IB History August Coup and Its Aftermath Notes

The August Coup Failed and Accelerated the Collapse It Tried to Prevent

The Union Treaty crisis

1. By 1991 the Soviet center had lost authority to elected republican governments. A new constitutional settlement appeared necessary if any union was to survive.
2. Gorbachev negotiated with leaders of nine republics at Novo-Ogaryovo. The proposed treaty would create a looser federation with extensive republican control.
3. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other participants wanted sovereignty over resources and law. Gorbachev sought common defense, foreign policy, currency, and central institutions.
4. Six republics did not join the main negotiation, including the Baltic states, Georgia, Armenia, and Moldova. Several had already chosen independence.
5. A union referendum in March 1991 produced majority support in participating republics for a renewed federation. Its wording allowed different interpretations of what renewal meant.
6. Yeltsin used the same Russian ballot to establish a directly elected presidency. He won that office in June and gained a mandate independent of the union center.
7. The treaty was scheduled for signature on 20 August 1991. Conservatives believed it would transfer the remaining powers of the Soviet state to republics.
8. Officials who had served Gorbachev now faced loss of their institutions and possibly the state itself. This fear turned political resistance into plans for emergency rule.
9. The treaty did not make the coup inevitable. It provided a deadline that forced divided conservatives to decide whether to accept decentralization or intervene.

The State Committee and its members

1. The State Committee for the State of Emergency called itself the GKChP. Its eight members held senior positions across government, security, defense, industry, and agriculture.
2. Vice President Gennady Yanayev became the public acting president. KGB chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov helped organize communications, surveillance, and the isolation of Gorbachev.
3. Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov ordered military units toward Moscow. Interior Minister Boris Pugo represented the police and internal security apparatus.
4. Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov joined the committee after months of economic crisis. Other members included Oleg Baklanov, Alexander Tizyakov, and Vasily Starodubtsev.
5. The plotters claimed Gorbachev was unable to perform his duties because of ill health. They announced emergency measures to restore order and protect the union.
6. Their program promised control over prices, supply, media, and public disorder. It offered few clear solutions to the economic and national crises beneath the emergency.
7. The committee represented powerful offices but lacked unity, public credibility, and a shared plan for violence. Some members expected obedience from institutions that had changed since earlier Soviet interventions.
8. Yanayev's televised press conference showed uncertainty, including visibly shaking hands. The performance weakened the image of decisive authority.
9. The conspirators tried to revive command without restoring the fear that had once made commands automatic. Their institutional power proved less complete than their titles suggested.

Gorbachev at Foros

1. Gorbachev was on holiday at his state residence at Foros in Crimea when a delegation arrived on 18 August. It demanded that he declare an emergency or transfer authority.
2. He refused to approve the action. Communications from the residence were cut, and guards prevented him and his family from leaving.
3. The coup leaders later claimed illness rather than admitting detention. This lie allowed them to use constitutional language while removing the president.
4. Gorbachev's absence created uncertainty about his position. Some citizens wondered whether he had agreed privately or lost control completely.
5. His aides documented events and found ways to receive information. The isolation showed that control of communication remained central to Soviet political action.
6. The plotters did not arrest or kill Gorbachev. Their restraint reflected division, legal caution, and fear of consequences if the coup failed.
7. When loyal officials reached Foros on 21 August, Gorbachev returned to Moscow. He appeared physically free but politically dependent on forces led by Yeltsin.
8. His refusal gave him a moral defense against the coup. It did not restore the authority lost during three days of detention.
9. Foros symbolizes the gap between office and power. The Soviet president retained legal title while others decided events in Moscow and the republics.

Yeltsin and resistance at the White House

1. Yeltsin reached the Russian parliament building on the morning of 19 August. He declared the committee unconstitutional and called for a general strike.
2. Russian officials used telephones, fax machines, radio, and foreign media to circulate decrees. The coup failed to achieve a complete information blackout.
3. Yeltsin climbed onto a tank from the Taman Division and read his statement. The image linked civilian resistance with uncertainty inside the armed forces.
4. Thousands gathered around the White House and built barricades. Political activists, elected deputies, veterans, clergy, and ordinary citizens joined the defense.
5. Some military units declared loyalty to the Russian government or avoided confrontation. Commanders received unclear orders and doubted the political legitimacy of an assault.
6. Western governments condemned the coup and maintained contact with Yeltsin's side. International reaction reinforced the isolation of the committee.
7. Yeltsin's courage mattered, but resistance depended on wider institutional failure. The coup leaders could not secure reliable obedience from troops, media, officials, or the public.
8. The White House became a competing seat of state authority. Russian law and presidential commands challenged union emergency decrees in real time.
9. Victory transformed Yeltsin from Gorbachev's rival into the central defender of elected government. He gained the political capital to dismantle union institutions.

Why the coup collapsed

1. The committee never detained Yeltsin before he organized resistance. This operational failure allowed a visible alternative government to remain active.
2. Television censorship was incomplete, and independent communication continued. Citizens could compare official claims with reports from Moscow and abroad.
3. Military leaders feared casualties, civil conflict, and legal responsibility. Units in Moscow did not show unified willingness to storm the parliament.
4. Three civilians died during a confused confrontation near a tunnel on the night of 20 to 21 August. Their deaths increased the moral and political cost of further force.
5. The plotters lacked a persuasive social program. Emergency decrees promised order but did not answer shortages, sovereignty claims, or public distrust.
6. Senior officials waited to see which side would win. This caution deprived the committee of the rapid bureaucratic compliance it needed.
7. The KGB and armed forces contained divided loyalties after years of reform and republican politics. Formal command no longer guaranteed coordinated action.
8. On 21 August Yazov ordered troops to withdraw. Committee members traveled to Crimea or attempted to escape responsibility as the action disintegrated.
9. The collapse within about three days showed that coercive capacity remained but political authority had fragmented. No group could easily command the whole Soviet state.

The immediate transfer of power

1. Gorbachev returned to Moscow on 22 August and defended his reform record. His language still treated the Communist Party as capable of renewal.
2. Yeltsin publicly challenged that position and suspended the Russian Communist Party. The scene demonstrated which leader now controlled the political agenda.
3. Gorbachev resigned as party General Secretary on 24 August and urged the Central Committee to dissolve. The union legislature suspended party activity.
4. Russian authorities seized party offices, archives, media, and property. Resources that had supported union power moved under republican control.
5. The Soviet government recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in September. Their exit gained rapid international recognition.
6. Other republics accelerated independence declarations and preparations. Leaders feared being left inside a weakened union on worse terms.
7. Union ministries lost personnel, revenue, buildings, and command. Republican officials took control of enterprises and agencies within their territories.
8. Gorbachev still negotiated a possible confederation, but Yeltsin and other leaders had fewer reasons to preserve his presidency.
9. The failed coup destroyed conservative credibility and the party apparatus together. It also removed institutions that might have implemented a negotiated union.

Ukraine, Belavezha, and the CIS

1. Ukraine had declared independence on 24 August subject to a referendum. Its size, economy, population, military assets, and strategic position made its choice decisive.
2. On 1 December more than 90 percent of participating Ukrainian voters supported independence. Majorities appeared in every region, including Crimea.
3. Leonid Kravchuk won the Ukrainian presidency on the same day. He now possessed an electoral mandate to reject a union government.
4. Yeltsin concluded that Russia would not remain in a union where its institutions were constrained by Gorbachev and Ukraine had left. Russian interests and personal rivalry aligned.
5. On 8 December Yeltsin, Kravchuk, and Belarusian leader Stanislav Shushkevich met at Belavezha. They declared that the USSR had ceased to exist.
6. The agreement created the Commonwealth of Independent States. It proposed coordination among sovereign states rather than authority above them.
7. Gorbachev argued that three republics could not dissolve the union without constitutional procedure. He lacked institutions willing and able to enforce that claim.
8. On 21 December eleven republics signed the Alma-Ata Protocol and expanded the CIS. They addressed command of nuclear forces and practical succession.
9. The dissolution occurred through agreements among republican leaders as well as popular votes. It combined democratic claims, elite decisions, and institutional collapse.

The end of the Soviet presidency

1. Gorbachev negotiated the transfer of nuclear command and state functions during December. Preventing uncontrolled military fragmentation became an immediate priority.
2. On 25 December he announced his resignation in a televised address. He defended freedom, reform, and an end to totalitarian practices while regretting the union's dissolution.
3. The Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin that evening and the Russian tricolor replaced it. The image became the public symbol of state succession.
4. The Supreme Soviet formally recognized dissolution on 26 December. Union ministries and diplomatic representation passed into new arrangements.
5. Russia inherited the Soviet permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council with support from the other former republics. Nuclear weapons outside Russia required later agreements.
6. Citizens entered new states with disrupted supply chains, currencies, pensions, armed forces, and citizenship questions. Political dissolution did not settle the social and economic transition.
7. Some nationalities gained long sought statehood. Others became minorities inside new borders and faced unresolved territorial disputes.
8. The Cold War ended without a direct superpower war, but collapse created uncertainty across Eurasia. The consequences extended beyond the three days of the coup.
9. Gorbachev left office because his state no longer existed, not because one successor legally replaced him as union president. Republican sovereignty had overtaken the center.