IB History Appeasement Notes

Appeasement and Italian Aggression

1. Appeasement was the policy of making concessions to aggressive powers to avoid war. In the context of Italian expansion, Britain and France repeatedly failed to confront Mussolini's aggression, from the Corfu Incident (1923) through the Abyssinian Crisis (1935-1936).
2. Britain and France had strategic reasons for appeasing Italy: they wanted to keep Mussolini as an ally against Hitler's Germany. The Stresa Front (1935) represented this hope. However, their half-hearted response to the Abyssinian Crisis destroyed this strategy and pushed Italy toward Germany.
3. The pattern was consistent: condemnation without effective action. The Abyssinian Crisis revealed the League of Nations to be, in Hodder's words, "simply an extension of the foreign ministries of Britain and France" rather than a genuine collective security body.

Early Signs: Corfu, Fiume, and Locarno (1923-1925)

1. Italy's foreign policy in the 1920s was "primarily opportunist" (Philip Morgan), taking advantage of small incidents. The Corfu Incident (1923) was a key early example: after Italian officials were murdered on the Greek-Albanian border, Mussolini bombarded and occupied the Greek island of Corfu.
2. The League pressured Greece (not Italy) to pay an indemnity. Italy faced no consequences for its aggression. Similarly, Yugoslavia simply handed the city of Fiume (Rijeka) to Italy to avoid conflict. These successes "required little on the part of Italy" and taught Mussolini that boldness was rewarded.
3. Italy's economic and military weakness in the 1920s meant foreign policy had to be necessarily cautious. An embargo on fuel from the USA or Britain would have crippled Italy. Food import reductions from France would have caused shortages and price increases. Mussolini could not risk provoking the Western powers.
4. At the Locarno Treaties (1925), Italy served as a guarantor power alongside Britain. This gave Mussolini international prestige while he secretly harboured expansionist ambitions. France included Italy in diplomatic efforts and was "not concerned with Italy's weak military."

The Stresa Front and Its Collapse (1935)

1. When Hitler announced German rearmament (March 1935), Britain, France, and Italy formed the Stresa Front (April 1935). All three condemned Germany's plans and "agreed to work together." This was the last moment Italy aligned with the Western democracies.
2. Mussolini believed the Stresa Front gave him a tacit green light for Abyssinia. The agreement focused only on European issues and did not mention Africa. In January 1935, French FM Pierre Laval had "verbally promised Mussolini that France would not interfere with Italy's actions in Abyssinia; France's main concern was Germany."
3. Britain undermined the Front by signing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (June 1935) without consulting Italy or France, "demonstrating that the Stresa Front countries were not as united as their public statements indicated." Italy and France discussed mutual military cooperation, but these talks collapsed after the Abyssinian Crisis.