IB History Entry Into the Second World War Notes

Germany's Path to War (1939)

1. After occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia (March 1939), Hitler turned to Poland. He demanded the return of Danzig, a German-majority free city under League control, and a road/rail corridor through the Polish Corridor to connect Germany with East Prussia.
2. The Polish Corridor was a strip of territory given to Poland at Versailles to provide access to the sea, but it separated East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Danzig was 95% German-speaking but had been designated a League-administered free city. Both were long-standing German grievances.
3. Poland refused Hitler's demands. Unlike Austria or Czechoslovakia, Poland had a strong sense of national identity and a military of over 1 million men. Polish leaders remembered that concessions had not saved Czechoslovakia and were determined to resist.
4. Britain and France issued guarantees to Poland (31 March 1939), pledging to defend Polish independence. This marked the definitive end of appeasement; Chamberlain had finally drawn a line that, if crossed, would mean war.
5. Britain introduced peacetime conscription (April 1939) for the first time in its history, signalling it was now preparing for war. Military spending had already quadrupled from £186 million (1936) to £719 million (1939).

The Failure of Anglo-Soviet Negotiations

1. In spring-summer 1939, Britain and France belatedly attempted to negotiate a military alliance with the USSR against Germany. A combined Anglo-French-Soviet front could have deterred Hitler from invading Poland.
2. The talks failed for several reasons: Britain sent a low-ranking delegation by slow boat rather than by air, signalling a lack of urgency. Stalin interpreted this as evidence that Britain was not serious about an alliance.
3. Poland and Romania refused to allow Soviet troops on their territory, fearing Soviet occupation. Without passage rights, the USSR could not effectively fight Germany. Britain could not force its allies to accept Soviet troops.
4. Deep mutual distrust undermined the talks. Stalin suspected Britain and France were trying to redirect German aggression eastward (as Munich had suggested). Britain feared communism almost as much as fascism. The Great Purges (1936-1938) had also devastated Soviet military leadership, making Britain doubt Soviet military effectiveness.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Invasion of Poland

1. While Anglo-Soviet talks stalled, Germany secretly negotiated with the USSR. The Nazi-Soviet Pact (23 August 1939) stunned the world by uniting ideological enemies. The public treaty was a non-aggression agreement; secret protocols divided Poland and eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres.
2. For Hitler, the pact eliminated the threat of a two-front war and guaranteed access to Soviet raw materials (oil, grain, metals). For Stalin, it bought time for Soviet rearmament and allowed the USSR to seize eastern Poland, the Baltic states, and parts of Finland and Romania.

1. Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939 using Blitzkrieg (lightning war): coordinated Luftwaffe bombing, Panzer tank columns, and motorised infantry overwhelmed Polish defences. Warsaw was heavily bombed from the air.
2. Britain issued an ultimatum demanding German withdrawal. When it expired, Britain declared war on 3 September 1939, followed by France hours later. However, neither could provide meaningful military assistance to Poland.
3. The USSR invaded eastern Poland on 17 September 1939 as agreed in the secret protocols. Poland was crushed between two invaders and surrendered by early October. Germany and the USSR divided Polish territory along the Bug River line.

The Phoney War (September 1939 - April 1940)

1. After Poland's defeat, a period known as the "Phoney War" (Sitzkrieg) followed. Britain and France were at war with Germany but no major fighting occurred on the Western Front for seven months.
2. France sheltered behind the Maginot Line and Britain deployed the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France, but neither launched an offensive. Both sides used the time to mobilise and prepare, though Germany used it more effectively.
3. The Phoney War ended dramatically in April 1940 when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway, followed by the devastating Blitzkrieg through the Low Countries and France (May 1940). France fell in just six weeks.

Italy's Non-Belligerence (September 1939 - June 1940)

1. Despite the Pact of Steel (May 1939), Mussolini declared Italy a "non-belligerent" when war broke out. During Pact negotiations, he had told Hitler that Italy would not be ready for a general war until 1943. Hitler had promised Mussolini there would be no war before then.
2. Italy's military was critically underprepared: the army relied on light L3 tankettes (3.2 tonnes, armed only with machine guns) rather than real tanks. The air force still operated obsolete biplanes, and the navy had no aircraft carriers.
3. Only about 10 divisions were considered combat-ready out of a nominal 73 divisions. Ammunition reserves would last only a few weeks of fighting. Italy lacked the industrial capacity for sustained warfare.
4. Italy's economy was dependent on German coal (two-thirds of supply) and imported oil. In March 1940, Britain blockaded German coal ports, threatening Italian energy supply and creating economic pressure to align with Germany.
5. Germany owed Italy approximately $40 million by August 1939 for Italian exports. Economic ties to Germany made continued neutrality increasingly difficult. Mussolini also feared that a victorious Germany would no longer need or respect Italy.
6. At the Brenner Pass meeting (18 March 1940), Hitler pressured Mussolini to commit to entering the war. Hitler assured him that Germany's western offensive would be swift and decisive, and that Italy's participation would be needed to share in the victory.

Italy Enters the War (June 1940)

1. The Fall of France (May-June 1940) transformed Mussolini's calculations. Germany's stunning Blitzkrieg victory over France in just six weeks convinced him the war would be short and Germany would win. He believed Italy must join before the war ended.
2. Mussolini feared that a neutral Italy would become "another Switzerland" - marginalized in a German-dominated Europe. He told his Chief of Staff: "I need only a few thousand dead to sit at the peace conference as a belligerent."
3. Italy declared war on Britain and France on 10 June 1940, just days before France's surrender. Fascist ideology demanded military glory; remaining neutral contradicted Mussolini's image as a decisive warrior leader.
4. Mussolini envisioned a "parallel war" (guerra parallela): Italy would fight its own separate conflict alongside Germany, pursuing Italian objectives in the Mediterranean, Balkans, and North Africa rather than serving under German command.
5. His territorial ambitions included Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, and Djibouti from France, and Egypt and Sudan from Britain. He wanted to transform the Mediterranean into an Italian lake (Mare Nostrum) and create a new Roman Empire.

Italy's Military Failures

1. Italy's initial engagement was minor skirmishes against France before the armistice (25 June 1940). Despite facing a collapsing French army, Italian forces gained minimal territory, exposing immediate military weakness.
2. In September 1940, Italian forces invaded Egypt from Libya with 236,000 troops. A much smaller British force of 36,000 under General O'Connor launched a devastating counterattack, capturing 130,000 Italian prisoners and advancing 800 km into Libya by February 1941.

1. In October 1940, Mussolini invaded Greece from Albania without informing Hitler, partly to prove Italy could match German military successes. The Greek army, fighting in mountainous terrain during winter, pushed the Italians back into Albania.
2. Germany was forced to intervene in April 1941, conquering Yugoslavia and Greece. Hitler also sent Rommel's Afrika Korps to North Africa to prevent a complete Italian collapse. The "parallel war" concept had failed completely.
3. Italy's failures had strategic consequences for Germany: the Balkan campaign delayed Operation Barbarossa (the invasion of the USSR) by approximately five weeks. Some historians argue this delay contributed to Germany's failure to capture Moscow before winter 1941.

Historiography, Source Analysis, and Exam Preparation

Key Dates Timeline