Model Essay

Source A

Source B (excerpt from Harland)

Harland Province piloted OpenBallot, an online voting system for provincial elections.

• Eligible voters could vote remotely using HarID, a government digital identity, with two-step verification.
• The electoral commission said OpenBallot aimed to improve participation for students, shift workers and residents abroad.
• Voters received a receipt code that allowed them to confirm that their encrypted ballot was included in the final count, without revealing their vote choice.
• The commission emphasised that in-person voting remained available and that paper ballots were used for recount capability.
• Civil society observers were invited to review the system design and the post-election audit summary.
• Some parties argued that remote voting increases the risk of coercion in households and that security explanations are too technical for ordinary citizens to judge.

Source C (excerpt from Harland)

• Turnout increased from 61% to 66% province-wide, with the largest increase among 18–24 year olds (+9 percentage points).
• Thirty-eight percent of votes were cast via OpenBallot, with usage highest in urban areas.
• The audit found no evidence of tally manipulation, but recorded two denial-of-service attempts and one software configuration error that temporarily delayed receipt-code checks.
• A voter survey found that 72% of OpenBallot users said it was easy to use.
• Thirty-four percent of all respondents said they did not understand how the receipt code proves anything.
• Help-line calls spiked among older voters.
• Accessibility advocates reported difficulties for some users with assistive technologies.

Source D (excerpt from Harland’s competitor’s website)

• Elections are not only about counting votes but about public confidence and freedom from pressure.
• Remote voting shifts the voting booth into the home, where coercion can be invisible and unprovable.
• The receipt code may increase suspicion rather than trust if many citizens do not understand it.
• Unequal access matters even if in-person voting exists, because easier digital routes may advantage some groups over others.
• An audit summary is not the same as full accountability.
• Technical systems require ongoing, independent, properly funded, and adversarial scrutiny.
• Convenience is valuable, but without secrecy and legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary voters, OpenBallot risks turning participation into controversy rather than a civic act.

OpenBallot: Remote Voting with Digital ID (Harland Province Election, 2026)

Process

• Log in with HarID: Identity verification via government‑issued digital ID.
• Two-step verification: Enter a time‑sensitive code from a registered device.
• Select candidates: Choose desired candidates and referendum options.
• Encrypt and submit: Vote is cryptographically secured before transmission.
• Receipt code: Receive a confirmation code to verify the vote is recorded.

Safeguards

• Device checks ensuring security software compliance.
• Rate limits preventing rapid‑fire voting attempts.
• Independent audit providing external verification of system integrity.
• Paper backup ballots creating a physical trail for recounts and verification.

Risks

• Coercion at home, with vulnerable voters pressured by family or others.
• Device malware that could compromise or alter votes.
• Unequal access due to disparities in technology and internet availability.
• Limited public trust in audits and verification processes.

Turnout Change vs Previous Election

• Ages 18–24: +18%
• Ages 25–44: +10%
• Ages 45–64: +4%
• Ages 65+: +2%

Political participation depends on both security and legitimacy.

(d) Discuss whether Harland Province should continue and expand OpenBallot. With reference to all the sources (A–D) and your own knowledge of the Digital Society course, consider legitimacy, transparency and auditability, coercion risks, accessibility and digital divides, and how digital systems reshape governance and civic confidence.