT I - the first strategic arms limitation treaty.
4. SALT I froze the number of ICBMs and SLBMs at existing levels and limited ABM sites to two per country.
5. The Basic Principles Agreement (1972) committed both sides to peaceful coexistence and avoidance of nuclear confrontation.
6. Trade agreements were signed - the USSR received US grain exports and access to Western technology.
7. SALT II was signed in June 1979 by Brezhnev and Carter, capping delivery vehicles at 2,250 each.
8. SALT II was never ratified by the US Senate after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
9. Both sides broadly adhered to SALT II limits informally despite the lack of ratification.
10. Detente benefited Brezhnev domestically - it projected an image of equal superpower status with the US.

The Helsinki Accords (1975)

1. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) produced the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975.
2. 35 nations signed the accords, including the USA, USSR, and all European states except Albania.
3. Basket I recognised post-1945 borders in Europe - a major Soviet diplomatic victory.
4. Basket II promoted economic cooperation and trade between East and West.
5. Basket III committed signatories to human rights and free movement - this became a tool for dissidents inside the Eastern Bloc.
6. Brezhnev viewed Helsinki as a triumph, but Basket III undermined Soviet legitimacy in the long term.
7. Helsinki Watch groups formed in the USSR and Eastern Europe, monitoring human rights abuses.
8. The accords were not legally binding, which limited enforcement but gave dissidents a moral framework.

Sino-Soviet Relations and the China Factor

1. The Sino-Soviet split had deepened under Khrushchev and worsened further under Brezhnev.
2. In March 1969, armed clashes erupted along the Ussuri River border, nearly escalating to full war.
3. The USSR stationed over 40 divisions along the Chinese border by the early 1970s - a massive military commitment.
4. Ideological rivalry between Moscow and Beijing meant both competed for leadership of the communist world.
5. Nixon's visit to China in 1972 alarmed the Kremlin and partly motivated Brezhnev to pursue detente with the US.
6. There was no rapprochement with China under Brezhnev - relations remained hostile until after his death in 1982.
7. The triangular diplomacy between the US, USSR, and China became a defining feature of 1970s geopolitics.

Third World Interventions

1. Brezhnev expanded Soviet influence in the Third World through military aid, advisors, and proxy forces.
2. In Angola (1975-76), the USSR backed the MPLA with weapons and Cuban troops in the civil war.
3. In Ethiopia (1977-78), Soviet and Cuban forces helped the Derg regime defeat Somalia in the Ogaden War.
4. The USSR also supported FRELIMO in Mozambique and Marxist movements across Africa and Asia.
5. These interventions were expensive and contributed to growing "imperial overstretch" of the Soviet economy.
6. The US saw these interventions as proof that detente was one-sided - fuelling American neo-conservative criticism.
7. Cuba acted as the USSR's main proxy in Africa, deploying over 35,000 troops in Angola at peak.

Military Buildup and Nuclear Parity

1. Under Brezhnev, the USSR achieved nuclear parity with the US by the early 1970s - a central goal since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
2. By 1975, the USSR had roughly 2,500 ICBMs and SLBMs compared to the US's 2,100.
3. Conventional forces also expanded - the Soviet navy under Admiral Gorshkov became a genuine blue-water fleet.
4. Military spending consumed 15-25% of Soviet GDP (estimates vary) - far exceeding Western proportions.
5. The deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles in Europe from 1977 alarmed NATO allies.
6. NATO responded with the Dual Track Decision (1979) - deploying Pershing II and cruise missiles while negotiating.
7. The buildup gave Brezhnev leverage in negotiations but crippled the civilian economy.

The Invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979)

1. In April 1978, the Saur Revolution brought a communist government to power in Afghanistan.
2. The regime faced fierce resistance from Mujahideen guerrillas and internal factional conflicts.
3. On 24 December 1979, Soviet forces invaded, killing President Amin and installing Babrak Karmal.
4. Brezhnev justified the invasion as fulfilling the Brezhnev Doctrine and protecting a friendly socialist government.
5. The invasion ended detente - President Carter withdrew SALT II from Senate ratification.
6. The US imposed a grain embargo, boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and began arming the Mujahideen via Pakistan.
7. The UN General Assembly condemned the invasion by 104 votes to 18 in January 1980.
8. The war became the USSR's "Vietnam" - costing over 15,000 Soviet soldiers killed and billions of roubles.
9. Afghanistan marked the shift from detente to the "Second Cold War" under Reagan from 1981.

Economic Stagnation and Its Impact on Foreign Policy

1. The Brezhnev era is often called the "Era of Stagnation" (zastoi) due to declining economic growth rates.
2. GDP growth fell from 5% in the 1960s to around 2% by the late 1970s - undermining Soviet global ambitions.
3. Heavy industry and military production were prioritised over consumer goods and agriculture.
4. The USSR became increasingly dependent on oil and gas exports - vulnerable to price fluctuations.
5. Corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency characterised the system - Brezhnev's policy of "stability of cadres" prevented reform.
6. Economic weakness made the arms race unsustainable and increased the need for Western trade and technology.
7. The cost of supporting client states in Cuba, Vietnam, and Africa placed further strain on the budget.

Eastern Europe and the Poland Crisis (1980-81)

1. The Solidarity trade union emerged in Poland in August 1980 under Lech Walesa.
2. Solidarity gained 10 million members - the first independent trade union in a communist state.
3. Brezhnev considered military intervention but was deterred by the cost of Afghanistan and fear of Western sanctions.
4. Instead, General Jaruzelski imposed martial law in December 1981 under heavy Soviet pressure.
5. The Poland crisis showed the limits of the Brezhnev Doctrine - direct Soviet invasion was no longer politically feasible.
6. Solidarity was suppressed but survived underground, re-emerging in 1989 to lead Poland's transition to democracy.

Comparison with Khrushchev's Policies

1. Khrushchev favoured "peaceful coexistence" as official doctrine; Brezhnev continued this but combined it with military assertiveness.
2. Khrushchev was unpredictable - risking confrontation over Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962).
3. Brezhnev was more cautious, preferring negotiations and proxy wars over direct superpower brinkmanship.
4. Both leaders intervened in Eastern Europe - Khrushchev in Hungary (1956), Brezhnev in Czechoslovakia (1968).
5. Brezhnev achieved nuclear parity that Khrushchev could only bluff about - making arms control possible.
6. Khrushchev's de-Stalinisation alienated China; Brezhnev's conservatism failed to heal the Sino-Soviet split.
7. Both leaders expanded Third World involvement but Brezhnev did so on a far larger and costlier scale.
8. Brezhnev's legacy was a militarily powerful but economically weakened USSR that could no longer sustain its global role.