IB History Role of Yeltsin Notes

Yeltsin: Courage, Chaos, and the Deal That Made Putin

From party official to elected challenger

1. Yeltsin rose through the Communist Party as a regional leader in Sverdlovsk. His reputation for demanding work targets and attacking privilege helped him enter national politics.
2. Gorbachev brought him to Moscow in 1985 and made him city party chief. Yeltsin removed officials, visited shops and transport, and presented himself as an opponent of complacency.
3. He criticized the slow pace of reform and the privileges of the party elite. His confrontational style brought conflict with Gorbachev and senior officials.
4. At the October 1987 Central Committee meeting, Yeltsin attacked the reform process and asked to leave the Politburo. Party leaders humiliated and removed him from the Moscow post.
5. The demotion damaged his health and career but gave him credibility as a victim of the establishment. Glasnost allowed the dispute to become public.
6. In the 1989 Congress elections, Moscow voters gave Yeltsin an overwhelming victory. He now possessed electoral legitimacy independent of party appointment.
7. He joined the Interregional Deputies Group and demanded deeper democratic and economic reform. Television turned parliamentary speeches into national political events.
8. Yeltsin became chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet in May 1990. The office gave him an institutional base inside the largest Soviet republic.
9. Russia declared sovereignty in June 1990, placing its laws above union law. Yeltsin used Russian state power against Gorbachev's union center.
10. He resigned publicly from the Communist Party in July 1990. This step made his break with the old political order unmistakable.
11. Russian voters elected him president in June 1991. His direct mandate shaped every later contest over who represented Russia.

The August coup and the end of the union

1. During the August 1991 coup, Yeltsin reached the Russian parliament and denounced the emergency committee as unconstitutional. He called for resistance and a general strike.
2. His appearance on a tank became the defining image of opposition. It showed that parts of the military would not obey the plotters automatically.
3. Russian officials maintained communication with citizens and foreign governments. Yeltsin could act because the republic already possessed a presidency, legislature, and administrative network.
4. The coup collapsed within three days after troops refused a full assault. Yeltsin emerged with greater authority than Gorbachev, who had been isolated in Crimea.
5. He suspended Communist Party activity in Russia and took control of party property. These actions dismantled institutions that had supported union power.
6. Yeltsin recognized Baltic independence and encouraged republican control of economic assets. The center could no longer enforce a common political line.
7. Ukraine's December referendum made a viable union without its second largest republic unlikely. Yeltsin chose a new relationship among sovereign states rather than preserve Gorbachev's office.
8. At Belavezha on 8 December, Yeltsin joined the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus in declaring that the USSR had ceased to exist. They created the Commonwealth of Independent States.
9. The decision bypassed a complete union constitutional process. It combined republican electoral claims with an agreement among three leaders.
10. Yeltsin gained full control of the Russian state, nuclear succession, and international representation. Gorbachev resigned because his union presidency no longer had a state.
11. His role in ending the USSR can be read as democratic self determination or personal state building. Both motives operated through Russian sovereignty.

Shock therapy and executive choice

1. Yeltsin gave Yegor Gaidar authority to begin rapid market reform in January 1992. The government liberalized most prices while retaining controls on selected essentials.
2. Prices rose sharply and savings lost much of their value. Households experienced the end of guaranteed supply before new markets became stable.
3. The government cut subsidies and sought monetary restraint, but the central bank continued credit to enterprises and former Soviet republics. Inflation remained severe.
4. Yeltsin defended rapid change as necessary to prevent a return to command planning. Reformers feared that gradual measures would allow old interests to block transition.
5. Privatization distributed vouchers to citizens, but many sold them cheaply or placed them in investment funds. Managers and insiders gained control of valuable enterprises.
6. The president relied heavily on decrees because parliament resisted reform. This method increased speed while weakening legislative ownership of the program.
7. Yeltsin replaced Gaidar with Viktor Chernomyrdin as prime minister in December 1992. The shift reflected parliamentary pressure and the influence of industrial interests.
8. Wage and pension arrears spread as the state lacked revenue and enterprises lacked cash. Formal employment often continued without reliable payment.
9. Market reform created private enterprise, trade, and new consumer access for some Russians. It also produced inequality, insecurity, and distrust of political leaders.
10. Yeltsin's responsibility lies in choosing speed, personnel, and executive implementation. Soviet economic weakness and institutional collapse limited every available strategy.

The 1993 crisis and presidential constitution

1. Conflict between Yeltsin and the legislature intensified over reform, appointments, and constitutional authority. Both sides claimed democratic legitimacy.
2. In September 1993 Yeltsin issued Decree 1400 to dissolve the Congress of People's Deputies. The existing constitution did not give him that power.
3. The Constitutional Court ruled against the decree, and parliament declared Vice President Alexander Rutskoy acting president. Russia now had competing commands.
4. Armed supporters gathered at the White House while police imposed a blockade. Negotiations failed to create simultaneous elections or a legal compromise.
5. On 3 October opposition supporters seized municipal offices and attacked the Ostankino television complex. Violence turned institutional conflict into an armed crisis.
6. Yeltsin secured military support and ordered tanks to fire on the White House on 4 October. More than one hundred people died in the confrontation.
7. The new constitution approved in December created a strong presidency. It gave the executive wide powers over government appointment, decrees, foreign policy, and dissolution of parliament.
8. Yeltsin argued that concentration was needed to govern a fractured state. The arrangement reduced checks that might have restrained future presidents.
9. Parliamentary and presidential elections continued after the crisis. Competitive procedure survived, but executive victory by force shaped the constitutional order.
10. Colton's interpretation stresses Yeltsin's democratic instinct and autocratic practice. The 1993 crisis provides the clearest evidence for that contradiction.

Chechnya, elections, and declining health

1. Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev declared independence in 1991. Yeltsin initially relied on pressure and covert intervention rather than a negotiated settlement.
2. Russian forces entered Chechnya in December 1994. Officials expected a quick operation, but resistance and military weakness produced a long urban war.
3. The assault on Grozny caused extensive destruction and civilian deaths. Television coverage undermined support for the government and exposed poor military planning.
4. The war damaged Yeltsin's democratic reputation because federal forces used large scale violence against a population inside Russia. It also weakened military morale.
5. By early 1996 Yeltsin's approval was low and Communist candidate Gennady Zyuganov posed a serious electoral threat. Business and media owners rallied behind the president.
6. Yeltsin campaigned energetically, promised spending, and used state resources and favorable television coverage. He won the second round after securing Alexander Lebed's support.
7. His campaign concealed serious illness. A heart attack between rounds left advisers and family members managing access and information.
8. Yeltsin underwent bypass surgery in November 1996 and remained absent for long periods. The constitution offered limited transparency about presidential incapacity.
9. The Khasavyurt accords ended major fighting in the first Chechen war in August 1996. They postponed a final decision on Chechnya's political status.
10. Electoral victory preserved Yeltsin in office but increased dependence on oligarchs, advisers, and family. Formal mandate coexisted with reduced personal capacity.

Government instability and the 1998 crash

1. Yeltsin changed prime ministers repeatedly during his second term. Frequent dismissal weakened coherent policy and turned appointments into struggles among factions.
2. Sergei Kiriyenko became prime minister in April 1998 as financial pressure grew. The state relied on short term domestic debt with high interest rates.
3. Low tax collection, capital flight, weak banks, and commodity dependence made public finances vulnerable. The Asian financial crisis reduced investor confidence.
4. On 17 August 1998 the government defaulted on domestic debt, widened the rouble trading band, and suspended some foreign payments. The rouble then fell sharply.
5. Banks failed or froze deposits, prices rose, and many households lost savings. The crisis struck an urban middle class that had begun to trust private finance.
6. Yeltsin tried to restore Chernomyrdin, but the Duma resisted. The appointment of Yevgeny Primakov produced a broader government with parliamentary support.
7. Devaluation later helped some domestic producers compete with imports. Rising oil prices after 1999 supported recovery, but these gains did not erase the immediate political damage.
8. Primakov gained popularity through stability and a more assertive foreign policy. Yeltsin dismissed him in May 1999, partly because he appeared to be a potential successor.
9. Sergei Stepashin served briefly before Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin prime minister in August. Rapid succession reflected the search for a safe transfer of power.
10. The financial crash exposed weak taxation, banking regulation, debt policy, and executive credibility. Yeltsin's government survived but no longer defined reform as success.

Succession, immunity, and Yeltsin's legacy

1. Yeltsin's inner circle became known as the Family. It included relatives, advisers, officials, and business figures concerned about influence and legal exposure after he left office.
2. Boris Berezovsky promoted potential successors and controlled important media access. Roman Abramovich and other figures also had connections to the presidential circle.
3. Putin had worked in the security services, St Petersburg administration, presidential property office, and Federal Security Service. His career combined loyalty, administrative experience, and limited public profile.
4. As prime minister, Putin presented a firm response to renewed violence in the North Caucasus. The Second Chechen War increased his popularity and visibility.
5. On 31 December 1999 Yeltsin announced his resignation in a televised address. He apologized for unmet hopes and transferred acting presidential power to Putin.
6. Putin's first decree protected Yeltsin and his family from prosecution connected to presidential acts. The arrangement made personal security part of political succession.
7. An election followed in March 2000, and Putin won. The incumbent advantage and control inherited from the presidency shaped the contest.
8. Lilia Shevtsova emphasizes the unresolved tension between personal rule and constitutional order. The handover preserved that tension rather than settling it.
9. George Breslauer describes Yeltsin as transformational without sufficient institution building. He ended one political system but did not create durable checks for the next.
10. The strongest judgement combines achievement and damage. Yeltsin defended elections and Russian sovereignty, yet his decrees, force, patronage, and succession deal left a presidency stronger than the institutions meant to control it.